
POSTHUMOUS WORKS
OF
FREDERICK II.
KING OF PRUSSIA

VOL. II.

266

THE
HISTORY
OF THE
SEVEN YEARS WAR.

PART I.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

BY

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P R E F A C E.

P R E F A C E.

I HAVE before written a narrative of the two wars which Prussia made on Silesia and Bohemia. This narrative was the work of a young man, and the consequence of that frenzy for writing which, in Europe, is become a kind of epidemic disease. After the peace of 1746 I renounced history, because that political intrigues, when they are unproductive, do not merit more consideration than do the cabals of private society ; and because that the interior administration of a state does not furnish sufficient materials for history. The war which happened in 1756 occasioned me to change my opinion. It had been preceded by so much artifice, and the number of our enemies was so superior to the forces of Prussia, that a history on subjects of such importance appeared to

me not unworthy of being transmitted to posterity. For this purpose, at the conclusion of each campaign, I wrote memoirs on the events it had produced, and while the memory of them was recent. But, these facts being strongly connected with political affairs, I was obliged to make the latter a part of my plan. In this work I have had two principal objects in view : the first was to demonstrate to posterity that the avoiding of this war did not depend upon me, and that the honour and the welfare of the state prevented my consenting to peace under other conditions than those stipulated when peace was concluded ; and the second to relate all military operations, as clearly and with as much precision as was possible, that I might leave an authentic collection of the advantageous and disadvantageous situations, as they occurred in the provinces and kingdoms where war was made, for the instruction of the house of Brandenbourg, whenever it may again have to contend with the house of Austria.

The success of any war depends greatly on the capacity of the general ; on a knowledge of the places he occupies, and on the art with which he may derive advantage from his situation ; either in preventing the enemy from taking such posts as might favour his purpose, or in choosing himself those most conducive to success. Numerous examples in proof of this assertion will be found in these memoirs. Little attention will be requisite to show the effect with which the Austrians took certain positions, and that with which the Prussians assumed certain others. May God grant that no second war, equally complicated and difficult with that we have lately terminated, should ever be seen ! It is not probable that any similar chain of causes should, in a short time, produce the same circumstances as those under which we were. When Prussia shall not have to oppose so many powers, she may always cover Silesia and the electorate of Brandenbourg, by immediately penetrating with her army into Bohemia. On an occasion

sion like this, the camps of Saxony and Bohemia, concerning which I have spoken so particularly, may be useful; and will abridge the labour of those who shall conduct the war, in which one of the things most difficult is, when war is to be carried on in a country but little known, to be well aware of which is the best road first to march. Positions are frequently obliged to be taken at a venture, for want of knowing which is good; and which are perhaps in the vicinity. Timidity is the consequence; and a camp ill chosen is exposed to the utmost peril: instead of which, when camps are by experience found to be good, every step is more decisive and more methodical. I must however observe, that camps are good or bad according to circumstances; as, for example, that of Torgau is admirable, when it can be filled with seventy thousand men; but defective when thirty thousand must be opposed to sixty thousand, because they will be too much dispersed, consequently weakened; and the enemy, if he please,

please, may force it on that side where it shall be the most feeble. A camp is like a garment, that ought neither to be too large nor too small for the wearer. If a choice must be made, however, it is better to have too many men than too few. There are other camps which cover a part of the ground, but which become defective if the enemy by his motions shall change his position : the camp of Landshut, admirable as it is for the covering of Lower Silesia, becomes bad and incapable of defence so soon as the Imperialists shall possess Glatz and Wartha, because that it will then be totally turned. In similar cases the judgment ought to dictate the part that should be taken. It ought particularly to be guarded against servile imitation, which is wrong. And wherefore? Because that generals never are placed in exactly similar situations. There may be something relative in their positions I allow; but examine them well, and infinite varieties will be found ; because that nature, in every sense fruitful, neither creates the same appearances

pearances nor repeats the same incidents. It would therefore be bad reasoning to say marshal Luxemburg was exactly situated as I am ; he acted in such a manner ; I will act the same. Past facts are good to store the imagination, and the memory ; they furnish a repository of ideas, whence a supply of materials may be obtained ; but which ought to be purified by passing through the strainer of the judgment. I therefore repeat, the details of the last war ought only to be employed as an augmentation of the magazine of military ideas ; and to prove the value of some principal positions, which will remain determinate so long as the country shall not change its face, and nature shall not be overwhelmed. It is exceedingly probable the Austrian generals will not depart from the method of marshal Daun, which is good past contradiction ; and that, in succeeding wars, they will be equally attentive to post themselves properly as they were in the last. This obliges me to observe that, a general would be wrong should he

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be in haste to attack the enemy in hilly posts, or on broken ground. I have sometimes, by necessity, been forced to this extremity; but, when war is made with equal powers, advantages more certain may be procured by stratagem and address, and without exposing an army to equal danger. The sum of many small advantages will be great. The attack of a well-defended post is beside a bone of hard digestion, and the assailant is liable to be repulsed and beaten. It is only to be carried by the sacrifice of from fifteen to twenty thousand men, which makes a wide breach in an army. Recruits, supposing they are to be plentifully obtained, will fill up numbers, but will not supply the qualities of the soldiers that have been lost. The kingdom becomes depopulated by renewing the army; the troops degenerate; and, if the war is long, the general will find himself at the head of ill-disciplined peasants, with whom he scarcely dares appear in face of the enemy. In any violent conjuncture, I grant, it is necessary to

to depart from rules, and to have recourse to desperate remedies ; as poison is given to the sick, when there are no other means of cure. But, such cases excepted, it is requisite, in my opinion, to proceed with more caution ; to weigh and to measure ; because that the general who allows the least to chance is the most able.

I have but another word, which relates to the style that I have adopted. I was so much offended by the words *I* and *me*, that I determined to speak of subjects that related to myself in the third person. In so long a work it would have been insupportable to have spoken continually in my own name. I made it a law to adhere scrupulously to the truth, and to be impartial ; because that the hatred and animosity of an author instructs no man ; and because that it would be weakness, even to pusillanimity, not to speak well of an enemy, and not to render him the justice he deserves. If in my own despite I have departed from this rule, posterity must pardon me, and correct me where I deserve

deserve correction. To add any thing more would be superfluous; and perhaps a work like this, meant only to be read by a few persons, stands in no need of a Preface.

Potsdam, March 3, 1764.

HISTORY
OF THE
SEVEN YEARS WAR.

CHAP. I.

*Internal Negotiations of Prussia and Austria,
during the Peace.*

THE peace enjoyed by Europe permitted the various powers to turn their attention to internal government. The king began by reforming those abuses which had been introduced into the general police. He laboured, by the aid of new establishments, to augment his finances ; he applied himself to restore military discipline ; to render the fortresses as perfect as possible ; and to collect all kinds of

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accoutrements, stores, and arms, the consumption of which while the war continued had been so prodigious.

Justice, ill administered during the preceding reign, and become the reverse of just, deserved particular cares and attention. People were accustomed to elude the laws. Attorneys made a shameful traffic of confidence : to be rich or poor was sufficient to gain or lose a cause. Such abuses, becoming daily more intolerable, called loudly for reform ; as well in the persons of the judges, advocates, and attorneys, as in the laws themselves ; which it was necessary to render more clear, and the formalities of which, not relating to the real question, and prolonging the suit, it was also necessary to retrench.

The king committed this labour to his great chancellor Cocceji, a man of integrity, whose virtue and probity were worthy of the noble ages of the Roman republic. Learned and enlightened, he seemed like Tribonianus, born for legislation, and the good of mankind. This sage of the laws undertook the painful and delicate work with so much zeal that, after one year's assiduous industry, the sovereign courts of justice, purged of those men by whom they had been disgraced, were supplied with virtuous magistrates ; a new code of laws, for all the

provinces under the Prussian dominion, was finished; and, after it had been approved by the states, promulgated. The prospect was extended to futurity; and, as experience teaches us that the best institutions decline, or become useless, if they are left in neglect, and if not restored to those first principles on which they were founded, a rule was made that there should be a general visitation, of the sovereign courts of justice, once in three years; that observation of the new laws might be enforced, and such officers of justice as were discovered to have been guilty of prevarication punished. This new order, introduced in the administration of justice, enforced the happiness of the people; and secured to each family its possessions. Every individual lived under the safeguard of the laws, for they were absolute.

However great the cares of the late king in regulating and arranging the finances had been, he had not effected all it was possible to effect. He had neither the time nor the means for concluding a work so great; and the improvements that still might be made were immense; as well respecting lands that were to be cleared as the establishment of manufactories, the extending of trade, and the encouraging of industry. The first years of the king's reign

were appropriated to war ; nor could he turn his attention to interior government, till he had first insured tranquillity. Along the Oder, from Swinemunde to Kustrin, were vast marshes ; which perhaps had, in all ages, lain uncultivated. A plan for clearing this country was formed. A canal was dug, from Kustrin to Wrietzen, by which these marshy lands were drained, and two thousand families were there settled. These settlements were continued from Schwedt to beyond Stettin, where twelve hundred additional families found ease and plenty. Thus was a small province gained, by industry, from ignorance and idleness.

The woollen manufactory, which was rather considerable, was in want of spinners. These were brought out of foreign countries, and were settled in different villages of two hundred families each. It had been a custom, time immemorial, in the dutchy of Magdebourg, for the inhabitants of Vogtland to come and gather in the harvest ; after which they returned home. The king gave these people settlements in the dutchy ; and thus procured the state a number of these foreigners.

By such various operations, the kingdom, during peace, acquired two hundred and eighty new villages. Nor did the care of the country occasion

occasion the towns to be neglected. A new town was built on the Swine, after which it was called Swinemunde, and was at the same time made a port, by digging the channel deeper, and cleansing the basin at the mouth of the Oder. The city of Stettin thus gained the tolls that had formerly been paid to the Swedes, in passing to Wolgast down the Peene, which greatly contributed to render its trade flourishing, and to attract foreigners. New manufactories were established in all the towns. Those for rich stuffs and velvets were found most suitable to the city of Berlin. Light velvets and plain stuffs were made at Potsdam. Splittergerber supplied all the provinces with the sugar which he refined at Berlin. A dimity manufactory rendered the city of Brandenbourg flourishing. Russian leather was dressed at Frankfort, on the Oder. Silk stockings and handkerchiefs were made at Berlin, Magdebourg, and Potsdam. The Wegeley manufactory was doubled. The planting of mulberry trees was encouraged throughout all the provinces. The clergy gave an example to the husbandmen, and taught them to rear that precious insect which originally comes from the Indies, and from the down of which silk is obtained. In places where wood was plentiful, but whence it could not be transported for the

want of navigable rivers, iron-foundries were established, which soon supplied the fortresses and the army with cast cannon, bullets, and bombs. In the principality of Minden and the county of Marck, new salt pits were discovered, and the salt was refined. The pits of Halle were brought to perfection, by the construction of buildings for the gradation of the salt, which saved wood. In a word, industry was encouraged in the capital and the kingdom.

The king enforced the right of market tolls, which the Saxons had disputed with the town of Magdebourg; and, by the means of duties established on the frontiers, the trade of the Prussian provinces was almost on a par with that of Saxony. The Embden company established an important trade with China. By diminishing the exportation duties at Stettin, Königsberg, and Colberg, the revenues of these places were almost doubled. The result of these various operations of finance was, without including the revenues of Silesia and East Friseland, or loading the people with any new tax whatever, that the crown had acquired an increase of revenue, in 1756, of twelve hundred thousand crowns; and, after the inhabitants of all the provinces had been numbered, the sum total was found to amount to five millions of souls.

Thus,

Thus, since the riches of a state consist in the number of its inhabitants, Prussia might be estimated twice as powerful as it had been, during the latter part of the reign of Frederic William, the father of the king.

The laws and the finances did not wholly absorb the attention of the king; the army, that instrument of fame and preservation, was not neglected. The king was particularly watchful that discipline and subordination should be maintained, in each province. The troops were regularly assembled every year; and in the fields of peace were taught the grand evolutions and manœuvres of war. The infantry was exercised in various motions; and taught to form; to attack in plains and on heights; to defend villages and intrenchments; pass rivers; cover marches with reversed columns; to retreat, and, in fine, to perform every movement which was necessary to be made in the face of an enemy.

The cavalry was exercised in different attacks, close and open; was taught to reconnoitre; to search for forage, green and dry; and to form, and take points of fight on prescribed lines. In those cantons that were the most populous, the supernumeraries amounted to thirty-six men for each company, and in the

least to twenty-four ; so that, though there were no new levies, the total number of these supernumeraries amounted to ten thousand men. Each battalion, each regiment of cavalry, was headed by old commanders ; approved officers, brave and meritorious. The corps of captains consisted of experienced men ; men of sound understanding ; men of valour. The subalterns were select ; several of them possessed great capacity, and were worthy of rising to superior stations. In a word, the industry and emulation which reigned throughout the army were admirable.

Among the generals it was not the same : although there were some who possessed real merit, the majority had much valour, but much indolence. It was the custom that rank must be obtained by seniority, and not by abilities. This was an ancient abuse, which had been of no prejudice in the preceding wars ; because that the king, acting only with one army, had no need of many detachments ; and because that the troops and generals of the Austrians, whom he opposed, were not above mediocrity, and had entirely neglected tactics. The king attracted marshal Keith from the Russian service ; and this was an excellent acquisition. He was a man of mild and virtuous manners ;

an able officer, possessed of the greatest politeness, and of heroic valour in the day of battle.

The corps of artillery had been augmented ; the king increased it to three battalions ; the last of which was destined for garrison towns. It was well exercised, and in good condition ; but not sufficiently numerous, for that profusion and various species of artillery which fashion soon after introduced into armies. The number ought to have been double ; but, as such had not been the custom in preceding wars, and as these two battalions would formerly have been sufficient for service, augmentation was not at first thought of.

The works of Schweidnitz were built during the peace ; and those of Neiss, Cosel, Glatz, and Glogau, improved. Schweidnitz was intended as a deposit for the army, should the war be carried into Bohemia on that side ; and, as the Austrians had shewn but little capacity, during the last war, for the attack and defence of fortresses, the works were but lightly constructed. This in reality was very ill reasoning ; for fortresses are not built for a day, but for duration. And who might warrant that the empress queen should not hereafter acquire an able engineer, who should introduce an art in

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which the Austrian army was deficient, and render that art common? Thus were faults committed; repentance was the consequence. To reason more solidly was learned from experience.

On the other part, it was foreseen that a well conditioned well maintained army was not alone sufficient for war; but that stores, provisions, arms, and clothing, in reserve were necessary. This was the cause that stores of all sorts, furniture, saddles, stirrups, bits, boots, cartouch-boxes, belts and the like were amassed. The arsenal contained fifty thousand muskets, twenty thousand sabres, twelve thousand swords, as many pistols, carbines, and bandoleers, and in a word whatever was necessary for periodical supply, and which cannot always be obtained in time of need, with sufficient promptitude. A train of heavy artillery had been cast, consisting of eighty battering pieces and twenty mortars, and deposited in the fortress of Neiss. The gunpowder collected amounted to fifty-six thousand quintals, which were distributed through the different fortresses of the kingdom. The magazines of provisions contained thirty-six thousand winspels of flour, and twelve thousand of oats; so that, by taking these previous measures, every thing was prepared for the foreboded

foreboded war, which seemed at no great distance. The king even made an augmentation in the garrison regiments, in 1755; those of Silesia were increased to eight battalions, those of Prussia to three, and those of the electoral marche to two; in the whole thirteen battalions.

In a poor country, the sovereign finds no resource in the purse of his subjects; and his duty is, by prudence and good œconomy, to set apart supplies for those extraordinary expences which will become indispensable. The ant amasses in summer what it consumes in winter; and a king ought to provide during peace for the expenditures of war. This article, which unfortunately was of such importance, was not forgotten; and Prussia was, of itself, capable of making some campaigns. In a word, she was ready to appear in the lists on the first signal, and to break a lance with her opponents. How useful this precaution was will be seen hereafter; as will the necessity of the king of Prussia, from the odd situation of his provinces, to continue armed and prepared for every event, that he might not become the sport of his neighbours and his foes. He ought indeed to have made greater preparations, had the state been capable of such; for, in the person

person of the empress queen, the king found an ambitious and vindictive enemy, who was the more dangerous because she was a woman, headlong in her opinions, and implacable.

Too true it was that she had long been secretly preparing those grand projects in her cabinet which were afterward to be put in act. Devoured by ambition, she fought for fame in every path. She imparted an order to her revenues which had been unknown among her ancestors; and, by excellent arrangements, not only repaired what she had lost in the provinces ceded to the king of Prussia and the king of Sardinia, but, had even considerably augmented her wealth, Count Haugwitz was made comptroller general of the finances. Under his administration, the revenues of the empress queen amounted to thirty-six millions of florins; or twenty-four millions of crowns. The emperor Charles VI. her father, though possessed of the kingdom of Naples, of Servia, and of Silesia, had not so much,

The emperor her husband, not daring to interfere with state affairs, undertook those of trade. He annually collected large sums from his Tuscan dominions; which he turned to good account in commerce. He established manufactures, and lent on interest. He contracted

tracted for the army-clothing, horses, arms, and uniforms of the whole Imperial army. In partnership with one count Boltza and a merchant of the name of Schimmelmann, he farmed the custom-duties of Saxony; and, in the year 1756, he even sold forage and flour to the army of the king, then at war with the queen his wife. During the war, he advanced very considerable sums to this princess, on good security. In a word he was banker to the court.

In the preceding wars, the empress queen had felt the necessity of better discipline; for which purpose she chose active generals, capable of introducing it among her troops. Those old officers who were ill-fitted for the command were dismissed, with pensions, and replaced by young men of family, full of ardour, and the love of military renown. Camps were annually formed in the provinces, where the troops were exercised by commissary inspectors, well versed in the grand manœuvres of war. The empress, at various times, repaired herself to the camps of Prague and Olmutz; that she might animate the troops by her presence, and donations. She, better than any sovereign, understood the value of such-like distinctions. She rewarded the officers, who were recommended by her generals; and every where excited emulation,

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the employment of talents, and the desire of pleasing.

A school of artillery was at the same time formed, under the direction of the prince of Lichtenstein. The corps was made to consist of six battalions, and he carried the use of artillery to that unheard-of excess which it has lately attained. His zeal for the empress queen occasioned him to expend, for this purpose, more than a hundred thousand crowns of his own property. That nothing might be neglected which any way related to the army, the empress queen founded a college for the young nobility, near Vienna, where they were instructed in all the arts which have any reference to war. Hither she drew able professors of geometry, fortification, geography, and history, who formed pupils of capacity; and thus the college became a nursery of officers.

By these various cares, the army acquired a degree of perfection before unknown, under the emperors of the house of Austria; and a woman executed plans worthy of a man of genius. This princess, who extended her views to every part of administration, ill satisfied with the manner in which foreign and political affairs had hitherto been managed, chose count Kaunitz, toward the conclusion of the year

1755, and gave him the patent of prime minister, that every branch of government might be under the inspection of one man. We shall, in its place, have occasion to bring the reader more particularly acquainted with a person who enacted so great a part. He partook of all the sentiments of his sovereign ; and had the art to flatter her passions and gain her confidence. When he became minister, he laboured to form alliances, and to exclude the king of Prussia, that he might prepare for the plan, which she had so much at heart, of recovering Silesia, and of humbling this sovereign. But, as this properly belongs to the following chapter, we shall here drop the subject.

Thus were two powers during peace preparing for war ; like two gladiators, who impatiently burn to employ the swords they are sharpening.

C H A P. II.

*Of War and Politics; from the Year 1746 to
the Year 1756.*

1746. **T**HE peace of Dresden, like most treaties which are made between sovereigns, suspended hostilities without destroying the seeds of discord, which existed between Austria and Prussia. Whatever dissimulation the court of Vienna might employ, the loss of Silesia dwelt too sorely on the memory to permit animosity and hatred to be smothered, or that they should not at length flame forth. Properly speaking, the war between these two powers was not ended; it did but change its appearance; and, though armies were no longer combating in the field, the Austrians in their cabinet continued hostilities. Stratagem, intrigue, artifice, were the arms they employed to embroil Prussia with every court of Europe; and, if possible, to raise her up enemies even to the very ends of the earth. Of this we shall bring sufficient testimony. But, that we may employ order and perspicuity in what we shall say, we first will take a retrospective view of particular events, which happened in

the various courts of Europe. As, after the peace of Dresden, war was still carried on, between the courts of Vienna and London on one part, and Paris and Madrid on the other, we find ourselves obliged to give a sketch of this war, that we may omit nothing which may conduce to the better understanding of this history.

The Imperial and allied armies did not prosper in Flanders, where they were opposed by marshal Saxe. Toward the end of the year 1746, the marshal gained the battle of Rœcoux. The loss of this battle was in part attributed to the prince of Waldeck, who was ill posted, and in part to the Austrians, who did not sustain the Dutch. Prince Charles of Lorraine, after having been a spectator of the defeat of the latter, sent prince Louis of Brunswic to cover their retreat; which he did so effectually that the allies gained Maestricht, without the French, who pursued them, being able to come up.

1747. Marshal Saxe opened the next campaign by taking most of the towns of Dutch Flanders. Louis XV. headed the army in person. The presence of the king and his ministers did but increase the embarrassment of marshal Saxe, and the expence of the army.

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The courtiers filled the camp with their cabals, and counteracted the general. A court so numerous daily demanded ten thousand ratios for the coach-horses. But neither the court of Versailles nor the enemies of France could prevent marshal Saxe from preserving his superiority during that campaign. His first project was to besiege Maestricht; and, that he might deceive the enemy, he feigned an attempt on Bergen op-zoom. The stratagem was understood by the duke of Cumberland, who hastily marched into the neighbourhood of Maestricht. The marshal seeing himself anticipated, as hastily quitted his camp at Malines, and marched beyond St. Tron to the heights of Henderen. The allies, who on the eve were at the commandery of Yons, neglected to occupy that important height. Undecided in their choice of the field of battle, and wavering in their resolutions, they set fire to villages and extinguished it; placed troops in these villages and withdrew them; and, on the morning of the action, after having set the village of Lafeld on fire, they quenched the flames, and placed men in it, though at the distance of two thousand paces in the front of their army. At this village the battle began. Marshal Saxe, a witness of the inconsistent motions of the allies, imagined

imagined Lafeld was destitute of troops, proposed to seize it, and found his mistake. The attack was made immediately ; and, by persisting and sacrificing their men, the French carried the village, which decided the victory.

The allies retired to Maestricht, without being pursued by marshal Saxe ; because that the count de Clermont Tonnerre did not think proper to charge the enemy with his cavalry, notwithstanding the reiterated orders he received. His disobedience to his general procured him the dignity of marshal of France. Louis XV. therefore properly speaking only gained, by his victory, the barren advantage of remaining on the field : and the duke of Cumberland, though vanquished, preserved Maestricht from a siege.

That he might not still let the campaign pass uselessly away, Saxe returned toward Bergen op-zoom, the siege of which he committed to marshal Löwendahl. The excellent works of Cöhorn, and the admirable wit with which he had constructed the mines, were alone almost sufficient for defence. Cronstrom was the governor. He was ninety years of age, and his mind and his body were alike infirm. The garrison was none of the best, and the officers, wanting experience, knew not whether they

ought to defend themselves by their mines or by inundation. They resembled the famous ass of the schools, that is said to have died between two bundles of hay, unable to determine on which to feed. The French made an assault, and carried the place almost without resistance. The governor scarcely had time to escape, in his nightcap and gown. This exploit terminated the success of the French, for the present year, in Flanders.

Fortune was more favourable to the Imperialists in Italy, and Provence. It is true that the revolution of Genoa occasioned the expedition of count Braun* on Toulon to fail. This revolution was the effect of chance. The Austrians ill-treated some citizens, who were at work in embarking artillery for Antibes. The people assembled, took the part of the insulted citizens, and, in their first fury, drove the marquis of Botta and the whole Austrian garrison out of Genoa. This was the cause that the army of Austria was in want of provisions and ammunition; and that count Braun quitted Provence. On his return, he laid siege to Genoa; but did not take the city. France sent succours thither, under de Boufflers; and

* A different spelling for Brown. T.

afterward

afterward under the duke de Richlieu ; who both took such proper measures that they rendered the efforts of the Austrians abortive.

The French and Spanish troops, headed by the chevalier de Belleisle, wished to open a road into Italy after the retreat of count Braun. The French first approached the pass of Exilles. De Belleisle, finding this post ill defended, thought it might safely be insulted. He sent to the Spaniards that, with the French, they might attack it with their united forces ; but they deferred joining him for three days. This gave time to the king of Sardinia to reinforce those who defended the pass ; and the defence of which was so important. The Spaniards came up ; and, though circumstances were altered since de Belleisle had sent for this reinforcement, he would not be thought in an error : he therefore attacked the Sardinians vigorously ; and, after having employed every means which daring courage could inspire, he was killed while he was, with his own hands, tearing up a pallisado of the enemy's intrenchment. Unable to surmount obstacles which nature and art had raised, these efforts only served to augment the loss of the French and Spaniards, who were every where repulsed ; and the number of officers of condition, and of the first families, who

fell there, put all France in mourning. The public, often unjust and full of prejudices, apparently ill informed, pronounced this enterprise rash: it was only bold, and could not have failed, if de Belleisle could have executed his project when it was first conceived; and had not the tardiness of the Spaniards occasioned him to lose the laurels he was so near gathering.

1748. The French indemnified themselves in Flanders, for their ill success in the neighbourhood of the Alps. The genius of marshal Saxe had gained an ascendancy over the foes of France. He opened the campaign by marching his army in several columns; one of which menaced Luxembourg; another Bois le Duc; and a third Venlo. Their motions led them collectively to Maestricht, which they invested and began the siege. But, however brilliant were the successes of marshal Saxe, his very triumphs became burdensome to France. This was the eighth campaign, and the continuance of a war the commencement of which had been so fatal exhausted the nation. All the belligerent powers were, in like manner, weary. The cause of quarrel had so often changed that they at length found they had none. The frenzy had subsided; they thought

thought seriously of peace, and began a negotiation. Each power felt its secret wounds ; for the cure of which tranquillity was necessary. The English feared to increase their national debt ; that master-piece of ideal wealth, the abuse of which prognosticated bankruptcy. The Imperial court, supported by the subsidies of England, would indeed have continued the war, so long as her allies would have supplied the means. She however consented to peace, in order to turn the resources she possessed to the execution of a project she had more at heart than the war of Flanders. France sensibly felt her great expences ; and she had the more to fear because of the famine in her southern provinces ; the ports of which were blockaded by the fleets of England.

To those reasons of state, which the ministry of Versailles publicly alleged, there were others to be added, more secret and still more powerful. Madame de Pompadour had lately become mistress to the king ; and she dreaded lest a continuation of the war should engage Louis XV. to head his army every year. There is danger in absence for favourites and mistresses. She well understood that, to fix the heart of her lover, it was necessary to remove every pretext by which they might be separated ;

in a word it was necessary to make peace, to effect which she employed all her power. When St. Severin departed from Versailles for Aix la Chapelle, in quality of plenipotentiary, she said to him—"Remember, Sir, not to return "without peace; for this the king will have, "at any price."

A congress was held at Aix la Chapelle, Maestricht surrendered, and peace was proclaimed. By this treaty, France restored all her conquests, in Flanders and Brabant, to the house of Austria: in return for which, the empress queen ceded the dutchies of Parma and Placenza, to don Philip; but the reversion of them was secured to the house of Austria; for it was stipulated that, when don Carlos should ascend the throne of Spain, don Philip should succeed him in the kingdom of Naples; and it is remarkable that this article, thus conceived, was ratified without either the participation or consent of the kings of Spain and Naples, or of don Philip. They therefore testified their discontent, and protested against every measure taken at Aix la Chapelle, as contrary to the independence of their crowns.

The interests of France and England were regulated in the seventh article; in which England engaged to give up Cape Breton to the French;

French; and the two crowns mutually guaranteed their American possessions, according to the tenor of the treaty of Utrecht. They agreed to name commissaries, in order to settle some disputes relative to the Canadian limits. The twenty-second article contained the guarantee of Silesia, by all the powers.

A very small degree of attention will shew that this peace, hastily made, was a precipitate work; and that the various powers sacrificed their future interests to present embarrassment. They extinguished the conflagration which raged through Europe; but they amassed combustibles, that must catch fire on the first occasion. Nothing more was necessary than the death of the king of Spain to excite new troubles; and the indeterminate limits of Canada could not fail, at some period, to embroil the French and English. An additional campaign, or resolution in negotiating, will sometimes put a long period to the disputes of sovereigns. But palliatives are often preferred to specifics; and a truce signed by impatience to a permanent peace.

By this war, the court of Vienna had lost the dutchies of Silesia, Parma, and Placenza. This diminution of power she could ill endure; and, as she accused the English of being the principal

pal cause of this loss, who she affirmed, and not without reason, sacrificed the interests of their allies to their own, she became dissatisfied with that alliance, and was induced to sound the shore at Versailles, and to attempt to detach that power from Prussia: attempting, also, at the same time, to find some expedient that might conciliate the interests of the two courts. Count Kaunitz, to whom this project most appertained, being plenipotentiary for the empress queen at Aix la Chapelle, did not delay making the first overtures to St. Severin, by insinuating that, should France and Austria come to a good understanding, arrangements might be made, between the two courts, for their mutual advantage; according to which Flanders and Brabant might become subject to the most christian king; provided the king of Prussia should be obliged to restore Silesia to the empress queen. The lure would have been very tempting at Versailles, had not Louis XV. weary of the war he had lately concluded, dreaded to begin a new war, for the execution of this project; so that, advantageous as it might seem, it was declined by St. Severin.

Count Kaunitz stopt not here. Frivolous in his pleasures, but profound in his projects, he was sent as ambassador to Paris, where he laboured,

bourne, with infinite assiduity and address, to erase the irreconcileable hatred of the French ; which, from the time of Francis I. and Charles V. had subsisted between the houses of Bourbon and Habsbourg. He frequently repeated, to the ministry, that the aggrandizement of Prussia was their own work ; that they had been repaid by ingratitude ; and that they could not derive any advantage from an ally who should act for his own interest solely. At other times he told them, as if forced by conviction to speak—
“ It is time, gentlemen, you should be relieved
“ from the pupillage in which you are held,
“ by the kings of Prussia, Sardinia, and other
“ petty princes. Their politics only tend to
“ sow discord among the great powers ; by
“ which they themselves may be aggrandized.
“ We make war for their gain. Did we under-
“ stand each other, we might mutually accede
“ to proposals, which would deprive the first
“ powers of Europe of all subject for quarrel,
“ and might serve as a basis to a durable
“ peace.”

These ideas at first appeared strange, to a nation that, from habit and a succession of wars, had long regarded the Imperial house as a perpetual enemy. Though the French ministry was flattered by the supposition that these great

powers would give laws to Europe, and render peace perpetual, there were other considerations by which they were held in constraint. Count Kaunitz however returned continually to the charge ; and, by his frequent repetition of the same sentiments, they became familiar to the court of France ; which insensibly was persuaded that these two great powers were not so natively inimical as their forefathers had imagined. Time was necessary for this shoot to bud and grow. The doctrine of count Kaunitz continually made proselytes, and occasioned a coolness between the courts of Versailles and Berlin ; which was particularly remarked when lord Tyrconnel was sent to Berlin. This ambassador, very angry at the supposition of pillage, which count Kaunitz had mentioned with such contempt, incessantly and affectedly spoke of the independence of great powers. He one day was imprudent enough to hold discourse, the sense of which was—“ Should the king of Prussia discover the least tergiversation, we shall permit his downfall, and he will be crushed.”

The French preserved the appearance of friendship and complaisance to the king, although the court of Versailles, no longer supposing an alliance with the empress queen impossible,

possible, no longer felt its former repugnance to that alliance. Such was the state of affairs in France, when the vexations of the English obliged Louis XV. to have recourse to arms.

The court of Vienna, not finding all that facility in the court of Versailles with which she had flattered herself, and ever assiduous in making good her party, turned toward Petersburg, where she employed every means to strengthen her union with Russia, and to excite a quarrel between the empress Elizabeth and the king of Prussia. The Russian minister was certain that his hatred to Prussia would be rewarded ; and the Austrians increased his salary in proportion to his bitterness. Those who were at the head of the government, seeking therefore only to inflame the courts of Petersburg and Berlin, found the pretext they sought in a subject which was, in itself, very innocent. The necessity of establishing a balance of power, in the north, had occasioned France, Prussia, and Sweden, to form a triple alliance. Count Bestuchef at this pretended to take umbrage. He filled the mind of the empress with fears, and proceeded to such excess that the Russians immediately formed considerable camps, in Finland, on the Swedish frontiers, and in Livonia,

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on the frontiers of Prussia. These appearances were afterward annually renewed.

1750. Under these critical circumstances a difference arose, between Russia and Sweden, concerning the limits of Finland, which had not been accurately defined, by the treaty of Abo. This unfortunate pretence gave Russia the liberty of beginning a war, whenever she should think proper. The court of Vienna fomented these dissensions, purposely to disquiet the king of Prussia, and induce him to take some false step, that might involve him in a quarrel with Russia. The empress queen however contented herself with feeding the discontent of the two courts, without rashly hastening a rupture. The situation of the king was delicate, and embarrassing; it might have become dangerous, had he not been fortunate enough to gain information of the most secret designs of his enemies, by procuring the whole correspondence between the ministers of the courts of Saxony, Vienna, and Petersburg.

Count * * * felt himself humbled by the peace of Dresden, was jealous of the puissance of the king, and laboured, in concert with the courts of Vienna and Petersburg, to communicate that hatred and envy by which he was devoured. This minister breathed nothing but

but war, and flattered himself he might profit by the first troubles in Europe, to abase a neighbour so dangerous to Saxony. He well understood that electorate would not be spared, and that the first efforts of the Prussians would be on that side ; yet did he suffer the army to moulder away. We will not examine how far his conduct was consistent. He ought not to have been ignorant that every state deceives itself which, instead of depending on its proper strength, hopes protection from that of its allies.

Thus there were no secrets with which the king was not acquainted ; and the frequent information he received served him as a compass, by which to direct his course, amid the rocks he had to avoid ; and to prevent him from supposing mere appearances indicated a design against him of immediately declaring war. Yet the influence of the court of Vienna, over that of Petersburg, daily increased ; which might naturally happen, because the mind of the minister was prepared to receive such impressions as they might endeavour to inspire him with, against Prussia. Count Bestuchef had suspected the king's ambassador, baron Mardefeld, of holding intelligence with the marquis de la Chetardie, to dispossess him of his post. In order

order to revenge this personal affront, he prevailed on the empress to conclude an alliance with the courts of Vienna and London. This treaty, made in 1746, was for two reasons advantageous to Russia: first, because the union of the house of Austria was convenient to Russia, that their powers might jointly oppose all attempts of the Porte; and, in the second place, because of the English subsidies, which afterward inundated Petersburg. Affairs being in this situation, it was not difficult for the empress queen to break off all correspondence between Prussia and Russia. Not all the cautions which the king could take, under such dangerous circumstances, nor the continual propriety of his conduct toward the court of Petersburg, could prevent matters coming to a crisis.

1753. A man of obscure birth, invested with the character of Russian ambassador, was employed by count Bestuchef to effect this purpose. This ambassador, ordered to seize the first occasion of coming to a rupture, obeyed these orders, that he might fulfil the intentions of his court. The king held a festival at Charlottenburg, on occasion of the marriage of prince Henry with the princess of Hesse. Hither the foreign ministers came. The proper

officer had orders to invite them all to supper. He acquitted himself of his commission ; but could not find the Russian ambassador, who had departed purposely half an hour before the others. On the morrow, this ambassador declared he could no more appear at court, after the insult given to the empress in his person ; and that he should wait the return of his courier from Petersburg, ultimately to regulate his conduct according to the orders he should receive. The courier arrived ; and the Russian ambassador immediately left Berlin clandestinely, escorted as he passed through the city by the secretaries of the Austrian and English embassies.

His departure obliged the king in like manner to recal his ambassador from Petersburg. No sooner were the Austrians freed in Russia from the Prussian ambassador, who was a curb upon them, than they gave the rein to their ill-will, and blushed not to propagate falsehoods and calumnies the most atrocious. To envenom the mind of the empress Elizabeth against the king, they persuaded her he had been concerned in the conspiracy against her life, that he might restore prince Iwan to the throne. The empress, who was of an easy and indolent

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character, believed their assertions, not willing to take the trouble of examining the truth, and conceived an irreconcileable hatred to the king. France at that time had no ambassador at Petersburg, and the Swedish ambassador there was rather Russian than Swedish, consequently very little proper to serve the king ; he had therefore no means of access to the empress, or of freeing her from the error into which she had been led, by the ambassador of Austria and his creatures.

The court of Vienna, satisfied with the sentiments of animosity and hatred with which she had inspired the court of Petersburg against Prussia, was too artful to proceed farther. She contented herself with having disposed minds for misunderstandings, but would not precipitate the quarrel, that she might conclude her interior arrangements, and wait a favourable opportunity of giving birth to her vast projects. Thus did this court agitate all Europe, and secretly form a confederation against Prussia, to which the first important event was to give effect.

The differences between Sweden and Russia concerning the frontiers of Finland were however amicably concluded ; but toward the end of the year 1756, a kind of revolution happened

pened in this kingdom, of which we are obliged to take some notice, because that its consequences influenced the general affairs of Europe: it happened as follows.

The court had long been on ill terms with the senators of the French faction, because of the vacant post of major-general, which the king had destined for M. von Lieven, and the senate for count Fersen. The senate carried the day; and the court, highly piqued at the affront, took every future occasion of counteracting the French faction. In 1755, counts Brahe and Horn and the sieur von Wrangle, with many lords of the first families of the kingdom attached to the court faction, led it to hope for a superiority in the diet, by electing a marshal who should be entirely at its devotion. It happened however totally the reverse, and count Fersen, the enemy of the court, obtained that office, by the intrigues and support of the French party.

In this diet, which began on the 17th of October 1755, the senate, proud of its superiority, presented a memorial to the states, that the grand dispute between the king and the senate, relative to the appointment to places, might come to a decision. As the judges were all at the disposal of the French ambassador,

the senate triumphed. An abusive use was made of victory, and that shadow of authority which the king till then had enjoyed, according to the laws of the kingdom, was diminished. The insolence of these magistrates went so far as to strip the queen of the crown jewels, and of those with which she had been presented. But little was wanting, to the contempt in which sovereign majesty was held, for these ambitious senators to have undertaken its total destruction.

Such outrageous proceedings made a very strong impression upon the court and its adherents, and particularly on the minds of counts Brahe and Horn, and the sieur von Wrangle, who assembled in the first emotions of indignation, and by one bold attempt resolved to change the form of government. The king had not a sufficient ascendancy to prevail on them to be more temperate. Their measures, tumultuously concerted, were still worse executed; and with a mixture of timidity and temerity they hesitated in the moment of action. An enterprize deferred is usually discovered. They were betrayed by some feeble friends, in whom they had confided. The senate took vigorous measures to preserve itself from every attempt. Count Brahe was arrested.

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The sieur von Wrangle and other lords of the party had the good fortune to escape. The name of the king appeared in the depositions of the conspirators. Count Brahe and several persons of an obscure birth perished on the scaffold ; and the king was entirely stripped of the prerogatives which he and his predecessor had enjoyed, according to the form of government established after the death of Charles XII.

From that time M. de Havrincourt, the French ambassador, was in reality king of Sweden ; he governed the nation with despotism, and afterward engaged in the German war in an irregular manner, and in contradiction to the constitution. This could not have happened had the lawful king preserved the authority which was legitimately his due. The only service the king of Prussia could render his brother-in-law was to represent, to the court of Versailles, that the arrogant conduct of its minister, which set all Sweden in commotion, ought in decency to be changed ; but France was better pleased to see its ambassador at the head of the kingdom than the lawful king.

The preceding year (1754) another dispute, but less vexatious, had happened between Prussia and Denmark. This related to a law-suit the countess of Bentinck had instituted against

her husband. An estate, situated on the frontiers of East Friseland, had been ceded by this lady to the count; but she afterward repented of the formal contract into which she had entered. The judges condemned the estate to sequestration. The king, as director of the circle of Westphalia, was to see justice done. The court of Vienna gave this commission to the king of Denmark, who sent troops thither that were anticipated by the Prussians. The king of Denmark took fire, and, had he not been withheld by moderation, he would have employed threats. The parties were appeased however by the mediation of France. Every body was satisfied; but the countess of Bentinck, who loved chicanery, broke the agreement that had been accomplished. She carried the cause to Vienna, whence she returned into her county; and, as no person seemed disposed to interfere, the suit remained undetermined.

1754, and 1755. It seemed that, during the peace, that spirit of discord which spread throughout Europe had divided all courts. The king had disputes with England, which he believed would have occasioned a quarrel between Prussia and that nation. During the last war, the English privateers had taken some ships which belonged to Prussian merchants. The

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English were both judge and party in their own cause; in so much that their court of admiralty declared the ships were lawful prizes. The king, after having made proper remonstrances to the court of London, entered into negotiation. The English would not relax, and treated what was alleged concerning the illegality of their proceedings with little respect. After ineffectually exhausting every mode of conciliation, no other expedient remained, for the indemnification of the Prussian subjects, but to put the sum which the king owed the English in sequestration, and which he had engaged to pay, according to the peace of Breslau. This was the restitution of one million eight hundred thousand crowns, borrowed by the house of Austria on Silesian mortgages, for the support of the war against the Turks, in 1737 and 1738. The last liquidation, of three hundred thousand crowns, which remained to be paid was stopped. The English were irritated. This gave place to warm declarations on each part. The Austrian ambassador at London was very active in empoisoning the dispute; which perhaps might have had disagreeable consequences, had they not been diverted by a more serious quarrel, between France and England, relative to Canada.

1755. The very duke of Mecklenbourg, reposing on the protection he enjoyed from the Imperial court, thought proper to cavil with the king. The subject was the rights which the king's ancestors, from time immemorial, had been in possession of; that is of recruiting in Mecklenbourg. This the duke, at the instigation of the court of Vienna, opposed; and the king administered justice in his own behalf. Some of the inhabitants of Mecklenbourg were carried off for soldiers; and certain land-bailliffs, who opposed the enrolment of the peasants, were imprisoned, in 1756. The duke made loud complaints; but perceiving that they terminated in nothing, he thought proper to come to an accommodation, and the affair was amicably concluded.

Soon after, when the empress queen perceived the war between France and England on the point of breaking out, searching some pretence of quarrel with Prussia, she persuaded the duke of Mecklenbourg to lay his complaints before the diet of Ratisbon. The court of Vienna was desirous this matter should be considered as a violation of the peace of Westphalia, and serve her as a pretext for declaring war against the king; and at the same time of claiming succours from those powers, by which

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this peace had been guarantied. We shall hereafter see that, though this allegation failed, the court of Vienna had no difficulty in finding another. The opportunity so impatiently expected was not long before it presented itself, and was eagerly seized. When sovereigns are determined to come to a rupture, they will not hesitate concerning materials for a manifesto. They decide, make war, and leave the care of their justification to some laborious civilian.

Our reason for not having hitherto mentioned Holland is that, after the war of 1740, and particularly after the death of the stadholder, the Dutch made no figure in Europe.

We have only succinctly to touch on a singular calamity which befel Portugal, and which threatened the kingdom with destruction. An earthquake so violent happened there that the city of Lisbon was laid in ruins. Houses, churches, palaces, were overthrown, swallowed up, or devoured by the flames, which issued from the earth's entrails. Between fifteen and twenty thousand people perished. Several other towns and villages of this kingdom were shaken, or thrown down. This earthquake was felt along the sea-coast, to the frontiers of Holland, and could only be attributed to the efforts of a subterranean fire; which, shut up in

in the bowels of the earth, had dug itself a channel, and formed a gulph under Portugal, where its efforts to escape were exerted. Posterity perhaps may behold a volcano on the place where Lisbon now stands. But it may be said that the plagues of Heaven were not sufficient to afflict this wretched globe. Soon afterward the impious hands of man were armed by their own wickedness; they mutually murdered each other for a vile quantity of dirt. Hatred, obstinacy, and revenge, made them proceed to the utmost excess. Europe was deluged with blood; and moral evil, to which the human race became victims, greatly surpassed the physical evil which Lisbon had felt with so much rigour.

C H A P. III.

Cause of the Rupture between France and England.

Negotiation of Lord Holderness. Alliance between Prussia and England. Offers of M. Rouillé. Embassy of the Duke of Nivernois. France offended. War declared against England. Cape Breton taken, by the Duke de Richlieu. The English, terrified by flat-bottomed Boats, send for the Hanoverians and Hessians. Russia strengthens herself on the Frontiers of Prussia. The Austrians assemble two Armies in Bohemia. Intelligence obtained from the Archives of Dresden, that discovers all the Mystery of Iniquity. Quarrel with Austria. Reasons for declaring War. First Dispositions of the Troops. Plan of the Campaign.

1755. **A**FTER having given a sketch of the situation of the several powers of Europe, at the commencement of the year 1755, it is necessary we should take a retrospect of those dissensions, and their causes, which occasioned the war between France and England. Present affairs are so intimately related to past that, for this purpose, we must go back to the treaty of Utrecht, to arrive at the origin

of this quarrel; which was the disputes of the French and English concerning the limits of Canada.

Louis XIV. in haste to conclude the treaty of Utrecht, that he might detach queen Ann from the grand alliance, ordered his plenipotentiaries to sign, and not to object. These plenipotentiaries employed equivocal terms to indicate the limits of Canada, concerning which the difference arose. The gain of France by this treaty was superior to all her possessions in a country so sterile; but no sooner were the troubles of Europe appeased than the English and French, each, interpreted the article of the limits of their American possessions to their own advantage. There were some contentions between the colonies of the two nations; though these petty quarrels did not degenerate into open hostilities.

By the treaty of Aix la Chapelle every difficulty ought to have been removed. The ambassador St. Severin and his colleagues, in conformity to the reiterated orders they received from France, to accelerate the signing of the preliminaries, referred the decision of the limits of these colonies to the examination of commissaries, who were to be appointed by the two courts, after the conclusion of the peace. The

commissaries, being assembled, instead of conciliating the two nations by their conferences, did but augment their mutual discontent and bitterness. The embassy of the duke de Mirepoix, and the negotiation he began at London, were of no effect. Mutual reproaches of ill faith were made; the English and French troops in America came to hostilities, some forts were carried, and war was begun without being declared. In the relations sent home, the English officers did not fail to impute every violence to the French. Each party wrote justifications of their conduct: with these the city of London swarmed.

The English nation, easily inflamed, imagining it has cause of complaint against France, being dissatisfied with the peace of Aix la Chapelle, breathed nothing but war. The conduct of the duke of Cumberland made the fermentation general. He perceived that age caused the king his father to approach the period of existence. To increase his credit, and gain greater influence in the succeeding reign, he had formed the project of filling the council with his creatures, and of bestowing all the great offices of the crown on persons who were intirely devoted to his party. He designed to place Mr. Fox at the head of the trea-

treasury, and to give him all the power with which the duke of Newcastle was invested. But the elevation of Fox could not take place, except by driving the duke of Newcastle from office; and this was the more difficult because that the latter had great power over the mind of the king, and was esteemed, in parliament, for his long services, his virtues, and his wealth; and, by the nation, because of his immense wealth, and the places which were in his gift, as well as of the numerous members of parliament whom his possessions gave him the power to have elected.

The duke of Cumberland imagined that the best means of obliging the duke of Newcastle to quit his great station would be to engage England in a war with France, by which the minister would be under the necessity of adding new debts to those with which the government was loaded, which would furnish opposition with subject of complaint; or he flattered himself he might profit by the possible ill success, of the commencement of the war, to impute error to the minister, and make him determine, by the vexation and persecution he should find, voluntarily to renounce his office. This was a vast and complicated plan, for the execution of which the quarrel between the two nations must be

be inflamed, and the peace infringed. Nothing could be more easy. At the very name of Frenchman the people of London are furious. Combustibles were collected, and they were presently set in flames. The tumultuous nation obliged king George to prepare some armaments. One step insensibly occasioned another, till the parties came to action. Violence gave place to reprisal; and, toward the conclusion of 1754, war between the two nations appeared to be inevitable: it was however remarked that the ministry of Versailles acted with the greatest moderation, and that wrong proceedings were all on the part of the English.

The two kings, perceiving themselves menaced by war, endeavoured each to strengthen his party, and to confirm ancient alliances, or to form new. At this time the king of Prussia was courted both by the French and English. His alliance with Louis XV. was not expired. The possessions of the French in the Indies were in all cases excepted from the guarantees of Prussia; and, under the present circumstances, it appeared that the part of the Prussians would be to remain neuter, and become spectators of the ensuing troubles. The court of Versailles thought otherwise; and imagined

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the king of Prussia was to France what a despot of Wallachia is to the Porte; that is to say a subordinate prince, who, the moment he receives orders, is obliged to make war. She farther persuaded herself that, by carrying war into the electorate of Hanover, she should soften the king of Great Britain; and thus, in the heart of the German empire, terminate those differences which subsisted in America, between her and the court of London. Rouillé, who then was minister for foreign affairs, one day said to the Prussian ambassador, Knyphausen, with an intention of engaging the king to contribute to this diversion,—“ Write, “ Sir, to the king of Prussia, that he may assist “ us in our expedition into Hanover. He will “ there find pillage; the treasury of the king “ of England is excellently furnished. This “ he has but to seize, and it will be a good “ capture.” The king returned him for answer that such-like propositions might be becoming, when negotiating with some persons; but that he hoped, in future, M. Rouillé would learn to distinguish those with whom he had to treat.

These negotiations were more warmly pressed toward the end of 1755. King George, informed of the design of the French, and alarmed at

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the storm which menaced his electorate, was persuaded that the most certain means of shelter was to conclude an offensive alliance with Prussia. He knew that the connections between the kings of Prussia and France were almost at an end, for the treaty of Versailles would expire in the month of March 1756; and he charged lord Holderness, his secretary of state, to begin a negotiation with the court of Berlin.

Uncertain of the dispositions of the king of Prussia, relative to such an alliance, lord Holderness, that he might not expose his master to a direct refusal, ventured to make his first proposals by the intervention of the duke of Brunswick; under pretence of securing the peace of Germany, against the danger with which it was threatened by an approaching war. The king was required to enter into measures which might ascertain the public tranquillity. Great consequences were annexed to this proposition. The situation of Prussia was then such that the part she should take would highly influence peace and war. Should the treaty with France be renewed, the electorate of Hanover must be attacked. This would draw upon her the forces of the English, Austrians, and Russians. Should

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an alliance with England be concluded, it was probable the French would not carry the war into the empire; and Prussia would find herself connected with Great Britain and Russia. This apparently must oblige the empress queen to remain at peace, whatever her desire might be to re-conquer Silesia, and however great the preparations she might have made, to act as occasion should serve.

Before he came to a determination, the king nevertheless thought proper to be certain of the disposition of the court of Russia; but, as the chancellor Bestuchef was his declared enemy, there was no possibility of obtaining intelligence immediately from Petersburg itself; since all intercourse between the two courts was interrupted. He therefore had recourse to the sieur von Klinggræff, his ambassador at the Imperial court, and to lord Holderness himself, that he might understand on what terms England and Russia were, and especially whether the court of Vienna, or that of London, had the greatest influence at Petersburg. Klinggræff replied that, the Russians being an interested people, there could be no doubt but that they were attached to those who could pay them, and not to those who had nothing to give; that the empress queen often wanted funds

funds to supply her own expences ; that therefore the Russians would be with the English, whose immense wealth enabled them to grant heavy subsidies.

The answer of lord Holderness implied that there was a perfectly good intelligence between England and Russia ; and that king George had a firm confidence in the friendship of the empress Elizabeth. The information which the king obtained, from his ambassador at the Hague, corresponded so well with that which he had received from Vienna and London, that he imagined so many people could not all be deceived, on the same subject ; and that their conjectures, being similar, must necessarily be just. Thus determined, he entered into negotiation with England, and answered lord Holderness that he was not disinclined to concert innocent and defensive measures with the king of Great Britain, which should only relate to the neutrality of Germany. The two powers, being agreed concerning the principles of their alliance, soon concluded a treaty, which was signed at London, on the sixteenth of January 1756. It consisted of four articles, the three first of which related to the reciprocal guarantees of their proper states ; the last regarded Germany only, and stipulated that it should not

be invaded, or entered, by any foreign forces. There were two secret articles, by one of which the Austrian low countries were excepted from the guarantee of Germany; and by the other the English engaged to pay twenty thousand pounds sterlinc to the Prussian merchants, who had pretended a claim of indemnification, for the prizes made and not restored by the English, during the last war.

The treaty arrived signed at Berlin, about a month after the duke de Nivernois had repaired thither. Louis XV. had sent this nobleman to the king to renew the peace of Versailles, which would soon expire, and further to engage Prussia in the project which France meditated against Hanover. The strongest argument which the duke de Nivernois employed, to induce the king to this alliance, and make him a party in the war, was an offer of the sovereignty of the island of Tobago. It should be known that, after the war of 1740, the French had bestowed this island on marshal Saxe; and, as the English appeared to be very much dissatisfied, it was stipulated that it should remain desert, uncultivated by any nation. This was too singular an offer to be accepted. The king turned the affair into a jest, and intreated the duke de Nivernois to search for some person who

who might become governor of the island of Barataria with greater propriety than himself. In like manner he declined renewing any alliance, or taking part in the war in question; and, that he might act with the utmost candour, and convince France of the innocency of those new engagements into which he had entered with England, he made no difficulty of shewing the duke de Nivernois the original of the treaty, which had lately been signed at London. The news of this alliance made a very strong impression at Versailles, on Louis XV. and his council, who were but little short of affirming that the king of Prussia had revolted against France. Impartially examined, the fact was otherwise. The alliance between Prussia and France would expire in two months. As a sovereign, the king was authorised to form alliances with those nations which might procure the greatest advantage to his states. He therefore forfeited neither his word nor his honour, by his union with the king of England; especially when this union was to preserve his own states and all Germany in peace. But the French would hear no reason; they spoke at Versailles only of the apostacy of the king of Prussia, who perfidiously abandoned his ancient allies; and the court uttered so many reproaches

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that it became probable resentment would not be confined to words.

We have, in the preceding chapter, seen the arts and subtleties with which the court of Vienna endeavoured to gain the friendship of that of Versailles; and with what industry count Kaunitz had applied himself, during his residence at Paris, to familiarize the minds of the French to the supposition of an alliance with Austria. During the momentary ill-humour of Louis XV. the fashion which obtained of declaiming against the king of Prussia, in the council of Versailles, occasioned this seed to take root. The extreme vivacity of the French nation led it to consider an alliance with the house of Austria as a superior refinement in politics. Accordingly, count Starenberg was charged, by the empress queen, to propose an alliance between the two courts. This was presently agreed on, for both parties wished the same thing; and it was signed, in the name of the most Christian king, by M. Rouillé and the Abbé de Bernis, on the 9th of May 1756.

This famous treaty of Versailles, announced with so much ostentation, and baptised—"the 'union of the great powers,'"—was in its own nature defensive; and in substance contained the promise of an aid of twenty-four thousand

thousand men, should either of the contracting powers be attacked. It was this alliance however which encouraged the empress queen in the execution of the grand project which she had so long been meditating.

The union of the house of Austria and Bourbon, so lately formed, began to make it suspected that the treaty of London could not maintain the tranquillity of Germany. Peace might be said to be suspended only by a hair; some pretext was but wanting; and, when that is the sole thing necessary, war is as if declared. It soon appeared inevitable; for information was obtained that the politicians had all been deceived in their dependence on Russia. That power, over which the intrigues of the Austrian ministers prevailed, broke with England because of the alliance which the king of Great Britain had concluded with the king of Prussia. Count Bestuchef for a moment remained undecided, between his passion for English guineas and his hatred toward the king: but hatred was victorious. The empress Elizabeth, an enemy to the French nation, after the last embassy of the marquis de la Chetardie, was better pleased to league with that nation than to preserve the least alliance with a power which had become connected with Prussia. Active in

every court of Europe, the court of Vienna profited by the passions of sovereigns and their ministers, to attract them to itself, and govern them according to the purposes proposed.

During these sudden and unexpected changes of system, the English ships no longer kept any measures with those of France. The vexations and infractions they committed enforced the king of France, in his own despite, to declare war. The French ostentatiously announced they were preparing to make a descent on England. They lined the coasts of Brittany and Normandy with troops, built flat-bottomed boats for their transportation, and assembled some ships of war at Brest. These appearances terrified the English, and there were moments during which this nation, which has the character of so much wisdom, imagined its destruction near. To remove these fears, king George had recourse to Hanoverian and Hessian troops, that were brought into England.

Thus was the court of London amused. The French profited by the panic they had inspired; and, while they kept up a show of invasion opposite the coasts of Great Britain, made a real descent on the island of Minorca. The duke de Richelieu, who headed this expedition, laid siege to Port Mahon. The English did

did not perceive the design of the French till it was put in execution : they nevertheless sent a fleet into the Mediterranean, to the succour of the place besieged, where their admiral, Byng, was beaten by the French squadron. The English government, that it might dislodge itself in the eyes of the furious populace, was obliged to immolate a victim. Admiral Byng was shot, whose innocence many sensible men pretended to prove. The duke de Richelieu in vain attempted to effect a breach in Port Mahon, the works of which are cut in the rock. Impatient at the length of the siege, he ordered a general assault : the French made a scalade, and the place was taken.

While fortune favoured the French in the south of Europe, the affairs of the north daily became more critical. The Russians formed camps in Livonia, which were still more considerable than those they had there formed during the preceding years. The court of Russia was induced to take these steps by that of Vienna, by which the treaty of Petersburg, made in the year 1746, was claimed as if war had been declared, and assistance requisite. An army of fifty thousand Muscovites, on the frontiers of Prussia, became a subject of importance. Whatever the cause of the armament might be, its effects

effects appeared to be formidable. The king had a channel through which he obtained certain advice, relative to the projects of his enemies, which were ripe for execution, by the means of a clerk of the secret chancery of Dresden, who weekly remitted to the Prussian minister the dispatches which his court received from Petersburg and Vienna, as well as copies of all the treaties he had found in the archives. From these writings it appeared that the court of Russia excused herself, because of inability, from undertaking war that year, her fleet not being in a condition to put to sea; but in revenge she promised the greatest efforts should be made the next. Thus informed, the king determined to send, as a seeming reserve, a corps into Pomerania, composed of ten battalions and twenty squadrons. These troops were cantoned in the environs of Stolpe, during the month of August, where they could incite no uneasiness in the Russians, and where they were notwithstanding in readiness to reinforce marshal Lehwald, whenever he should have reason to apprehend any attempt on the part of the enemy.

More troops than usual were presently assembled in Bohemia, by the court of Vienna, of which two armies were formed. The one

under the command of prince Piccolomini, encamped near Königsgrätz ; and the principal, under marshal Braun (Brown) in the neighbourhood of Prague. This was not sufficient : the court amassed magazines in Bohemia, and assembled horses for the conveyance of provisions and of the numerous artillery which was intended to be employed in the army. In a word, all those preparations took place which are usual, when one power proposes to attack another.

The dispatches which the king received from Dresden were full of the plans that were formed by the court of Vienna to invade the states of the king. From these he learned that, if no better could be found, the empress queen would make the difference of the king with the duke of Mecklenburgh a pretext for war. This difference was a trifle ; the affair had been accommodated, and slumbered. It related to the right of recruiting. The duke thought proper to take offence at the exercise of this right. After the justice of the proceeding had been proved, he being still obstinate, the king then took executive justice into his own power. Though this paltry affair was no longer in question, the empress queen determined again to bring it on the tapis. She pretended to understand

stand the proceedings of the king as contrary to the laws of the empire, and in violation to the peace of Westphalia, which engaged her to make herself a party in behalf of the duke of Mecklenburgh, and to require assistance from the princes who guarantied that peace.

The information which the king obtained of this design, added to the motions of three armies on his frontiers, that daily menaced open rupture, gave occasion to demand an explanation, from the court of Vienna, relative to these grand armaments. This court was intreated to give a categorical answer, that it might be known whether it was or was not intended to break the peace. The reply of count Kaunitz was found to be conceived in equivocal and ambiguous terms; but he explained himself with less reserve to count Flemming, the ambassador from the king of Poland at Vienna, who sent his court an account of this conversation. A copy of his dispatches was immediately sent from Dresden to Berlin. In these count Flemming said—“ Count Kaunitz proposes to incite disquietude in the king by his replies, and to induce him to commit the first hostilities.” It is certain that the style was so haughty, so arrogant, that it was sufficiently clear the empress queen was determined on war; and

and that she wished the king should be supposed the aggressor. But it still was probable the year would have passed away, before that the enemies of Prussia would have proceeded to the last extremities, because the court of Petersburg was desirous of deferring war to the following year, and because it was apparent the empress queen waited till her allies should all be ready, that the king might be attacked with their united forces.

Considerations like these caused the question to be examined, whether it were more advantageous to anticipate the enemy, by an immediate attack, or wait till they had finished their grand preparations, and suffer them to use their own discretion, concerning the enterprizes they should form. Whatever part should be taken, under such circumstances, war was equally inevitable; it was the business of calculation to find whether it would be most advantageous to delay, some months, or to begin immediately.

This history will hereafter show that the king of Poland was one of the most zealous partisans of the union, formed by the empress queen, against Prussia. The Saxon army was feeble. It was known that it amounted to scarcely eighteen thousand men; but it was also known

that it was, during winter, to be augmented to the number of forty thousand. By deferring war, the king therefore would give an ill-disposed neighbour time to become more formidable; not to add that Russia could not enter into action during the present year; and, Saxony not having concluded its arrangements, the moment seemed favourable to gain upon the enemy, by obtaining, in the first campaign, advantages which ill-timed delicacy would lose; should military operations be deferred to the following year. Inaction would farther facilitate the enemy's means of falling, with united powers, on the states of the king; which must, on the opening of the first campaign, have become the seat of war. Instead of which, by carrying war into the enemy's country, whose evil designs were proved, it would there be fixed, and the Prussian provinces spared. As to the terrific epithet of aggressor, this was a vain scarecrow, fit only to impose on timid minds, and to which no attention ought to be paid in a crisis so important, when the safety of the state was in danger. The true aggressor, no doubt, is he who obliges another to arm, by attack to anticipate his enemy, and, by a war less difficult, guard against a war more dangerous; for, of two evils, the least must be chosen.

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The substance of the contest would be the same, whether the enemies of the king did or did not accuse him of being the aggressor; the conspiracy of the powers of Europe against Prussia being already formed. The empress queen, the empress of Russia, and the king of Poland, were agreed, and at the moment of entering on action; so that the king would not have had a friend the more, nor an enemy the less. In fine the preservation of the state, and the support of the house of Brandenbourg, were to be considered. At a moment so serious, so important, would it not have been an unpardonable fault, in politics, to have stopt at vain formalities; from which we ought not to depart, in the common course of things, but to which we ought not to submit, in cases so extraordinary as these, when irresolution and delay would have ensured destruction, and when safety could only be found by vigorous and prompt resolution, executed with equal activity?

The different reasons here alleged determined the king to outstep his enemies. He gave the court of Vienna to understand that its answer was considered as a declaration of war, and that war it should have. He afterward took the necessary dispositions to put the troops in motion. It was the month of August, and

Prussia

Prussia had nothing to fear from Russia, for the present year, for reasons before given ; so that marshal Lehwald was satisfied with assembling the troops under his command, in the environs of Königsberg ; that they might be in readiness, and be brought into the field, should circumstances so require.

The king proposed to attack the Austrians with two armies. Marshal Schwerin, who received the command of that in Silesia, was to penetrate into the circle of Königsgrätz ; the other, opposed at once both to Saxons and Austrians, must naturally be the strongest, and was formed of the Pomeranian regiments, of those of the Electorate, the dutchy of Magdebourg, and the provinces of Westphalia. The king thought proper to command this in person. His design was at once to enter Saxony with several columns ; either to disarm the Saxon troops, if found dispersed in their quarters, or give them battle, if assembled, that he might not have an enemy in his rear when he should advance into Bohemia, or be exposed to perfidy similar to that of the Saxons in the year 1744. The king held himself authorized thus to act by the experience of the past, the engagements the Saxons had entered into with the house of Austria, and from their ill intentions, which were manifest in

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the dispatches of all their ministers, in the possession of the king. Thus did reasons of right, of policy, and of war, support and justify his conduct.

It was at the same time resolved to gain as much ground, during the first campaign, as possible; the better to cover the states of the king, remove the war to the greatest possible distance, and carry it into Bohemia, if this could be effected. Such were the general dispositions which the king opposed to the league of the greatest powers in Europe, intending to assail him: the Prussian troops were soon on their march, and began their operations in Saxony and Bohemia, of which we shall give an account in the following chapter.

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C H A P.

Hist. Seven Years War. Vol. I.

C H A P. IV.

The March into Saxony. The famous Camp of Pirna. Bohemia entered. Battle of Lowofitz. Campaign of Marshal Schwerin. The Succour at Schandau rendered ineffectual. The Saxons taken. Winter Quarters. Line formed by the Troops.

THE first thing necessary, at the commencement of the war, was to deprive the Saxons of the means of making themselves parties in it, and of disturbing Prussia. The electorate of Saxony must be traversed to carry the war into Bohemia. If Saxony were not conquered, an enemy would be left behind ; who, depriving the Prussians of the free navigation of the Elbe, would oblige them to quit Bohemia, whenever the king of Poland should please. This the Saxons had done, in the war of 1744 ; when, interdicting the navigation of that river to the troops of the king, they rendered his expedition fruitless. It was not from vague conjecture that they were now supposed to have the same designs ; proofs were possessed of their

their ill intentions ; and it would have been an unpardonable fault, in politics, weakly to have spared a prince allied to Austria, who waited only the proper moment openly to declare himself, when so he could do with impunity. As the king likewise foresaw that the greatest part of Europe prepared to attack him, he could not cover the electoral marche of Brandenbourg, except by occupying Saxony ; in which it was better to fix the seat of war than in the vicinity of Berlin. It therefore was resolved to carry the war into Saxony, in order to secure the Elbe, and to endeavour, if the least opportunity should occur, to disarm the Saxon troops.

On a motion made by some Prussian regiments, in August, to march from Pomerania into the electorate, the Saxon forces took their position between the Elbe and the Mulde. They soon after went into their usual quarters, and again presently assembled in cantonments. All these marches and countermarches did not deceive the king, who positively knew that the design of the court was to assemble an army in the camp of Pirna ; where the Saxons, occupying a post that could not be forced, thought they might safely wait the succour they had been led to hope from Austria ; and still flattered themselves they might amuse the Prussians

by frivolous negotiation. Without paying the least attention therefore to these troops, it was determined incessantly to penetrate with the army into the frontiers of Bohemia.

The king divided his army into three columns, the common point of reunion for which was to be Pirna. The first left Magdeburg, under the command of prince Ferdinand of Brunswic, took the road to Leipsic, and passed through Borne, Chemnitz, Freyberg, and Dippoldiswalda, to repair to Cotta. The second column, under the king, marched to Pretsch, while prince Maurice of Deffau made himself master of Wittenberg; after which this detachment, reunited to the rest of the corps, crossed the Elbe at Torgau, whence the king passed, by Strehlen and Lommatsch, to Wilsdruf.

Here certain information was received that the Saxon troops were all assembled at Pirna, where the king was in person, and that there was no garrison in Dresden, but that the queen still remained there. The king sent his compliments to the queen of Poland, and the Prussian troops entered the capital, observing discipline so strict that no person had cause to complain. The army encamped near Dresden; from which on the morrow it advanced toward

Pirna,

Pirna, and took post between the Elbe, Sedelitz, and Zest.

The third column, led by the prince of Bevern, traversed Lusatia ; whence, having been joined at Elsterwerda by twenty-five squadrons of cuirassiers and hussars, coming from Silesia, it marched for Bautzen, Stolpen, and finally for Lohmen. Prince Ferdinand at the same time arrived at Cotta ; so that, by the junction of these three columns, in the environs of Pirna, the Saxon troops were entirely blocked up.

The presence of so many armies however gave birth to no battle ; not a single act of hostility was committed. The Saxons very civilly suffered themselves to be famished ; and each endeavoured to secure his own establishment, to the best of his abilities. The king of Poland, that he might gain time, began to negotiate. The Saxons could with greater facility write than fight. Repeated proposals were made ; but, as no solid advantages were offered, they were rejected. Their end was to obtain a perfect neutrality, to which the king could not accede ; because that the engagements between the king of Poland and the courts of Vienna and Russia were too well known.

The Saxons however made all Europe resound with their lamentations. They spread

reports the most injurious, to the Prussians, on the invasion of their electorate. It was necessary to disabuse the public respecting these slanders; which, not being refuted, would gain credit, and fill Europe with prejudices, against the conduct of the king. He long had possessed copies of the treaties of the king of Poland, and of the narratives of his ministers to foreign courts. Though these pieces fully justified the enterprizes of the Prussians, they could not be made useful. Had they been published, the Saxons would have accused them of being imaginary, and forged at will, only to authorize a daring conduct, which was not to be justified but by falsehoods. The king therefore found himself obliged to have recourse to the original pieces, which still were in the archives of Dresden; and gave orders that they might be seized. They were all packed up and ready to be sent into Poland. The queen, informed of this, opposed the attempt; and she was with difficulty brought to comprehend that the best mode of acting would be civilly to yield to the king of Prussia, and not absolutely resist an act which, though not so respectful as might have been wished, was still the consequence of absolute necessity.

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The first use made of these archives was to publish an extract from them, known to the world under the title of *Mémoire raisonné sur les desseins dangereux des cours de Vienne et de Dresden, avec les pieces justificatives* *. While this scene was enacting at the palace of Dresden, the Prussian and Saxon troops remained quiet; the king of Poland amusing himself with the hope of the succour which the Austrians were to send, and the king of Prussia not being able to undertake any thing against a camp where numbers and valour would have been useless. It will not be improper, to render the facts we shall relate more intelligible, that we should give a particular description of the famous camp of Pirna, and of the position of the Saxon troops, by whom it was occupied.

Nature had been pleased on this capricious spot to form a kind of fortress, to which art had little or nothing to add. To the east runs the Elbe, between rocks which, by narrowing its limits, render the stream more rapid. The right of the Saxons was supported by the fortress of Sonnenstein, near the Elbe. In a hollow, at the foot of these rocks, stands the town

* Well known in English under the title of "Four
" Pieces," &c. or—The King of Prussia's Justificatory
Pieces. T.

of Pirna, from which the camp takes its name. The front which faces the north extends to the Kohlberg. This is as the bastion of that curtain before which is one continued ravin, from sixty to eighty feet deep, which turning thence toward the left surrounds the whole camp, and ends at the foot of the Königstein. From the Kohlberg, which forms a kind of angle, runs a chain of rocks, the summit of which the Saxons occupied ; and which, facing the west, extend, leaving Kottendorf in front, and narrowing toward Struppen and Leopoldsheim, and terminate at Königstein, on the banks of the Elbe.

Too feeble to fill a camp so vast, and in which insurmountable rocks every where presented themselves, the Saxons were satisfied with guarding well the difficult passes, which yet were the only ones through which they might have been attacked. They threw up abatis, redoubts, and pallisades ; all which were easily performed, because of the immense forests of pine trees, with which these hills are loaded. The camp, one of the strongest in Europe, having been minutely examined, was judged safe from surprise and assault ; and, as time and dearth only could vanquish so many obstacles, a strict blockade was determined on, to prevent the Saxons from obtaining

obtaining provisions from the environs, and to act in every respect as in a formal siege. For this purpose the king employed a part of his force to draw lines of circumvallation, and the remainder to form an army of observation. This disposition, the best imaginable under such circumstances, was the more prudent because the Saxons, flying hastily to these rocks, had wanted time to amass much subsistence, and all they possessed must be consumed in two months.

The king's troops soon occupied all the passages through which succour or provisions might arrive to the Saxons. The prince of Bevern and his division took post at Lohmen, Wehlen, Oberswaden, and Schandau, quite along the Elbe. His right communicated with the division of the king by the bridge which was built near the brick-kiln. Ten battalions and ten squadrons, encamped near the king, occupied the space between the Elbe and the village of Sedelitz, as far as Zest; where the division of prince Maurice began, which extended beyond Cotta, by detachments sent as far as Leopoldsheim, Markersdorf, Hennersdorf, and Nöllendorf; in all, thirty-eight battalions and thirty squadrons were employed, to form the circumvallation of which we speak.

Marshal

Marshal Keith had the command of the army of observation, in twenty-nine battalions and seventy squadrons. Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick first entered Bohemia with the van-guard. Having passed Peterswalde he encountered the Austrian general Wied at Nöllendorf, with ten battalions of grenadiers, and cavalry in proportion, whom he dislodged from the village. The Austrian took to flight, and the prince continued his march. Marshal Keith immediately approached from Auffig, and encamped at Johnsdorf, whence he detached Mannstein, who seized on the castle of Tetschen, to ascertain the navigation of the Elbe. Things continued thus in Saxony, and in that part of Bohemia, till the end of the month.

Piccolimini on the other part was advantageously encamped near Königsgrätz, on the heights situated between the confluence of the Adler and the Elbe. His camp, of an angular form, might not be approached. Marshal Schwerin marched with his army through the county of Glatz, whence he advanced, first to Nachod, next to the banks of the Metau, and finally to Aujest; where he defeated general Buccow, who marching to meet him with a corps of cavalry lost two hundred men. Marshal Schwerin could undertake nothing against Piccolomini,

colomini, in the post he held. No grand project could be formed either of siege or battle; and, as the season was rather advanced, he contented himself with consuming all the subsistence he found in Bohemia, and foraging as far as the very cannon of the Imperial army; which general Piccolimini pretended not to perceive. A detachment of Prussian hussars defeated four hundred of the enemy's dragoons, near Hohenmaut, and brought in the greatest part of them prisoners. The attempts of marshal Schwerin were here bounded, because that Piccolimini, careful not to remove, remained scrupulously shut up in his camp, which was stronger than many fortresses are.

Great effects this year were only to be produced by the army of the king, employed to attack the Saxons and prevent them receiving succour. Here difficulties daily increased. Though the camp of Pirna was so far inclosed as to prevent the arrival of subsistence and aid, to guard all the paths that led through the forests and rocks of its vicinity was impossible. By this means the king of Poland still maintained, though with difficulty, a correspondence with the court of Vienna, and information was received, toward the end of September, that marshal Braun had received orders to relieve the

the Saxon troops, blockaded at Pirna, at all events. Marshal Braun advancing with his army to Budin, had three modes of executing this task, the one to march against marshal Keith, and beat his army, a thing not easily accomplished. The second to proceed through Billin and Töplitz, and enter Saxony, either by the Basberg, or Nöllendorf. But this would oblige him to present his flank to marshal Keith, and expose all his magazines between Budin and Prague to destruction. The third was to send a detachment on the right of the Elbe, which, passing through Böhmischt, Leippa, Schluckenau, and Rumburg, should march to Schandau. Neither could this last produce any thing decisive; for the Prussians might send succour into that country, over their bridge of Schandau, and the ground in the vicinity of Oberrathen and Schandau was rugged, difficult, and so liable to be disputed, from its impracticable passes, that a single battalion might stop a whole army.

As this critical moment was to decide the fate of the campaign, the king thought his presence necessary in Bohemia; that he might oppose every attempt of the enemy. On the 28th he arrived at the camp of Johnsdorf. Here the troops were posted in a confined situation, overlooked

overlooked by eminences, and the rear separated by an escarpment of rocks so limited that, should they have come to action, it would have been difficult to have sent aid from one part of the camp to another, without being greatly exposed. From this situation, which must have been abandoned at the approach of an enemy, it was thought proper to remove on the morrow. Marshal Braun was too distant for intelligence to be obtained of his motions; and, it being important to watch these narrowly, the king put himself at the head of the vanguard, composed of eight battalions and twenty squadrons, and advanced to Tirmitz, where he was informed marshal Braun would pass the Eger, on the morrow, near Budin. This was the moment of approach to gain information of his intentions; and even to give battle, should opportunity offer. The situation of affairs was such (September), and the plans of the two parties so opposite, that an action must ensue, whether marshal Braun should determine to cut his way into Saxony, sword in hand, or should proceed only by detachments.

On the 30th the army of the king followed in two columns. Scarcely had it gained the height of the Pascopol, before it discovered a camp in the plain of Lowofitz, with its right supported

supported at Wielhotta, Lowositz in its front, and Sulowitz on its left, and the extremity of which extended behind the pond of Schirkowitz.

The van pursued its march, and dislodged some hundreds of pandours, who occupied a post of information, from Welmina. This village is situated in a bottom, surrounded by rocks, most of which rise in the form of cones. These heights, and the very bottom itself, overlook the neighbouring plains. The king diligently advanced with his infantry to occupy the vineyards and passes of the plain, beside Lowositz. The troops arrived about ten in the evening, and passed the night under arms, a little distance in the rear of the van-guard, which was posted in face of the enemy. On the morrow, the 1st of October, the camp that had been discovered was reconnoitred, by break of day. A thick fog, extending over the plain prevented objects from being distinctly seen. The town of Lowositz was perceived as through a black veil; and near it some cavalry in two corps, each of which appeared to consist of five squadrons. The army on this was put in order of battle. A column of infantry was formed on the right, another on the left, and the cavalry stationed in the second line; for, the ground

ground being too ample for the small army of the king, it was necessary to place twenty battalions in the first line, so that the reverse consisted only of four. The remainder of the troops were either in detachments or guarding the magazines. The field, on which the army of the king formed, increased in width toward the left. The declivity of the hills descending to Lowositz is covered with vineyards, that are in small inclosures, with stone walls breast high. Marshal Braun had posted pandours in these inclosures, to impede the Prussians; so that, as the battalions of the left formed, they engaged the enemy immediately as they entered the line. The fire of the pandours was but ill sustained; and, as they made no great resistance, the opinion was confirmed that the detachment that had been perceived on the eve, encamped in this vicinity, now prepared for retreat, and that the pandours who skirmished in the vineyards, and the cavalry that was scattered over the plain, were but the rear-guard. This appeared the more plausible because no trace of an army was discovered. The conjecture however was very false; for the troops first seen at Lowositz were the van-guard of Braun. The Austrians, ignorant of the march of the king's army, did not gain the intelligence till they saw it leaving

Welmina, when the news was sent to Braun by the general of his van-guard, upon which he marched that very night to join him with his army at Lowositz. The fog we have mentioned continued till about eleven o'clock, and did not totally subside till the action was almost over.

As it was still supposed that there was only the rear-guard to combat, the Austrian cavalry was cannonaded ; by which it was disturbed, obliged to change its position, and form several times, now in a square, presently in three lines, then in one ; and sometimes five or six bodies toward the left would disappear, and soon after return more numerous than they seemed to be at the beginning. Weary of this trifling, which was but lost time, the king supposed that, by charging this cavalry with twenty squadrons of dragoons, the enemy's rear-guard would soon be dispersed and the affair ended ; on which the dragoons came from the heights and formed in the bottom, protected by the infantry. They assailed and overthrew all their opponents. In pursuing the fugitives they received a fire of small arms and artillery in flank and front, at the village of Sulowitz, which drove them to the position they had assumed at the foot of the vineyards. Hence it was conjectured that this was

was no longer a combat with the rear-guard, but that marshal Braun and the Austrians were in face of the army. The king wished to call off his cavalry, and place it in the second line on the height; but, by one of those mistakes which unfortunately are but too common on the day of battle, it happened that the cuirassiers had all joined the dragoons before they could receive orders from the *aid du camp* of the king. Yielding to their impetuosity and desire of signalizing themselves, they attacked a second time. They soon overthrew the enemy's cavalry; and, though received with the same fire that had repulsed the dragoons on the first charge, they continued pursuing for three thousand paces. Carried away by their ardour, they freed a ditch of fifty feet wide, three hundred paces beyond which another ditch, more deep, covered the Imperial infantry. A battery of sixty pieces then played on the Prussian cavalry, and forced it to return and form anew at the foot of the hill; which, not being pursued, was executed in good order. The king, unwilling they should indulge in such follies, formed them into a second line, in the rear of his infantry.

While the cavalry retreated, the fire of the
G left

left began to be more hot and general. Marshal Braun was desirous of reversing the question. Seeing himself on the point of being assailed, he rather chose to attack. For this purpose he caused twenty battalions to file off, behind Lowofitz, which, having successively glided along the Elbe, came to support the pandours, who combated in the vineyards, and even endeavoured to turn the left flank of the Prussians. They were vigorously repulsed by the infantry, which forced the vineyards one after another, and, descending into the plain, pursued some battalions of the enemy, whose fears hurried them into the Elbe. Another body of fugitives threw themselves into the first houses of Lowofitz, and made a show of defence. Some battalions from the right were then detached to reinforce the left, so that the left of the Prussians was supported by the Elbe; and in this order it advanced proudly, and with a determined air, on Lowofitz; while the right of the army remained on the height by which it was supported. The grenadiers fired into the houses through the doors and windows, to which for the greater dispatch they set fire; and, though they had consumed all their powder, still were not the regiments of Itzenplitz and Manteufel prevented from entering Lowofitz with lowered bayonets,

bayonets, and forcing nine fresh battalions, which Braun had sent thither, to cede the place and take to flight. All the forces of the enemy that had combated in this part afterward gave ground, and yielded the victory to the Prussians.

The king could not profit so much as he would have wished by this success, because he had properly only beaten the right wing of the Imperialists. They still occupied the village of Sulowitz ; and, as their left was posted behind the ditch before mentioned, they were safe from the Prussian cavalry. Braun in the interim made a fine motion with his troops. He advanced some brigades of his left that had not been in action, with whom he covered his disbanded troops, flying from Lowositz in great disorder. He withdrew by night, and occupied Leutmeritz by a detachment that broke down the bridge of the Elbe which was in his van. The marshal with his main army recovered his camp of Budin, and destroyed all the bridges of the Eger to impede the passage of the Prussians.

The king lost in dead and wounded twelve hundred men : two field generals, Quadt and Luderitz, fell on this day. Only seven hundred prisoners were taken ; among whom was a prince

Lobkowitz, an Imperial general. Could the cavalry have been employed, toward the close of the action, the number might have been much greater.

On the morrow, the prince of Bevern was detached with eight thousand men to Schirkowitz, a village on the right of the king, half way to Budin. He sent parties from his camp along the Elbe, to reconnoitre the passages, and still more to incite the attention and the fears of marshal Braun, in order to keep him inactive by appearances, and prevent any attempt to succour the king of Poland and the Saxons. To this the Bohemian army was confined. Too feeble to attack, it was satisfied with observing the enemy. The king in reality could not act offensively. To effectually incite the apprehensions of marshal Braun, the Eger must be passed; in which case the Imperial detachment at Leutmeritz, being in the rear of the Prussians, might have carried their magazine of Auffig; and to pass the Eger would have been to depart too far from the line of defence. The army too would have been rendered incapable of sending any prompt succour into Saxony. Should it be determined to attack Leutmeritz, far from gaining by the conquest, embarrassment would but have been increased; for the army would have been enfeebled

enfeebled by putting a garrison into the town ; and, being unable to garnish the heights which surround and overlook it, this garrison would have been exposed to be taken as soon as attacked.

All these reasons obliged the king to remain contented with the gain of a battle, at the commencement of the war, and not to attempt any thing farther than to prevent Braun from making detachments ; or, if he made any, to be able to send others equally strong to the succour of the camp of Saxony. The Imperial army in Bohemia was twice the strength of the Prussian ; but the troops of the latter were so excellent, so well disciplined, and their officers were so brave, that they were supposed equal if not superior to the foe. However well founded any good opinion of ourselves may be, security in war is always dangerous ; and rather than be negligent it is best to take superfluous precaution. As numbers were in favour of the Austrians, and the king might still be obliged to make detachments, he ordered some batteries to be raised, and the most feeble parts of his camp to be intrenched. These measures were found to be the more sage when it was known, on the 6th, that Braun had secretly detached some regiments, to the amount as sup-

posed of six thousand men; which, passing through Raudnitz, advanced toward Böhmischt Leippa, and from thence were to continue their route toward Saxony. Though this detachment excited no great apprehension, the king sent intelligence to the margrave Charles and prince Maurice in Saxony, and put himself at the head of the reinforcements of cavalry, to conduct them to the camp of Sedelitz, where there were only thirty squadrons, which were insufficient to contain the Saxons, especially should they attempt to pass by the side of Hohendorf and Töplitz. On the 13th, his majesty departed from Lowositz, with fifteen squadrons; and on the 14th, at noon, arrived at his army, which he found at Struppen, the quarters the king of Poland had occupied, during the whole time that the Saxons had been blockaded.

The face of affairs had entirely changed, in Saxony, since the king had taken the command of his army in Bohemia. The battle of Lowositz had terrified the court. The hope of assistance from the Imperialists was but feeble. The troops being menaced with approaching famine, the Saxon generals were desirous to cut their way through the Prussians by their own strength. Their project was to escape over

over the Elbe, across which they attempted to throw a bridge at Wilstedt. Here they found a Prussian redoubt, which sunk some of their boats, and deranged their measures. Changing their plan, they then transported their pontoons to Halbstadt, which they believed to be the properst place for their sally; especially because of the succour which again was promised them by marshal Braun.

Every operation of the armies was so intimately connected with the nature of the ground that we are obliged, for the information of the reader, to give him as exact an idea of this as we are able. What has been said sufficiently indicates the strength of the post of Pirna; but if this was difficult to be carried it was equally difficult to be abandoned. The most natural and easy way of quitting it is through Leopoldsheim. The Saxons descending from the rocks might take the road to Bohemia, through Hermersdorf and Nöllendorf; not that it can be said they might have forced this pass without loss; but still it is probable they would have saved a part of their troops. Töplitz once gained, they would meet with but trifling obstacles; and their junction with the Austrians by the Eger could not be impeded. According to all appearance, the Saxon generals were un-

acquainted with the situation of Halbstadt, Burkersdorf, Schandau, and Ziegenruck, and were particularly ignorant of the manner in which these posts were occupied by the Prussians; otherwise they never would have made so ill an attempt. Lestwitz was advantageously posted, with eleven battalions and fifteen squadrons, between Schandau and a village named Wendische Fehre. Marshal Braun, who had entered Saxony at the head of his detachment, encamped in his presence; and the Austrians occupied the villages of Mitteldorf and Altendorf; but, finding Lestwitz stronger than they had supposed, they were careful not to attack. Braun could not attain Burkersdorf, from which he was separated by a chain of impracticable rocks. He did not find it to his advantage to engage Lestwitz; and yet, to aid the Saxons on the side of Altstadt, he would be obliged to file off with his men two at a time, in face of the Prussians, and under the fire of their small arms. There was therefore no mode which a man of experience, like marshal Braun, could take, without risking his reputation. He preferred remaining inactive to thus ineffectually leading his troops to slaughter.

Beside Altstadt, where the Saxons had determined to pass the Elbe, and on the right shore

of that river, is a small plain, overlooked by the Lillienstein, a steep rock by which it is in part bounded. On each side of this rock were five Prussian battalions, under the command of Retzow, behind an abatis, which in the form of a half moon was extended and supported at each side by the elbowing of the Elbe. Five hundred paces in the rear of this post, six battalions and five squadrons held the defile of Burkersdorf, on the back of which is a chain of rugged and steep rocks, named the Ziegenruck, which, encompassing the whole ground, extends at each end to the Elbe. To force their way therefore the Saxons had three successive posts to attack, each more formidable than the other: yet this was the side on which they began to establish their bridges, on the 11th of October, to effect their escape.

The Prussians took good care not to disturb them. Their descent from Tirmsdorf toward the Elbe was not difficult; but, when their bridges were finished, and they wished to mount the rocks on the other side to gain the plain of Altstadt, they found only a fisherman's path. Half a day was necessary for the passage of two battalions. The heavy rains that fell rendered the roads still more intolerable. They were obliged to abandon their cannon, which it was

impossible

impossible to transport to the opposite shore: thus their whole artillery remained in the intrenchments they had quitted. The slowness of their passage occasioned the cavalry, infantry, baggage, and rear-guard of this pell-mell multitude, to remain in the environs of Struppen. On the 13th, before day, prince Maurice of Anhalt was first informed of the flight of the Saxons. He ordered the men immediately to arms, and divided the army into seven columns, that with difficulty clambered the rocks of Pirna. The generals formed on the summit of these mountains, abandoned as they were by their defenders, between the Sonnenstein and Rottendorf. Ziethen immediately attacked the rear-guard of the enemy with his hussars, and drove it to Tirmsdorf. The free companies and Prussian chasseurs took post in a wood, near this rear-guard, which they incommoded greatly by their fire. Prince Maurice came up, and sent a regiment of Prussian infantry to occupy the height in the rear of the Saxons. The cannon from this hill scarcely made two discharges before the Saxons, surprised at receiving a fire from a part so little expected, fell in disorder, and suddenly took to flight. The hussars fell upon and pillaged the baggage. The chasseurs glided into a wood near the Elbe,

whence

whence they fired on the Saxon rear-guard, that had just passed the bridge. The latter then entirely lost all recollection. They cut the cables of their own bridge; which, carried away by the stream as far as Rathen, was there taken by the Prussians. Prince Maurice immediately made the troops encamp on the heights of Struppen; their left inclined toward the Elbe, and their right extended behind a deep ravine, which ends beside Hennersdorf.

Such was the state of things when the king arrived with his dragoons at Struppen. The Saxons waited a given signal, according to agreement with the Imperialists, to attack the Prussians in concert. This signal was not given, and all hope was lost. They were then but too well convinced, seeing the manner in which Retzow was posted, it was impossible they should cut their way by their own efforts. The king of Poland, who had taken refuge at the Königstein, warmly pressed his generals to attack Retzow at Lillienstein; and count Ruttowsky in return forcibly represented the inefficacy of such an attempt, which must end in effusion of blood and butchery, and from which no advantage could be drawn.

Marshal Braun, though not in equal danger, was not less embarrassed. In his front was an

army

army of Prussians superior to his own. As all communication was cut off with the Königstein, there being natural impediments which interdicted any attempt to relieve the Saxons, who he well might fear would surrender without his knowledge, after which the whole Prussian force would fall upon him, judging the situation of the Saxon army hopeless, and thinking only of his own safety, on the 14th of October he retreated into Bohemia. The Prussian hussars pursued. Warneri beat his rear-guard, and put three hundred Croat grenadiers to the sword.

This ill executed attempt occasioned the most injurious reproaches to pass between the Saxon and Austrian generals. They were mutually wrong; the Saxon general who had formed this project of escape alone was culpable. He must no doubt have consulted defective maps. He had never been in those parts, of the situation of which he was so ignorant. For what man in his senses would choose to retreat through defiles, between steep rocks, of which the enemy is the master? The ground, wholly inimical to the manœuvres the Austrians and Saxons intended to make, was the true cause of the misfortunes of the latter. So necessary is it to study the situation of places, by which mi-

litary actions are decided, and with them the welfare of states.

The king of Poland, on the heights of the Königstein, was a spectator of the deplorable situation of his troops, in want of bread, surrounded by enemies, and incapable, even by the most desperate resolution, of escaping at any expence of blood, for all resource was cut off. That he might not see them perish with famine, he was obliged to consent they should surrender prisoners of war, and lay down their arms.

Count Rutowsky was employed to draw up this melancholy capitulation. The whole corps was taken, and the officers gave their parole of honour not to serve against the Prussians, during the war. As their word was depended on they were released. Not to humble a vanquished foe, the king restored to the king of Poland the colours, standards, and drums; he also consented to the neutrality of the fortress of Königstein. But, at the very time he was endeavouring to soften the afflictions of the king of Poland, the latter concluded a secret treaty with the empress queen, by which he ceded to her, in consideration of a certain subsidy, four regiments of dragoons, and two pulks of Ulans, whom he maintained in Poland. Such a procedure only served to justify the conduct

conduct of the Prussians. The king of Poland, more than ever disgusted with war after the scene that had so lately been acted, demanded free passage for his person, that he might repair to Poland. This was not only granted him but attention was carried so far as to withdraw the Prussian troops, from the road on which he was to pass, that he might not behold objects which only could give him pain. On the 18th he departed with his two sons and his minister for Warsaw.

The Saxon army that so lately had capitulated amounted to seventeen thousand men, and the artillery to more than eighty cannon. Of these troops, which the king distributed, he formed twenty new battalions of infantry; but he committed the error of not incorporating them with his subjects, the officers excepted, who all were Prussians. This was the cause that little advantage could afterward be made of these regiments, and of the ill services they performed.

After the reduction of the Saxons, the king returned to withdraw his army out of Bohemia. Marshal Keith quitted the camp of Lowositz on the 25th, and retreated to Linay without being followed by the enemy. The regiment of Itzenplitz, that guarded the ford of the Elbe

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at the village of Solesel, was attacked the same night, and defended itself so well that, not satisfied with repulsing the enemy, it took some prisoners. From Linay the army continued its march through Nöllendorf, Schönwalde, and Gishubel, and arrived on the 30th in Saxony. The king cantoned the men between Pirna and the frontiers of Bohemia.

While the army of the king entered Saxony, marshal Schwerin forsook the vicinage of Königsgrätz, and retired into Silesia. On his march toward Skalitz he was followed by some thousands of Hungarians, who harrassed his rear-guard. The marshal, not understanding raillery, put himself at the head of a part of his cavalry, fell upon them suddenly, and defeated and pursued them to Smirfitz; after which he tranquilly continued his march, and on the 2d of November arrived on the frontiers of Silesia.

The enemy kept so quiet that the troops were early permitted to go into winter quarters, for which a line was formed. Prince Maurice had the command of the division sent to Chemnitz and Zwickau, whence detachments were made to guard the defiles of Bohemia; and the posts of Ausche, Oelsnitz, and the Basberg, were intrenched. General Hulsen

commanded the battalions of Freyberg and Dipholdiswalde, and held the posts of Sayda, Frauenberg, and Einsidel. The defile of Gishubel and the pass of Höhlendorf the king confided to general Zastrow; beyond which, passing the Elbe, the line extended through Dresden and Bischofswerda to Bautzen, where a body of ten battalions and ten squadrons was ready to send succour wherever it should be requisite. Lestwitz was posted at Zittau, with six battalions. To ascertain his communication, he had detachments at Hirschfelde, Ostritz, and Marrienthal. The prince of Bevern commanded the posts of Gölitz and Lauban, with ten battalions and fifteen squadrons. General Winterfeld, and the prince of Wurtemberg, who marched with a detachment into Silesia, continued the line; including Grieffenberg, Hirschberg, Landshut, and Friedland. General Fouquet covered the county of Glatz. Another corps of the army of marshal Schwerin wintered beside Neustadt, and served to cover Upper Silesia against the incursions the Imperialists might have made from Moravia.

Such was the disposition in which the Prussian troops passed the winter of 1756 to 1757.

C H A P. V.

The Winter of 1756 to 1757.

THE invasion of Saxony by the Prussians occasioned very lively sensations throughout Europe. Several courts, unacquainted with his reasons, or wishing so to be, blamed and disapproved the conduct of the king. The king of Poland exclaimed against the violence committed by the Prussians; his ministers in foreign courts exaggerated the calamities of Saxony, and empoisoned and calumniated the most innocent proceedings of the king. Aspersions like these were re-echoed at Versailles, Petersburg, and throughout Europe. The king of France was piqued that the king of Prussia, instead of renewing the treaty of Versailles, had concluded an alliance with England. On one part the Austrian ministers embittered the minds of the French to engage them in a German war; and on the other the tears of the Dauphiness were employed to excite the compassion of Louis XV. that he might take part with the king of Poland. The most Christian

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king yielded to these ardent solicitations, and resolved to carry the war into Germany: he only delayed this step that he might obtain some apparent and plausible pretext. This his ambassador, the duke de Broglie, had orders to furnish, by giving occasion to the Prussians to insult his public character. He was the poorest of persons that could have been chosen to have embroiled the two courts. The commission given him was the cause of his strange conduct. While the Saxons remained blockaded in their camp of Pirna he had continued at Dresden, and made various attempts to repair to Struppen, where the king of Poland was, though there was a general prohibition to the contrary. He attempted to force the guards to induce them to commit some violence. He vainly essayed to pass the chain of horse patrols. He was opposed on every occasion with so much firm politeness that he could not come to the king of Poland, nor find any trifling pretext of national quarrel. The court of Versailles grew impatient at this, and without further ceremony dismissed the Prussian ambassador, M. von Knyphausen, from Paris, and recalled M. de Valori, the French ambassador at Berlin. This open interference obliged the king, on his return from Bohemia, to signify to the duke de Broglie

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at Dresden, where the king fixed his quarters, that, all intelligence having been interrupted between the two courts by the late recall, it was no more proper for an ambassador of France to reside in the same city with his majesty, and that he must incessantly prepare to depart to the king of Poland, whom his embassy concerned. The ambassador received this declaration with that air of haughty dignity which the French so well know to assume, when they recollect the prosperous period of Louis XIV. He did not by this delay his departure for Warsaw. The court of Versailles determined on a rupture, and, having lost sight of that fixed point in her politics, which was to push the war by sea against the English, abandoned herself to caprice and impulses given by foreign powers. She declared she considered the invasion of Saxony as a violation of the peace of Westphalia, of which she was a guarantee. She imagined this pretext of guarantee sufficient to authorize her to take part in the war, and even to induce the Swedes to do the same. The Abbé de Bernis, who had been the promoter of the alliance with the house of Austria, became minister for foreign affairs, instead of M. Rouillé.

In fine, French impetuosity, which always carries the nation to extremes, the inconsistency

of ministers, the animosity with which the king of France had previously been inspired against the king of Prussia, novelty, and fashion, all so contributed to promote the alliance of that court with Austria that this alliance was considered as a master stroke in politics. Imperial ministers only were in vogue, and they so adroitly employed their influence over the councils of Louis XV. that, instead of twenty-four thousand auxiliaries, stipulated by France to be sent to the empress queen, they intrigued so effectually that, in the following spring, a hundred thousand French passed the Rhine.

The Swedes were presently summoned to fulfil their guarantee of the treaty of Westphalia, by the French ministry; and the Swedish senate had long been in the pay of France. Though the laws of the kingdom, in express and positive terms, forbade any declaration of war, without the consent of the three orders which form the general diet of the state, the partisans of France violated these fundamental laws; and, neglecting all usual formalities, blindly adopted the measures the king of France proposed.

While the court of Versailles laboriously prepared the means of overwhelming Germany, a madman endeavoured to accomplish a revolu-

tion in France. An obscure fanatic, who had lived servant at a convent of Jesuits in Flanders, undertook to assassinate Louis XV. This lunatic, named Damiens, repaired to Versailles, that he might watch the moment of putting his abominable project into execution. One evening, when the king was to depart for Choisi, he mingled with the crowd, approached the king behind, and plunged his knife into his side. He was immediately arrested. The wound was found to be slight; and the culprit was committed to the care of the parliament. The prisons were filled with persons whom he had accused in his depositions, but who being innocent recovered their liberty; nor has the public hitherto obtained any other than vague motives, which could induce the monster to commit an act so atrocious.

The court of Vienna, so active at Versailles, was not less diligent in intrigue with the other powers of Europe. She depicted the invasion of Saxony by the Prussians, at Petersburg, in the blackest colours. It was an insult to Russia! It was to brave the force of that empire! It was a manifest contempt of the guarantees the empress Elizabeth had granted the king of Poland for his electorate! In support of these insinuations the Austrians were prodigal of their slanders

against Prussia, as they also were of money, which was not uselessly dispersed. To hasten the march of the Russian troops, the empress queen promised an annual subsidy, of two millions of crowns, to the empress Elizabeth. This sum, properly speaking, was paid by France, and was the equivalent of the contingency she owed to Austria. By this the latter power engaged Russia to declare war against the king.

The servants of the empress queen laboured with no less zeal at Ratisbon to involve the states of the empire in these troubles. The French so far intimidated the diet, by their threats, that it blindly subscribed to the will of the court of Vienna. This diet resolved that the holy empire should form an army of execution, which should immediately advance into the electorate of Brandenbourg; the command of which was bestowed on the prince of Hildburghausen, a marshal in the Austrian service. The fiscal of the empire entered the lists, and affirmed the kings of Prussia and England merited being put to the ban of the empire. Some princes remonstrated that, though the elector of Bavaria had formerly been put to this ban, it was not till after his defeat at the battle of Höchstädt; and that, when the Imperial armies should have gained similar battles, they might then

then be at liberty to proceed against these kings, France well conceived that, were this sentence precipitately made public, the court of Vienna would endanger its dignity ; and it might further be feared that the two kings and their adherents should entirely separate themselves from the holy Roman empire. This they represented at Vienna, and counselled the empress queen to wait that opportunity which good fortune might afford, and maturely to reflect on the final measures she ought to take. Though this advice was followed, it did not prevent the fiscal from acting with rude and insupportable indecency against kings, toward whom even enemies usually observe a polite and respectful procedure. It would have been difficult to answer the injurious and bitter memorials of that diet, had not M. von Plotho, the king's ambassador at Ratibon, had the talent and the address to steep his pen in similar gall. The style of the Imperial court was not more gentle ; its memorials were distinguished from even those of the fiscal, by insolence abounding in haughtiness, and by somewhat still more poignant mingled with supercilious arrogance. Offended by proceedings like these, the king insinuated to the empress queen they might remain enemies without foul language, and that it might suffice for sovereigns

to end their contests by the sword, without prostituting their dignity by memorials in the language of Billingsgate*. These remonstrances long continued vain, and did not acquire force till some battles had first been gained.

While all Europe armed against the kings of Prussia and Great Britain, England was in a general state of commotion, which benumbed government, and would have been prejudicial to the nation, had not this been redressed by a seasonable change. The domestic dissensions which agitated the state were fomented by the duke of Cumberland, who flattered himself he might place his creatures in the first offices of the kingdom. He it was who excited the nation against the French; he it was who promoted war, hoping that the ministry could not sustain itself in times of trouble. The first attempts of the English were so unsuccessful that they lost Port Mahon, and this was a pretext, employed by his party, to tax the duke of Newcastle with incapacity. At the opening of the parliament, the minds of men were heated, the animosity of parties redoubled, and so many springs were made to act by the intrigues of the duke of Cumberland that the duke of Newcastle, rather fatigued than vanquished, resigned his post. The triumphant party bestowed

* *En style des Halles.*

stowed the seals on Mr. Fox, the creature of the duke of Cumberland.

The new ministry could not maintain its power : Fox voluntarily quitted a place procured by so many arts, and the duke of Newcastle was restored to office. These changes in the servants of the state would have been of little consequence, had they not produced a kind of inactivity and lethargy in the transaction of business. The ministry and the great were more occupied concerning the interests of faction than the measures to be taken against France. Animated rather against their competitors than against the national enemy, no plans were formed for the approaching campaign. No one troubled himself concerning the war by sea, hitherto unfortunate ; still less concerning the war that was soon to rage in Germany. What most interested the king at this moment was to induce the English to take measures for the continental war ; and, as he foresaw what would be the general operations of the French army in the empire, he sent the king of England a plan for the common defence of Germany. It chiefly consisted of the following points. The king proposed Wesel should be maintained as a place of arms for the allies, by which they would be enabled to pass the Rhine. He required

quired an army to be assembled in a proper place, behind the Lippe, between Wesel and Lippstadt. This position would have the advantage of enabling troops to march toward the Rhine, or toward the Weser, as occasion should demand. If the French should march into Hesse, the army of the Lippe, by advancing toward Frankfort, would oblige them to quit their pursuits; and while the allied army should be driven from the Rhine, by these operations, the fortress of Wesel would afford employment to the French till it could march back to its relief: for, while this place held out, it was not to be presumed the French forces, on the Lower Rhine, would advance too far into Westphalia.

The king of England, little accustomed to subjects of this kind, read the plan without comprehending its importance; and, as it was proposed to maintain Wesel, he suspected the reasoning of the king of Prussia; but he had entire confidence in his Hanoverian ministers, who incessantly remonstrated that he must confine himself to the defence of the Weser. This judgment was false in every sense; for the Weser is in general fordable, and the shore opposite to the electorate of Hanover is the highest; so that nature never intended, whatever

ever M. von Munchhausen might affirm, that an able general would put this river to the use he proposed. His advice nevertheless prevailed, and all that could be obtained from the king of England was that he consented the Hanoverian and Hessian troops should return into Germany. The want of harmony between the king, the English, and the Hanoverians, obliged the former to take measures different from those he had imagined for the dutchy of Cleves and the fortress of Wesel. Under the necessity of abandoning the latter, he gave orders that a part of its works should be ruined, its numerous artillery be transported by sea to Magdebourg, and that the garrison should evacuate the town and retire to Bielefeld, there to join the allied army in the spring, which was to assemble under the command of the duke of Cumberland.

After the proof that had been given of the influence which the Hanoverian ministers had over the king of England, it was evident that, to apply to the fountain head whence he derived his resolutions, it was necessary they should be addressed. Every thing was to be feared for the army of the duke of Cumberland, which was less under the command of this prince than under a knot of civilians; who, never having seen a camp,

nor

nor read a book on the military art, imagined themselves equal to Marlborough and Eugene. The interest of the king was too closely connected with that of the king of England for him to remain a cool spectator of the false conduct of which he was going to be guilty ; and with the hope of preventing this he sent general Schmettau to Hanover. Schmettau made the most energetic remonstrances to these presumptuous and ignorant rulers, to induce them to renounce the plan they had formed for the campaign. He demonstrated its faults, and vainly predicted its consequences : had he spoken Arabic he would have been equally well understood. The ministry, whose minds were exceedingly confined, had not understanding sufficient to follow a chain of military reasoning. Their want of knowledge rendered them suspicious, and the fear of being deceived, on a subject concerning which they were ignorant, increased their natural obstinacy. Such were the reasons that rendered the mission of general Schmettau ineffectual.

The more artful French had firmly persuaded them it was their intention only to cross their country ; and that the plan of their campaign was entirely directed against the king of Prussia ; that, in a word, they intended to besiege Magdebourg ;

debourg ; and, provided the Hanoverians would remain peaceful spectators of the scene, their country should be spared and their persons respected. The ministers were the dupes of their own credulity, and the French punished their perfidy toward the king of Prussia, as will be seen in the relation of the ensuing campaign.

While these negotiations agitated Europe, the king was at Dresden, where the queen of Poland raised him other difficulties. This princess, while she daily sent her grand master, count Questenberg, to compliment the king with infinite assurances of friendship, maintained a secret intelligence with the Austrian generals, and informed them of whatever she knew. These proceedings gave place to the precautions taken to discover this correspondence. As all packages and merchandize which came from Bohemia were carefully examined at the gates, a box of puddings was one day opened, addressed to madam Ogilvi, first lady to the queen, who had estates in the vicinage of Leutmeritz. These puddings on examination were all stuffed with letters. The discovery rendered the court more circumspect in its correspondence ; the same practices however were continued, but with additional finesse. The ill-will of the queen did not stop here ; she

he sent emissaries to all the garrisons where the king formed new-raised regiments of the Saxons taken at the Lillienstien, to excite them to sedition, revolt, and desertion. Many of them were seduced, and this was the cause that, at the commencement of the campaign, entire corps mutinied and passed over to the enemy. The intention of the king of Poland and his allies was to reincorporate these corps in Hungary, and put them on the same footing they were before they had been taken by the Prussians. Soldiers were assembled, but, wanting officers, they had recourse to a means such as history furnishes no example of, on the part of secular princes. The Saxon officers were released from their parole given to the Prussians; and many of them were mean enough to obey the mandate. In the ages of ignorance, popes may be found who absolved nations from oaths of fidelity sworn to their sovereigns. Thus cardinal Julian Cesarini obliged Ladislas, king of Hungary, to violate the peace he solemnly contracted with Soliman. The crime which authorizes perjury had only been the crime of ambitious and implacable pontiffs; but never of kings, among whom good faith ought to be found, though it had been banished the rest of the world. Should I be thought to insist on such traits,

traits; it is but to characterize the spirit of animosity and obstinate revenge which were predominant in this war, and distinguished it from all others. France and Austria did not obtain all the aid from these Saxon regiments which they expected; they did but increase their expences.

Amid this general effervescence, the enemy's troops were not more tranquil in their quarters than were negotiators in their intrigues. Those corps which the king had in Lusatia were most exposed to projects of attack. This province toward Zittau forms a kind of point, which narrows as it advances between the provinces of Bohemia, and it was surrounded by the Austrians, with large detachments, sent to Friedland, Gabel, and Rombourg. These, being commanded by young officers who ardently sought occasions to distinguish themselves, were in the field during the greatest part of the winter. The prince of Löwenstein was at the head of one; and general Lascy, son of the marshal who had served with distinction in Russia, led the other. They sometimes attempted the post of Ostritz, at others that of Hirschfeld, or Marienthal; and, though their attempts were ineffectual, men were killed to no purpose. Major Blumenthal, of the regiment of Henry,

lost

lost his life on one of these occasions, as did many soldiers from whom the state might have expected better services. The corps of Lestwitz at Zittau, and that of the prince of Bevern at Görlitz, were fatigued by perpetual alarms, being obliged to send aid, sometimes on this side, at others on that : the restless activity of the Austrians kept them continually on foot and in action. As the enemy increased in strength, by the troops that came to join them from Flanders, the contest must at length have become unequal ; and, as reinforcements were necessary for the Prussians to maintain themselves in Lusatia, the king sent a reserve thither, which had occupied that part of Pomerania that is nearest to the province of Prussia. The first destination of these troops had been to join marshal Lehwald, the better to enable him to resist the Russian army ; but the more immediate necessity must be attended to, and the more distant neglected. It was to be remembered that, by dividing the army into three corps that were relatively too equal, neither of them could strike any vigorous and decisive blow ; whereas by assembling a large army in Saxony, some considerable advantages over the Imperialists might be hoped, at the commencement of the campaign, which might confound their allies,

allies, and induce some among them to desist from intended war, and conquests which ambition projected.

The Prussian regiments that came from Pomerania arrived at Görlitz, toward the middle of March, and were employed to strengthen the posts in which there were not sufficient troops ; and after their arrival in Lusatia the enemy remained quiet.

About this time the king made a journey into Silesia, to concert with marshal Schwerin. They met at Haynau. The plan of the approaching campaign was there laid down, and the best possible measures taken to conceal it, even from the knowledge of the army ; after which the king returned into Saxony, where, as well as in Silesia, every preparation was made to execute this plan, as soon as the arrangements relative to subsistence and the coming spring should permit.

I

C H A P.

C H A P. VI.

Campaign of 1757.

THE Prussian troops entered into cantonments toward the end of March. They were divided into four different corps. Prince Maurice commanded in the vicinity of Zwickau. The king, with the main army, kept between Dresden, Pirna, Gishubel, and Dippoldiswalde. The prince of Bevern had assembled the corps that had wintered in Lusatia, near Zittau; and marshal Schwerin advanced with his army, on the frontiers of Bohemia, between Glatz, Friedland, and Landshut. The plan of the campaign was to penetrate at once with these four corps into Bohemia, and by different directions to arrive at Prague, which was the place of rencontre. This grand manœuvre would certainly throw the different corps of the enemy, dispersed in their quarters, into commotion and astonishment. There were hopes that some might be surprised, and that others might be brought to action, and cut off in detail, which might give a superiority and ascendancy to the Prussians during the remainder of the campaign, and bring

bring on a decisive action, the success of which might fix the fortune of the war. To conceal this project was of the utmost importance, and it could only be effected by depriving the enemy even of suspicion, as well as the court of Saxony, by which the Prussians were betrayed. Neither must the army be informed. Nothing must be left to the tongue of imprudence. That every body might be deceived, the city of Dresden was fortified and palisadoed, to put it in a situation of defence. The king meantime chose a certain number of advantageous camps round Dresden, as if he prepared for defensive war. These camps were marked out at Cotta, Maxen, Poffendorf, the Windberg, and Moren. The Saxon chasseurs employed for this purpose informed the court with all haste; and the queen of Poland was equally hasty to inform the Austrian generals. Nor were these false appearances all; but, the better to lull the enemy, feeble incursions were made into Bohemia, as if meant to avenge the alarms of the enemy during winter, in Lusatia, to the disturbance of the Prussians. With this intent prince Maurice took a circuit toward Eger. Marshal Keith came up with an Austrian detachment unexpectedly at Schluckenau. The prince of Bevern surprised four hundred foot and pan-

dours at Böhmisich Friedland, who surrendered themselves prisoners. These trifling attacks kept the Imperialists in security, who were persuaded the king would content himself with giving them petty alarms, and did not suspect him of more grand designs.

The different corps of the Prussian army were in motion, some on the 20th, others on the 29th of April. Prince Maurice entered Bohemia, by the Basberg, whence he advanced to Commotau. The king encamped at Nöllendorf, and sent his van-guard to Karwitz, where Zastrow was detached with his brigade to occupy Auffig, and drive the Austrians from the castle of Tetschen. On the morrow the army marched to Linay, where prince Maurice joined it from Brix. The quarters of the Austrians all fell back beyond the Eger, at the approach of the Prussians. The castle of Tetschen surrendered on the 27th; general Zastrow there had the misfortune to be killed. The army afterward passed the Pascopol, and traversing the plains of Lowositz (24th) encamped at Trebnitz. The Hasenberg was occupied, and the right was supported at the Pascopol. This position was facing that which marshal Braun had lately taken at Budin. It was known that the marshal expected a division of his troops, that

that had wintered in the circles of Saaz and Eger, on the morrow ; and it was thought proper to attempt to prevent this junction, and combat this corps, before it was near enough to receive aid from the camp at Budin. To this effect it was resolved that the army should pass the Eger, at night, a mile and a half above the camp of marshal Braun ; and, if no opportunity of beating this division, which was on the march, should present itself, still the manœuvre must turn the marshal, and oblige him to abandon his position. Bridges were in consequence established at Koschtitz ; which were not finished before the morning of the morrow, when the troops passed the Eger. The hussars, sent immediately on discovery, met the division that was to join the marshal near Penitz. Informed of the passage of the Prussians, that division retired to Welwarn, without any possibility of being attacked, because scarcely half of the army had passed the river. Marshal Braun soon perceived his post was turned, and that he could not join his division, but by retiring himself to Welwarn ; consequently he immediately began his march : the Prussian hussars harassed his rear-guard and took some prisoners.

The army of the king (28th) encamped at Budin, and employed the morrow in repairing

the bridges of the Eger, to ascertain a communication with Saxony. The important magazines which the enemy had at Martinowe, Budin, and Karwatitz, were taken by the Prussians, which greatly facilitated the subsistence of the troops. From Budin the army advanced to Welwarn, which the enemy had abandoned, and the van-guard, composed of forty squadrons, and all the grenadiers, were sent forward as far as Tuchomirfitz (30th), where the king himself was, and saw the army of marshal Braun still on its march. Behind the columns that were filing off followed the rear-guard ; the apparent ill countenance of which gave birth to the desire of attack. Ziethen fell on it and took three hundred prisoners. The enemy from the beginning had taken post on the Weisse-Berg ; this they abandoned on the 2d of May. It was seized by the van-guard of the Prussians, who saw the enemy pass the city of Prague and encamp beyond the Muldau. On the same side, the army of the king occupied all the environs of the city, and formed a kind of circumvallation. His right was supported by the Upper Muldau, whence the camp proceeded, including St. Roc and the convent of Victory, and supported itself at Podbaba, at the Lower Muldau.

During

During the march of the army of the king, the prince of Bevern had proceeded with vigour. On the 20th of April he entered Bohemia, advancing through Krottau and Kratzen to Machendorf. On the march his cavalry beat an Austrian detachment, which advanced to reconnoitre; the enemy had taken an advantageous position at Reichenberg. Count Königseck commanded this corps, the strength of which was estimated at twenty-eight thousand. On the 21st of April, the prince of Bevern marched to the attack, in two columns, taking the road from Habendorf toward the army of the enemy. To arrive there the cause-way must be passed. This defile, which the enemy could not defend with small arms, delayed the Prussians but little. Beyond was the corps of Königseck, which he had formed in a circle, with the Austrian cavalry in the centre, arranged in three lines, on a small plain, included between the two wings of infantry which advanced, with the rear supported by thick forests, having in some places abatis in front, and redoubts, with artillery, for the protection of the cavalry.

The right of the prince attacked the left of the enemy. Fifteen squadrons meantime charged the Imperial cavalry in the plain, and

put it to the rout. The prince of Wurtemberg here enacted wonders. Lestwitz attacked the right of the enemy, and the redoubts that covered Reichenberg: and, though it crossed various defiles before it arrived, still the regiment of Darmstadt, commanded by colonel von Hertzberg, forced these redoubts, and obliged the enemy to take to flight, who was pursued from height to height, as far as Kochlitz and Dorffel. The difficulty of this hilly country, and the impossibility that troops desirous of maintaining their order should come up with a scattered enemy, prevented the prince of Bevern from entirely ruining this corps. The Austrians lost about eighteen hundred men, eight hundred of whom were taken by the prince of Bevern. The Prussian loss did not exceed three hundred, for the resistance of the foe was not obstinate. The prince followed count Königseck to Libenau, where an impracticable defile, behind which this general formed, impeded any new assault.

The Prussians would have been unable to penetrate farther into Bohemia, on this side, had not the march of Schwerin afforded them seasonable succour. The army from Silesia was the first that entered Bohemia, on the 18th of April, by five different routes. One co-

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lumn directed its course to Schatzlar, and had nearly surprised the princes of Saxony, who were there. Another, taking the route of Guldene Els, met with three hundred pandours, who defended a pass on a steep rock. Winterfeld found means of sending some troops to climb these rocks, who took the pandours in the rear, and put them to the sword. The other three columns, passing through the county of Glatz, met no enemy on the road, and all joined marshal Schwerin at Königshof.

The marshal, having received intelligence of what had passed between the prince of Bevern and Königseck, came on the rear of the latter, thinking to surprise him in his camp of Libenau. The Austrians hastily departed, intending to march toward Jung-Buntzlau. They were again prevented by marshal Schwerin, who at the same time seized a considerable magazine the enemy had formed at Kosmanos. At this place the corps from Lusatia joined the army from Silesia. Count Königseck nevertheless advanced by long marches toward Prague. The marshal followed him to Benatek; whence he detached general Wartenberg to pursue the enemy more closely, who defeated the Austrian rear-guard fifteen hundred strong, the greatest number of whom were killed or taken near Alt-

Alt-Buntzlau; but the brave general, one of the best officers of cavalry in the army, here lost his life, and was universally regretted. Fouquet then marched with the van-guard of the army to Buntzlau, and halted there till the 4th of May, to re-establish the bridges of the Elbe, that had been broken down by the enemy to secure their retreat. The same day the marshal crossed the river with his army, and encamped a mile and a half from Prague.

A part of the troops that had served under Piccolomini the preceding year was not yet assembled. Of these marshal Daun received the command, after the death of Piccolomini. Hearing of these different incursions of the Prussians, the marshal received orders to assemble his army and march immediately for Prague. Braun expected him with the more impatience when he perceived he should be incontinently attacked by the whole Prussian force. The king was informed of the march of marshal Daun, but his army could not undertake any thing against Braun, who was covered by the Muldau and the city of Prague; yet such was the situation of affairs that the fate of the two armies must necessarily be decided by a battle; and, since marshal Braun could only be attacked on the opposite shore of the Muldau, the king

king resolved to engage him before his junction with Daun.

To this effect a bridge was thrown over the Muldau, near Seltz, and the king crossed at the head of a detachment of twenty battalions and forty squadrons. This was the 5th of May. He had time to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, found the front of the marshal too difficult for attack, and perceived that, by turning the right of the enemy, the ground would present an aspect more advantageous for engagement. Early on the morning of the morrow, the two Prussian armies joined within reach of the enemy's artillery ; and it was determined immediately to begin the attack. The left of the Austrians was supported by the hill of Ziska, and protected by the fortifications of Prague. Its front was covered by a ravin more than a hundred feet deep. Its right terminated on a height, at the foot of which stands the village of Sterboholi. To render the meditated battle more equal, marshal Braun must be constrained to abandon a part of these hills, and descend into the plain. The king, that he might effect this, changed his order of battle. The army had filed off in broken columns : it was placed in two lines, and marched to the left, taking the road to Postchernitz. As soon

as marshal Braun perceived this motion, with his reserve of grenadiers, his cavalry of the left, and his second line of infantry, he kept pace with the Prussians in a parallel line. He acted exactly as the king wished. The army of the king advanced to Bichowitz, through defiles and marshes, which somewhat separated the troops. The Prussian cavalry filed through the village, where it came to a plain bounded by a pond, which presented the exact distance necessary to form, between this village and the pond, and adjust its flanks free from all insult. It then vigorously attacked the Austrian cavalry, which after three successive charges was broken and put entirely to the rout. Scarcely were ten battalions of the left formed, before the second line could join them, when they attacked the enemy with more precipitation and courage than wisdom. They received a prodigious fire of artillery, and were repulsed, but not certainly with shame, for the bravest officers and half the battalions were extended on the field. Marshal Schwerin, who in despite of his great age still preserved all the fire of youth, beholding with indignation the Prussians repulsed, and seizing a pair of colours, headed his regiment, led it to the charge, and performed extraordinary acts of valour; but, as there were not yet sufficient

ficient troops to support him, he fell, was slain, and thus terminated a glorious life by death which acquired him additional glory.

In the interim the second line came up. The king farther sent for prince Ferdinand of Brunswic and some regiments, and the battle was restored with the more facility because that Treskow, with his brigade, who though however little was more to the right, had pierced the enemy's line. The king caused the regiments of Charles and young Brunswic to join Treskow, and with this corps pursued the Austrian infantry beyond their tents, which they had wanted time to strike. From this moment the rout on the right of the enemy became general. Cavalry was sent for to profit by the disorder. Unfortunately the hussars and dragoons had fallen upon the flying enemy's baggage; and arrived too late to attack the infantry, who otherwise would have been all taken or put to the sword. This did not prevent the king from hotly pursuing the foe. Putkammer was sent with hussars toward the Saffawa, whether a part of the fugitives had escaped, and the main army advanced toward the Wischerad; so that the left and right of the Austrians were totally separated.

It was not intended that the right of the
Prussians

Prussians should engage, because of a deep ravin before noticed, which was in front, and of the disadvantages of the ground; but they were led on by the imprudence of Mannstein, whose courage was sometimes too violent. This ardent bravery, which flamed forth at the sight of the enemy, occasioned him to advance without having received orders. He immediately attacked the foe. Prince Henry and the prince of Bevern, who disapproved his conduct, still, unwilling to abandon him, were obliged to support the attack. The Prussian infantry had difficult rocks to climb, defended by the whole left of the Austrians, and a numerous artillery. Prince Ferdinand of Brunswic, perceiving the battle begun on this side, and being useless on the left, where he had no more foes to face, took the Austrians in flank and rear, by which the efforts of prince Henry were so well seconded that he seized on three of the batteries of the enemy, whom he pursued from hill to hill. The vanquished, cut off from the Saffawa by the corps of the king in their rear, at the village of Michele, could only find safety by throwing themselves into the city of Prague. They attempted to escape near the Witscherad, where they were thrice repulsed by the cavalry of the king. They next made an essay toward

toward Königsaal, and were again driven back by marshal Keith, whose army occupied all the heights at the foot of which they were to pass.

It was indeed known that the Imperial fugitives had escaped to Prague, but not how many of them ; the king therefore was satisfied with investing and blockading the city, as well as the darkness and the species of confusion attendant on victories would permit.

This battle, which began about nine in the morning, continued, including the pursuit, till eight in the evening, and was one of the most murderous of the present century. The enemy there lost twenty-four thousand men, five thousand of whom were made prisoners, with thirty officers, eleven standards, and sixty cannon that were taken. The loss of the Prussians amounted to eighteen thousand, without enumerating marshal Schwerin, who himself was equal to more than ten thousand men. His death withered the laurels of victory, bought by blood so precious. This day beheld the pillars of the Prussian infantry fall : generals Fouquet and Winterfeld were dangerously wounded. Hautcharmoy, Goltz, the prince of Holstein, Mannstein *, Anhalt, and a number of valiant

* Either there were two officers of the name of Mannstein, or this is a mistake, as will presently be seen. T. officers

officers and old soldiers, there lost their lives, and could not be replaced, during a cruel and bloody war.

On the morrow the king sent general Krockow to Prague, to summon the city to surrender; who was highly astonished to find prince Charles of Lorraine there, and to learn with certainty that forty thousand Austrians, escaped from the battle, were inclosed within the walls. This news obliged the king to take different measures. He seized on the hill of Žiska, where the right of the army encamped, and where the front, occupying all the vineyards that looked toward Prague, extended through Michele, and ended at Pödoli and the Muldau. A bridge was here constructed to preserve a certain communication on that side with marshal Keith, and a similar one at Branick, on the Lower Muldau. The city of Prague cannot be considered as a fortress. Situated in a bottom, it is surrounded by vineyards and rocks, which overlook it on all sides. Its ditches are dry, its stone works flight, the parapets in many places too thin, the curtains too long. All its ramparts had been so neglected during the peace that they were in many parts liable to insult; but the garrison was very different. To attack this in form a more numerous army was requisite,

quisite, especially after the detachments the king had been obliged to make, and of which we shall presently speak. This induced him to attempt nothing more than a blockade, that the garrison might be taken by famine. It was hoped the bombs might set fire to the magazines: mortars and artillery were brought up, and three grand batteries fixed, one on the hill of Ziska, another before Michele, and the third by the side of marshal Keith, toward the Strohhof. All these were ineffectual; the city had casemated bastions, where the magazines were sheltered from every attempt of the Prussian artillery.

While these arrangements were made round Prague, marshal Daun and his corps had advanced to Teutschbrodt. The king first sent general Ziethen to oppose him, and soon after the prince of Bevern; who at the head of twenty thousand men inclined first to Kaurzim, then to Kuttenberg, still obliging Daun to recede till he had retired as far as Haber. But every step in retreat did but strengthen him, and give him the means of collecting the scattered fugitives from the battle of Prague; who having escaped beyond the Saffawa were enabled to join the marshal.

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On another side the king sent colonel Mayer into the empire with his volunteers, and five hundred hussars, to terrify the German princes, and retard the union of the army of the circles; and, at the same time, to alarm the pedants of Ratisbon, whose insulting eloquence violated every rule of good breeding. Mayer entered the bishopric of Bamberg, and thence proceeded toward Nuremberg, causing the arrogant deputies, who imagined themselves judges of kings, to desert Ratisbon; after which he ventured into the Upper Palatinate. The elector of Bavaria, and several princes whom this irruption inspired with fears, sent deputies to the king to treat on their personal interests, and the whole empire would have abandoned the party of the empress queen, if one of those revolutions, so common to war, and which are part of the sports of fortune, had not crossed the prosperity of Prussia. In the continuation of this work, we shall perceive how many of these vicissitudes overthrew the hopes of the Prussians, and of the Imperialists.

The blockade of Prague however continued; the city was bombarded, but the Austrians made frequent sallies. One day they were desirous of attacking the batteries of the Strohhof, whither prince Ferdinand of Prussia hastened, and chased them

them to their covered way, with the loss of twelve hundred men. Another time they attempted a sally toward Wischerad, but, with so little precaution and foresight that, presenting their flank to the Prussian batteries placed beside Podoli, the artillery made them re-enter Prague in the utmost disorder. A third time prince Charles of Lorrain, with four thousand men, made a sally on the little side of the city. His troops took an arrow defended by fifty soldiers, but they were soon repulsed by Retzow, and pursued to the very gates.

During this siege, the Prussians had not only enemies but the elements themselves to combat : a violent storm and descending rains suddenly swelled the waters of the Moldau, the impetuosity of which broke the bridge of Branick, and carried it away toward the bridge of Prague. The enemy took twenty-four pontoons ; twenty others escaped them, and were recovered at Podoli.

The great number of bombs thrown by the Prussians into Prague had considerably damaged certain quarters of the city, and had even consumed one of the bakeries. All the deserters asserted provisions began to fail, and that, instead of butcher's meat, the garrison fed on horse flesh. It was vexatious to perceive that neither

force nor stratagem prevailed against the city, and that all hope depended on time. Famine and despair only could force prince Charles to cut his way through the besiegers ; for they were so fortified, in their quarters, that he must have been obliged, after some fruitless efforts, to have surrendered.

The project of taking Prague, with the army by which it was defended, must however have succeeded, would time have permitted to have brought it to maturity ; but marshal Daun was to be opposed, a battle was to be fought, and misfortune was the result.

We have left the prince of Bevern encamped at Kuttenberg, and marshal Daun at Haber. Here the marshal was joined by all the garrisons the court could send from the hereditary states, and the troops of Hungary, exclusive of the fugitives from the battle of Prague ; so that his army, only fourteen thousand strong at the commencement of the campaign, then contained sixty thousand men. The increase of this army deranged all the combined preceding projects of the king : it was necessary to reinforce the prince of Bevern, that he might support himself against an army which tripled his own force ; yet was it dangerous to enfeeble the besieging army, which had a vast circumference to defend,

fend, and which might daily expect to be attacked by forty thousand men, inclosed within the walls. Means however were found, by œconomy of posts, fortifying some, and narrowing others, to make a detachment of ten battalions and twenty squadrons. These troops might depart, but not for any length of time, or the blockade must have suffered. In order to take Prague, and the army by which it was defended, marshal Daun must indispensably be driven from these parts; because that the troops employed in the circumvallation, though well posted to repulse sallies, formed but one line, and could not at once defend themselves in front and rear; and because that, leaving the army to be inclosed round Prague, the Prussians would have wanted subsistence, the cavalry being already obliged to go four or five miles from the camp, in search of forage.

These important considerations determined the king to head the detachment that was to join the prince of Bevern, that he might personally judge of the part it was necessary to take. On the 13th of June the king left Prague: Trefskow was detached at the same time to clear the banks of the Saffawa, which began to be infested by the light troops of marshal Daun. The king pursued his march through Schwartz

Kostelitz, to Malotitz, where he was joined by Treskow, who had taken the route to the right. The intention of the king was to arrive at Kolin, and join the prince of Bevern. He found a considerable corps in his front, encamped at Zasmuky, commanded by general Nadasti, who had taken this position, and in some manner cut off the prince of Bevern from the Prussian army. Two columns were discovered at a distance, on the road of Kolin, taking the route to Kaurzim, and from the party sent to reconnoitre it was learned that this was the prince of Bevern, coming to join the king. The day declined and night arrived before the prince, by which the king was obliged to remain satisfied with encamping the troops as well as darkness would permit. He was astonished at the motion of the prince, which was unexpected. It was occasioned by what had passed on the eve. He had been attacked, on the 13th, at Kuttenberg, by Nadasti, whom he had repulsed; while marshal Daun made a motion upon his flank, which had obliged him, that it might not be turned, to quit his position of Kuttenberg, and assume that of Kolin. Here he received information that the Austrians, encamped at Wisoka, prepared to attack him on the morrow. That he might run no risk he rather chose to depart

and meet the Prussian detachment, which he knew was on its march to reinforce him, than wait the attack.

On the 16th the king wished to reconnoitre the roads of Wisoka, that he might judge of the disposition of the enemy; but this could not be performed, because of the thick forests and the numerous pandours by which they were infested. The same day four thousand Croats attacked a convoy, coming from Nymburg to the army, escorted by two hundred foot, under the command of major Billerbeck, of the regiment of Henry. This brave officer defended himself for three hours against his numerous assailants, till the arrival of succour, by which he was relieved, without having lost the smallest part of his convoy, and with only seven wounded; a very inconsiderable number when we recollect the strength of the corps by which he was attacked. Such petty details are only so far worthy of history as they are exemplary of the effects of fortitude, and good disposition, in war.

The ground on which the Prussians encamped was not sufficiently advantageous, to wait for the enemy in safety. The king wished to march to Scwoischitz, the vicinage of which was susceptible of defence; but scarcely was this under-

taken before the army of marshal Daun made its appearance, and formed near Scwoischitz, in a kind of triangle, with the left toward Zasmuky, the right toward the Elbe, and the front opposite Kaurzim and Malotitz, covered by a marshy meadow, through which a rivulet ran. This motion of the enemy (17th) produced a necessary change in the disposition of the Prussians. The army took another direction, inclined more to the left, approached Nymburg, and encamped, having Planiany to the left of its front, and its right at Kaurzim, into which a battalion was thrown to secure the flank. A corps of Austrians was encountered near Planiany, the intention of which could only be to seize on the provisions of the Prussians at Nymburg. This corps was obliged to retreat, and to take post on a height behind Planiany, where it remained all night.

The situation of the king daily became more critical and difficult; his position was bad, his camp narrow, shut up between mountains; his front indeed was unapproachable, because of the marsh and rivulet which separated the armies; but so was not his right, ill supported at Kaurzim, and which marshal Daun had the power to turn when he pleased, by inclining from Zasmuky toward Malotitz. Had the enemy

enemy made this motion the army must have been taken in flank, and beaten without resource.

The objects to accomplish were too numerous and too contradictory to be reconciled; yet to neglect any one would be of considerable prejudice. The magazines of Brandeis and Nymburg were to be covered, from which the army of observation derived bread; and the blockade of Prague protected, by preventing, with a feeble corps, an army doubly superior from making approaches, or detaching troops. The more the inferiority of the Prussians became evident the more had they to dread some considerable check; for, supposing they could even maintain the camp in which they lay, the impossibility of preventing marshal Daun from sending a large detachment, which proceeding beside the Saffawa should come on the back of the Prussians, encamped between Branick and Michele, was not the less. Thus the besieging army, attacked in rear while prince Charles of Lorrain should make a sally, would be between two fires, and consequently entirely beaten.

Should the king retire to Kosteletz, or Teutschbrodt, he there would find camps more advantageous, but the inconveniencies just mentioned

tioned would still subsist ; for, by approaching the Elbe, and covering the magazines, the road toward Prague would be left open ; and, by inclining toward the Saffawa, to protect the siege, the magazines would be left uncovered, and this loss must be immediate ; not to mention that, by giving ground in a country where there was forage, the army must retire into one more close and exhausted, the provisions of which had already been consumed.

Considerations still more forcible presented themselves. Marshal Daun commanded an army of sixty thousand men, assembled by the empress queen at a great expence. Was it to be presumed that, having so many troops in Bohemia, the court would with impunity suffer that the Prussians should take prince Charles of Lorrain and forty thousand men prisoners in Prague, and in presence of this army ? It was even known that marshal Daun had orders to risk every thing for the deliverance of the prince. It therefore was to be determined whether the enemy should be left to attack the Prussians in their post, or by assault prevent assault. Add to this that, since marshal Daun had become so strong, it was impossible to take Prague without a second victory ; and it would have been shameful to have raised the siege at the approach
of

of the enemy, since the worst that could happen was to abandon the place, should the enemy be victorious.

Independent of what has hitherto been said, there was a still more important reason: by gaining another battle the king would have an entire superiority over the Imperialists. The princes of the empire, who already began to waver, would have conjured him to grant them a neutrality; the operations of the French in Germany would have been deranged, and perhaps impeded; the Swedes would have become more pacific and circumspect: even the court of Petersburg would have taken time to reflect, because the king would have been enabled to send succours to his Prussian army without any risk, and to that of the duke of Cumberland likewise. Such were the weighty reasons that induced the king to attack marshal Daun on the morrow.

Early on the morning of the 18th the march began. Treskow, with the van-guard, dislodged the corps that had encamped, the evening before, on the heights behind Planiany. This was necessary as a preliminary step in order to clear the road of Kolin, on which the army was to march in two columns. It filed off to the left in two lines in presence of the enemy.

enemy. Marshal Daun, discovering this motion, immediately changed his front, and marching to the right, proceeded on the top of the hills which inclined toward Kolin. Nadasti was placed before the army of the king, with from four to five thousand hussars, that were driven from ground to ground by a corps of cavalry; but this retarded the march of the columns. These light troops were continually pressed upon till an eminence was gained, which must necessarily be occupied to attack the enemy.

As the troops did not arrive with that promptitude which might have been desired, the king profited by the interim to assemble his general officers, and with them to concert the plan of the battle. There was an inn adjoining the road on which the troops marched. Here the order in which marshal Daun had arranged his forces, and the ground on which it was necessary to act, were distinctly seen. At this place the following measures were taken. It was resolved to attack the right of the enemy, because it was ill supported, and the ground was the most accessible. The Austrian front extended over rugged and steep rocks, at the foot of which were villages, in the plain, filled with pandours. But the more impregnable they

were on this side the less were they so on the right. The place where the left of the Prussians was to attack was the height which they already occupied. From this a lonely church-yard presented itself, defended by Croats, which must be carried ; afterward, turning a little to the left, the army of Daun would be taken in flank and rear. This attack, to be supported, must be supplied with all the Prussian infantry ; for which reason the king proposed entirely to refuse his right to the enemy, and severely forbade the officers who commanded it to pass beyond the high road of Kolin. This was the more reasonable because that part of the Austrian army, posted opposite his right, occupied ground that could not be approached. Had the position the king prescribed been observed, he would have been enabled, during the action, to file off such battalions as might be wanted, to sustain the brigades that made the first attack.

In addition, general Ziethen had orders to make head against Nadasti, with forty squadrons, that the Prussian army might not be molested in its operations : the remainder of the cavalry was placed in reserve in the rear. When every thing was regulated, general Hulsen departed, at the head of seven battalions and

and fourteen cannon, to begin the action. Of twenty-four battalions, that remained, six formed the second line, and fifteen the first *.

Such was the disposition which would have rendered the Prussians victorious, had it been followed. We shall relate what actually happened.

Ziethen attacked the corps of Nadafti, which was generally routed, and pursued to Kolin, so that it was separated from the Austrians, and disabled from affording the least impediment, during the action, to the plans of the king. At one o'clock Hulsen attacked the church-yard, and the village on the height, where he met with no great resistance. He next mastered two batteries, each of twelve pieces. Every thing was successful, during this first attack; but here follow the errors which occasioned the loss of the battle. Prince Maurice, who led the left of the infantry, instead of supporting it behind the village that Hulsen had carried, formed it at the distance of a thousand paces from the height. This line was in the air. The king perceived the fault, and brought it near the foot of the height, while a warm

* Either there is an error in the press, or, the king has omitted to mention in what manner the remainder was employed. T.

firing was heard on the right. Obliged to hasten, and incapable of acting otherwise, he filled the spaces he found in his line by the battalions of the second : he then repaired to the right, to learn the cause of the firing in question. He found Mannstein *, who had engaged so unseasonably at the battle of Prague, had again committed a similar error. He perceived some pandours, in a village near the road maintained by the column. These he took a fancy to dislodge, entered the village contrary to orders, drove away the enemy, pursued, and found himself under the fire of the case-shot, from the Austrian batteries. He was attacked in turn, and the right of the infantry marched to his support. At the time the king arrived the affair had become so serious that there were no means of retreating, without the loss of the battle. The left was presently in like manner engaged, which the commanders however might have prevented. The action became general, and it was afflicting for the

* The king recounts the death of Mannstein, at the battle of Prague. Perhaps this is a mistake. It appears however that there were several Mannsteins, for the name again recurs after the death of the present, which soon follows. The Mannstein here mentioned is the general whose memoirs the world is in possession of, translated by the immortal Hume. T.

king to remain a spectator, without having one battalion in reserve, of which he could dispose. Marshal Daun, like a great general, profited by the errors of the Prussians. He filed off his reserve, in the rear of his front, and attacked Hulsen, who till then was victorious. Hulsen still maintained his ground; and, could four fresh battalions have been sent to his aid, the victory would have been gained. The Austrian reserve was repulsed; the dragoons of Normann fell upon the enemy's infantry, dispersed it, and took five pair of colours. They next attacked the Saxon carabiners, whom they drove to Kolin. Meantime, the Prussian infantry, of the center and the right, had gained some ground, without however any considerable advantage. These battalions, having all suffered by the cannon and fire of small arms, being half cut off, left intervals of thrice the space they ought to have done; and, as there were neither second line nor reserve, the intervals could only be filled by regiments of cuirassiers, placed at some distance in the rear of these intervals. The Prussian regiment of cavalry even attacked a body of the enemy's infantry, which it would have destroyed, had not a case-shot battery timely played upon it, by which it was repulsed

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in confusion, and threw the regiments of Bevern and Henry in its rear into disorder. This the enemy immediately perceived, profited by the moment, attacked with the cavalry, and confusion became universal. The king wished to charge with the cuirassiers that were at hand, and who might in part have repaired the evil; but he found it impossible to put them in motion. He had recourse to two squadrons of Truchses' regiment, took the enemy's cavalry in flank, and sent it back to the foot of its hills. Of the line of infantry, there remained only the first battalion of guards which still kept its ground on the right; it had repulsed four battalions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, by which it had been attempted to be surrounded: but a single battalion, however brave, cannot gain a battle.

Hulsen, with his infantry and some cavalry, that had been sent him, still maintained the ground from which he had driven the Austrians at the commencement of the action. Here he remained till nine o'clock, when he and the whole army were obliged to retire. Prince Maurice led the troops to Nymburg, where he passed the Elbe, without being pursued by a single hussar of the enemy. This

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action cost the king eight thousand of his best infantry. He lost sixteen cannon, which could not be carried off, the horses having been killed. After he had given orders to his generals, concerning the retreat of the troops, he hastened with all speed to his army at Prague, where he could not arrive before the evening of the morrow; and dispositions were made to raise the blockade of the city, which the fatal day of Kolin would no longer allow to be continued.

A singular circumstance at the battle of Kolin was that the Austrian infantry began to retire, and the cavalry prepared to follow their example, when one colonel Ayassas, of his own proper motion, attacked the Prussian infantry, with his dragoons, at the very moment the cuirassiers of Prussia had put them in confusion, and when success occasioned the first orders to be revoked. No doubt the embarrassment of the Austrians, after so obstinate a battle, prevented their pursuit of the Prussians. They were nevertheless victorious. Had marshal Daun possessed more resolution and activity, his army might certainly have arrived on the 20th before Prague, and the consequences of the battle of Kolin would have become more fatal, to the Prussians, than defeat itself.

Early

Early on the morning of the 20th, the Prussians raised the blockade of Prague. The corps that had encamped toward Michéle retired, beyond the Elbe, through Alt-Buntzlau, and Brandeis, to join the army of Kolin, that encamped at Nymburg. The corps of marshal Keith was to retire to Welwarn, to cover the magazines of Leutmeritz, and Auffig. Contrarieties happened. The bridges were not removed with sufficient promptitude; delay succeeded, and marshal Keith could not quit his camp before eleven o'clock. The Prussians had left Michéle by three in the morning. Prince Charles, who had received intelligence of the victory of Daun, prepared to make a sally on the troops of marshal Keith, that were about to raise the piquet guard. He came from the city on the little side, and hotly cannonaded the two Prussian columns, as they retired by the convent of Victory. The grenadiers of the rear-guard calmed the impetuosity of the enemy; and the prince of Prussia took a position at Reesin, where he protected the retreat. The Prussians only lost two hundred men, killed and wounded, in this affair. Prince Charles took two three pounders, the horses of which were killed; which was the sole trophy he acquired.

The corps with which the king had marched to Brandeis took, on the morrow, the camp of Lissa, where it was joined by the remaining troops from Kolin. It was falsely supposed that marshal Daun would act against the army of the king, and prince Charles against that of marshal Keith. The Austrians lost much time in bringing up their magazines; and the two Austrian armies formed a junction, at Brandeis, a week afterward. The prince of Prussia took the command of the army of Lissa, with which he marched to Jung-Buntzlau, and soon after to Böhmisch Leippa. The king took the road to Melnick, with a reinforcement, to join marshal Keith, and passed the Elbe at Leutmeritz.

In order however not to lose a communication with the prince of Prussia, he left prince Henry, with a detachment, at Trebotschau, on the right shore of the Elbe. The army of the king extended over the plain, between Leutmeritz and Lowolitz.

Some battalions occupied the Pascopol, and the defile of Welmina. The passes of Saxony were guarded by troops newly levied.

The town of Leutmeritz (July) had served as a deposit, during the siege of Prague; and was the grand magazine and hospital of the army.

army. Situated in a bottom, this town cannot be defended, except by camps that shall occupy the surrounding hills. As the troops arrived, care was taken to disencumber it of the sick, ammunition, and artillery, that were guarded here. No activity, or haste, with these transports, could complete them before the 20th of July. At the commencement of this month Nadasti approached the army, encamped at Gastorf, in presence of the corps of prince Henry, and made every effort to interrupt the communication which the Prussians held, between the camps of Leutmeritz and Leippa. This he did without difficulty, by sending his pandours into the forests, and defiles, which are numerous in this part of Bohemia.

On the left of the Elbe, only a small corps of Austrians appeared, commanded by general Laudon. This partisan, at the head of two thousand pandours, took post at the foot of the Pascopol, whence he infested the high roads, disturbed the detachments, and gained inconsiderable advantages. That in which he was most successful was fatal to Mannstein, famous for having begun the battle of Prague, and having occasioned the loss of victory at Kolin. This general was on his road to Saxony, that he

might there have his wounds cured. He was escorted by two hundred newly raised men. Laudon attacked him; his escort was thrown into disorder; Mannstein left his carriage, drew his sword, furiously defended himself, and, refusing to receive quarter, fell dead on the spot.

War was carried on with greater vigour in the parts where the prince of Prussia commanded. Prince Charles of Lorrain and marshal Daun, after their junction, quitted Brandeis, and followed the prince. They encamped at Nîmes, where they turned his left flank, and gained a march on the Prussians toward Gabel. General Puttkammer defended the castle of that town, whither he had been sent, by the prince of Prussia, with four battalions, to protect the convoys that arrived at his army from Zittau. Had the prince marched immediately to Gabel, the Austrians would have gained nothing by their motion. But, not at first perceiving its consequences, he remained tranquilly in his camp, and suffered the enemy to act as he pleased. Marshal Daun sent a detachment of twenty thousand men, to attack Puttkammer at Gabel. The general, after a vigorous resistance, when the trenches had been three days opened, not being succoured, was obliged

obliged to surrender prisoner of war. After the loss of this post, the prince of Prussia understood its importance. The high road from this camp to Zittau was through Gabel ; which being interdicted, the remaining road led through Rumburg, but was some miles longer, and could only be passed by one column. This the army was obliged to take, and lost its baggage and some pontoons, that were broken, in the narrow roads, between the rocks. The prince arrived at Zittau by describing an arch, and marshal Daun by the chord of that arch. General Schmettau, who commanded the van of the Prussians, as he approached Zittau, found the Austrians established on Eckartsberg, the post the most important in that vicinity, and one which commands the town and the environs. The army of the prince of Prussia occupied a height that faced the camp of the enemy, with the town of Zittau before his right, between the two armies, and his left extended toward the hill of Hennersdorf. The prince might support the town, though he could not prevent it from being insulted by the Imperialists. Excited by prince Charles of Saxony, marshal Daun bombarded the town. The streets of Zittau are narrow ; most of the roofs are boarded ; these took fire,

and the planks communicated the conflagration to several quarters of the town at once ; the houses fell and passage was stopt by their ruins. The prince saw the necessity of withdrawing the garrison. The troops of the opposite side could not regain the army, because of the flames and ruins in their way, by which means colonel Dierke, with a hundred and fifty pioneers, and colonel Kleist, with eighty men of the regiment of the margrave Henry, were taken by the enemy.

As the town of Zittau was in itself of no consequence, this misfortune was only felt because of the considerable magazine which was there. After it was consumed by the flames, the army of the prince of Prussia being obliged to derive subsistence and bread from Dresden, these must have been brought twelve miles, before they could arrive at the camp ; and, as the difficulties of such transportation were insurmountable, the prince was obliged to approach his provisions. He decamped from Zittau, without being followed by the enemy, and chose a position for the army in the vicinage of Bautzen.

When the king was informed of the loss of Gabel, he proposed to evacuate Leutmeritz, and return into Saxony. The town of Leutmeritz was empty ; the ammunition and provisions had arrived

arrived at Dresden; and, as there was no time to lose, prince Henry passed the Elbe. After he had joined the king, the army encamped between Sulowitz and Lowofitz. (August) Nadasti, who had followed the rear of the prince, attacked the grand guards of the camp: warmly received, and repulsed with loss, he repassed the Elbe with promptitude. The following days the army retired to Linay; and from thence to Nöllendorf and Pirna. A detachment of two hundred newly raised men, who guarded the Schreckenstein, was attacked and taken by Laudon. The posts of Auffig and Tetschen were evacuated without loss. The king left prince Maurice, at Gishubel, with fourteen battalions and ten squadrons, to defend that pass, and marched with the remaining troops, desirous to join the prince of Prussia at Bautzen. The prince, who had fallen ill, quitted the army and languished ever after. The king advanced, with a detachment, from Bautzen to Weissenberg, whence he dislodged general Beck, who retreated toward Bernstadt. The arrangements necessary for the re-establishment of order in subsistence, and the preparation of new chests, retarded the king a fortnight. Pressed by the progress of the French on his right, and the Russians on his left, he was obliged to make detachments.

tachments. This inspired him with the project of marching to the Austrians, and ridding himself of them, before he should be too feeble. On the 16th, he departed for Bernstadt, heading the column of the left, and the prince of Brunswick that of the right. They thought to surround Beck, on the hill near Sohland, and this partisan could only escape by losing a part of his men. At Bernstadt, information was received that a detachment of the enemy had assembled at Ostritz. Hither Werner was sent, and was on the point of taking Nadasti, whose baggage and the troops that escorted him fell into his hands. Among his papers were found original letters, from the queen of Poland, informing this general of all she knew, concerning the Prussians, and proposing projects of surprise. The king sent the originals to Finck, governor of Dresden, that he might shew them the queen, in order that she might understand her proceedings were known.

The king detached (17th) five battalions from Bernstadt, to take post at Görlitz, and marched with the main army immediately toward the Austrians. Marshal Daun was encamped at the Eckartsberg. He had but a motion to make with his troops, to present his front to the Prussians. This post was not to be attacked. A

hill

hill on the left, cut in the form of a bastion, and defended by sixty twelve pounders, flanked the half of his army. In the van of his front the village of Wittgenau lay, in a bottom, through which runs a rivulet, between steep rocks. Three roads presented themselves, which led to the enemy through this village, the largest of which was wide enough for a carriage. The right of the marshal was supported by the Neisse, beyond which river Nadafti was encamped, with the reserve of the army, on a height; whence, with thirty heavy cannon, he could sweep the whole front of the Imperial army.

The main armies were only separated by the hollow way of Wittgenau, and the day was passed (18th) in a reciprocal cannonade. On the morrow a corps, under the command of Winterfeld, crossed the Neisse at Hirschfeld, to reconnoitre whether some means might not be found of engaging Nadafti, which would have induced Daun to succour him, and might have brought on a battle. But the difficulty of ground again opposed this plan, and it was renounced. Nothing however could be more advantageous for the king, under his present circumstances, than a decisive action. He had no time to lose. A body of French was at Erfurt. The army of the duke of Cumberland was cooped up at Stade.

Stade. The dutchy of Magdebourg, and the old March, were exposed to the incursions of the French. The Swedish army had passed the Peene, near Anclam. The troops of the circles were in motion, toward Saxony. Yet did the impossibility of engaging, on ground so difficult and impracticable, and the necessity of making immediate detachments, oblige the king to retire (20th.) The infantry retreated in a line, which the enemy pretended not to perceive. The army marched to Bernstadt, and encamped on the heights of Jauernick, as far as the Neisse, beyond which the corps of Winterfeld extended to Radomeritz. A detachment was sent to the relief of the brigade of Görlitz, with which Grumbkow was ordered to repair to Silesia, to clear the frontiers of the enemy's parties, that committed disorders there, and at the same time to watch for the security of the fortrefs of Schweidnitz.

The king gave the command of the army to the prince of Bevern (25th) in conjunction with general Winterfeld, in whom he really confided. They were particularly recommended carefully to cover the frontiers of Silesia, after which he departed, with eighteen battalions and thirty squadrons, to oppose the French and the troops of the empire. That we might not interrupt the incidents

incidents of the campaign, which were each connected with the other, we have made no mention of the campaign of the allied army, under the command of the duke of Cumberland, of which it is at present necessary to give a short recapitulation.

At the beginning of April, the French took possession of the towns of Cleves and Wesel, without encountering opposition. The count de Gisors seized on Cologne, which the French designed to make a place of arms. Marshal d'Etréées, who was to take the command of the army, arrived there in the beginning of May, and advanced, on the 26th, with all his forces, and encamped at Munster. The duke of Cumberland collected his troops at Bielefeld, whence he had sent a detachment to Paderborn, at the approach of d'Etréées, whose army encamped at Rheda. The duke retired to Herford, on which the French sent a detachment into Hesse; which, meeting with no opposition, seized on the whole landgraviate. Cassel itself (the capital) surrendered after a feeble resistance.

The duke of Cumberland, not intending to maintain his ground till he had passed the Weser, according to the plan of the Hanoverian ministry, who believed the passage of this river more difficult than that of the Rhine, crossed

(July)

(July) with his troops over bridges that he had prepared in the villages of Rhemun and Vlotho. He gave orders, in the mean time, that the fortifications of the towns of Munden and Hameln should be hastened. This was thinking tardily. The French inclined toward Corbie. One of their detachments, having passed the Weser, occasioned the duke to change his position, and he encamped with his right at Hameln, and his left at Afferde. The duke of Orleans, in the interim, threw bridges over the Weser, to cross at Munden. The duke of Cumberland, who expected soon to be attacked, called in all his detachments, and assembled them at Hafensteinbeck, the position of which had been described to him as admirable. The right of his army was there well supported, and the centre retreated elbowing. In his front was a wood, and in this wood a considerable ravin.

The French army approached the allies, who were reconnoitred by d'Etréés on the 25th, while he was cannonaded by the duke of Cumberland. On the Morrow the French attacked his left, by gliding through this ravin at the bottom of the wood, and carried the centre battery of the allies. This the hereditary prince of Brunswick recovered, sword in hand; by which first essay he shewed nature had destined him

a hero. Meantime a Hanoverian colonel, Breitenbach, took upon himself to collect the first battalions he met, entered the wood, fell upon the French in the rear, expelled them, and seized their cannon and colours. Every body supposed the battle gained. D'Etréés, who saw his troops routed, had given orders for retreat. These the duke of Orleans opposed. At length, to the great astonishment of the whole French army, they learned that the duke of Cumberland was on the full march, retreating to Hameln. The hereditary prince was obliged to abandon the battery he had with so much glory recovered; and the retreat was made with such precipitation that the brave colonel Breitenbach even, whose merits were so conspicuous on that day, was forgotten. This worthy officer remained singly the master of the field, and departed by night to join the army, bringing his trophies to the duke, who wept in despair, to perceive he had been so hasty to quit a field which was no longer disputed.

Not all the remonstrances of the duke of Brunswick (August) and the generals of his army could dissuade him from continuing to retreat. He marched first to Nienburg, and afterward to Verden; whence, through Rotenburg, and Bremervörde, he took the road for Stade. By this

this false manœuvre, he abandoned the whole country to the discretion of the French. Hameln was immediately occupied by the duke of Fitz-james.

What was most remarkable, and singular, on this occasion, was that marshal d'Etréés was recalled, for having gained a victory. The duke de Richelieu, on whom the court bestowed the command of the army, arrived on the 7th at Munden. He took Hanover, the duke d'Ayen Brunswick, and M. le Voyer Wolfenbuttle. Richelieu sent the prince de Soubise, with a detachment of twenty-five thousand men, to Erfurt; where he was to be joined by the army of the circles, and a detachment of Austrians. The duke himself pursued the allies, passed the Aller, and encamped at Verden. D'Armentières meantime seized on Bremen, on the 1st of September. The French army advanced toward Rotenburg, with an intent to attack the duke of Cumberland, but did not find him there: he had already retreated to Bremervörde, avoiding, after the battle of Hastedbeck, all engagement with the enemy.

No sooner did the king perceive, by the manœuvres of the duke of Cumberland, that he confined himself to the defence of the Weser, than he foresaw what would be the result, and recalled

recalled the six battalions he had in that army, to throw them into Magdebourg; which he did very seasonably, as we shall hereafter perceive.

By what we have said, it will be seen the dutchy of Magdebourg was menaced with invasion, and the city with a siege, by the French; that Saxony was to become the prey of the army which assembled at Erfurt; that the garrisons of Dresden and Torgau were to be taken; and finally that Berlin, a metropolis without defence, was on the point of being invaded by the Swedes, who had penetrated into the Uckerane March, and who there found only a handful of men to oppose their progress. Under such circumstances, the most pressing reasons required a body of troops should march against so many enemies. The king accordingly put himself at the head of a few forces, that he might not enfeeble his army of Silesia, which had the most formidable foe to combat.

The prince of Bevern, with whom remained fifty battalions (August 31st) and one hundred and ten squadrons, encamped, after the departure of the king, at the Landeskrone, near Görlitz. Winterfeld placed his detachment beyond the Neisse, on the Holtzberg, near the village of Moys. The prince transported his

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magazine from Bautzen to Görlitz. Marshal Daun and prince Charles (September) encamped opposite him, at Auffig ; and detached Nadasti to Schönberg, to observe Winterfeld. Count Kaunitz had lately arrived at the Austrian army, personally to regulate the remaining operations of the campaign, with the generals. Nadasti, to pay his court to the count, proposed attacking the post of Winterfeld, on the Holtzberg. This post was only held by two battalions ; ten others of the same corps encamped three thousand paces in the rear, near Görlitz. The day on which the attack was made (the 7th) general Winterfeld was with the prince of Bevern, with whom he had some arrangements to make. Information was brought him that the enemy attacked his post ; thither he hastened, but the Holtzberg was carried before his arrival. Desirous to dislodge the enemy, he advanced at the head of four battalions, and had the misfortune to be mortally wounded. Nadasti, satisfied with the advantage he had gained, voluntarily retreated to Schönberg. The Prussians there lost twelve hundred men, and many brave officers. General Winterfeld died of his wound ; and was the more regretted, under the present circumstances, because he was the man most necessary to the army of the prince of Bevern.

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The king had depended wholly on him, in the measures he had taken, for the defence of Silesia. The day after this affair, the prince struck his camp, and repaired through Catholisch Hennerdorf and Naumburg to Lignitz, neglecting to take the camp of Löwenberg, or that of Schmutseifen, by which he would have covered Silesia. Not satisfied with abandoning the frontiers, he farther enfeebled himself by detaching fifteen thousand men, whom he threw into different places. These were the errors that brought on all his misfortunes, at the close of the campaign.

Marshal Daun followed the Prussians, and marched by Löwenberg and Goldberg, encamping on the heights of Wahlstadt. The Prussians were in a bottom, with their right at Lignitz, the Katzbach in their rear, and their left at the village of Beckren. From this situation they had every thing to fear. An enterprising enemy would have reaped his advantage. Daun was not so. One afternoon, animated by wine and the discourse of the chevalier de Montazet, prince Charles wished to gain some advantage over the enemy, and caused eight or ten battalions of grenadiers with artillery to advance, and attack the village of Beckren. This detachment was too feeble to oppose an

M 2 army ;

army; it was not sustained, and was repulsed by the troops that the prince of Bevern ordered to advance from the line, to support the village. The Prussian regiment of infantry particularly distinguished itself, on this occasion. The attempt taught the prince of Bevern what the badness of his situation was, how ill he had chosen his camp, and to what dangers he was exposed. Fearing to be attacked on the morrow with more considerable force, he repassed the Katzbach by night; and on his march to Parchwitz encountered an Imperial corps, that disputed the passage of the Katzbach. He threw bridges over the Oder, passed this river and repaired, October the first, on the right side of the Oder, to Breslau. Crossing once more over the bridge of the city, he took post behind the small rivulet of the Lohe, and threw up intrenchments. The Austrians faced him at Lissa. The court of Vienna had negotiated for troops, with the elector of Bavaria and the duke of Wurtemberg, and sent them at this time into Silesia. These corps joined the reserve, under Nadasti, in the environs of Schweidnitz, to which they were to lay siege. We will for a moment suspend the narrative of the campaign of Silesia (September) to attend the king on his expedition against the French.

The

The king first went to Dresden, whence he detached Seidlitz, with a regiment of hussars, and another of dragoons, to Leipsic, in order to pursue M. de Turpin, who with his light troops hovered about Halle. The French retired, at the approach of the Prussians; and Seidlitz, becoming useless in that part, rejoined the king between Grimma and Rötha, whence the troops marched to Pegau. Hither the enemy had detached the two Imperial regiments of hussars, Ceczeni and Estherhasi. This town is situated on the other side of the Elster, over which is a stone bridge at the gate. The gate was garnished by the enemy, as were some of the neighbouring houses, to forbid entrance. Seidlitz caused a hundred of hussars to alight, who forced the gate; the main body of the regiment followed and entered Pegau full gallop. Seculi and Kleist, traversing the town, left it through the opposite gate, and there found the two regiments of the enemy, posted behind a hollow way. They attacked, routed, and pursued them to Zeitz; bringing back three hundred and fifty prisoners. On the morrow, the army of the king inclined to Naumburg. Here the van-guard met six squadrons of the troops that had been beaten the day before. They were soon dispersed,

and lost many men; particularly in passing the bridge of the Saale, near the Schul-Pforte. The bridge was repaired (September 8th), and the troops passed it, on their march to Buttstett.

Here the news was received of the famous convention, signed, by the dukes of Cumberland and Richelieu, at Closter-Seven. This treaty was negotiated by one count Lynar, ambassador from the court of Denmark. It was stipulated that hostilities should cease; that the troops of Hesse, Brunswick, and Gotha, should be sent back into their respective countries; that those of Hanover should remain quiet at Stade, on the other side of the Elbe, within a given district. Nothing was regulated concerning the electorate of Hanover, either respecting contributions or restitutions; so that this country was abandoned to the discretion of the French. Scarcely was the convention concluded before the duke of Cumberland, without waiting for its ratification, returned to England; and the duke de Richelieu prepared to make an invasion into the principality of Halberstadt.

About this time, the Prussian army intercepted some letters, from count Lynar to count Reuss. These men were of the sect called Pietists. Count Lynar, speaking to his friend

of

of the negotiation, said—“ The thought of
“ concluding this convention was a celestial in-
“ spiration. The Holy Ghost gave me the power
“ to stop the progress of the French arms ; as
“ the sun was formerly stopped by Joshua.
“ The Almighty God, the governor of the
“ world, has employed me, an unworthy in-
“ strument, to spare the effusion of Lutheran
“ blood, of precious Hanoverian blood, which
“ was about to be shed.”—As misfortune would
have it, count Lynar was the only person who
applauded count Lynar. We shall leave him,
in company with Joshua and the sun, to return
to more important affairs.

This disgraceful convention completely de-
ranged the affairs of the king. The army, as
it was called, which he headed was eighteen
thousand strong ; yet from this was he obliged
to make a detachment, that was either to cover
Magdebourg or reinforce the garrison. How-
ever, as the prince de Soubise was at Erfurt,
he wished to attempt driving him thence, that
he might enfeeble himself with the less danger.
To this effect, he advanced with two thousand
horse, a free battalion, and two battalions of
grenadiers, to Erfurt. Great was his surprise
when he saw the French army decamp, from the
Cyriacsburg, in his presence. De Soubise, not

thinking himself in safety at Erfurt, retired to Gotha. Scarcely was he gone before the town was summoned to surrender; and it was agreed, by capitulation, that the Petersberg should remain neuter; that the town should be occupied by the Prussians; and that the enemy should evacuate the Cyriacsburg.

When the troops had assumed a kind of position near Erfurt, prince Ferdinand of Brunswick left the army, with five battalions and seven squadrons, to cover Magdebourg, and oppose the duke de Richelieu (20th). These he might strengthen with six battalions, drawn from the city. But such measures, the only ones that could be taken under present circumstances, were feeble, and insufficient to resist fifty thousand French. Prince Ferdinand, determined to supply by ability his want of means, made a circuit to reach Magdebourg. Marching through Egeln, he fell upon the regiment of Lusignan, four hundred of whom he took. He thence audaciously posted himself at Wansleben, where he seemed to defy the duke de Richelieu, who encamped at Halberstadt. The Prussian parties had every where the superiority over the French, during the close of that campaign; and there were few days in which they did not bring in prisoners to the prince.

Under

Under the present circumstances of the king, recourse must be had to every means; stratagem, negotiation, all possible attempts must be made, to better the situation of affairs. Beside that no ill could happen from making attempts, except the chagrin of having imagined fruitless expedients. With this intent, colonel Balby assumed the disguise of a land-bailiff, that he might arrive at the duke de Richelieu. He was acquainted with the duke, with whom he had made some campaigns in Flanders. Balby was to make proposals, to induce the court of Versailles to entertain more mild and pacific sentiments. He perceived that the duke de Richelieu, doubting of his own credit, did not believe he had sufficient influence with the French ministry or the king to change their system, or their opinion, respecting their alliance with the house of Austria; an alliance which, recently concluded, pleased by its novelty. This emissary, perceiving all he could urge produced no effect, reduced his demands to the request that the duke would at least spare, in part, those provinces of the king into which he should carry the war.

The king was soon obliged farther to enfeeble his army, by another detachment. He sent prince Maurice to Leipsic, with ten battalions

lions and ten squadrons, there to maintain a central position; whence he would be ready either to join the king or prince Ferdinand, as should be necessary; and where he might watch general Marshall, encamped at Bautzen with fifteen thousand Austrians; who inspired the greater apprehension because that, Lusatia being uncovered, there was reason to fear the general should make an irruption into the electorate, and even proceed to Berlin. This capital was in like manner menaced by the Swedes, from the side of Pomerania. They were retarded in their progress by Manteufel, with five hundred hussars and four battalions. After these two corps had quitted the camp of Erfurt, eight battalions and twenty-seven squadrons only remained with the king. Had the enemy perceived the weakness of this corps, it cannot be doubted but an attack must have ensued. This above all things was to be avoided, and recourse was had to various expedients, to deceive the people of Erfurt and the French. For this reason, the troops did not encamp; the infantry was sent into the neighbouring villages; the quarters were several times changed; and, as on each occasion the names of the regiments were changed also, this multiplied the order of battle, which the spies were

were assiduously collecting, for the information of the prince de Soubise.

Two days after the Prussians (16th) had taken Erfurt, the king went, with twenty squadrons of hussars and dragoons, on a reconnoitring party, toward Gotha, that he might attempt to dislodge the two Imperial regiments of hussars, that had so repeatedly been beaten. His success was beyond his hopes; the dread in which these hussars held the Prussians hastened their retreat. They had a defile to pass, near Gotha, where they lost one hundred and eighty men. They were pursued even to within sight of Eisenach; where the prince de Soubise, who had been joined by the prince of Hildburghausen, general in chief of the army of the circles, was encamped. The ducal house (of Saxe Gotha) was delighted to see itself disengaged of guests so indiscreet. It had equally to complain of the French and Austrians. The French had committed violence on the castle, from which they had carried off the cannon; and the Austrian officers, little respectful in their discourse, had behaved with arrogance, very unsuitable to the sovereign princes of the empire.

Seidlitz remained with the cavalry at Gotha, there to watch the motions of the enemy, and give

give timely information to the little army of Erfurt; that, if necessary, it might retreat, at the approach of the army of Eisenach. A few days after, he was attacked by a very superior corps. The prince of Hildburghausen, desirous of signalizing his authority by some famous stroke, proposed to the prince de Soubise to dislodge the Prussians from Gotha. They began their march with their grenadiers, the Austrian cavalry, Laudon and his pandours, and all the light troops of the French army. Seidlitz had seasonable information of the intended project. They presently made their appearance. A column of cavalry passed on the right of Gotha, and over the heights which lead toward Thuringia. Another column of cavalry, preceded by the hussars, came on the left from the side of Langensaltza. The pandours, at the head of the grenadiers, formed the column of the centre.

Seidlitz had arranged his men, in order of battle, at a certain distance from Gotha; the hussars on the first line, and the dragoons of Meinicke on the second. The dragoons of Czettritz he had sent to a defile, which lay half a mile in his rear, with orders to place themselves on a single line, to form an extensive front, that he might deceive the enemy.

This

This did not prevent the regiment from being entirely ready to protect his retreat, should he be obliged to yield to numbers. Manœuvres so able, and a stratagem so artful, had their effect. (October 13th) The prince of Hildburghausen imagined the Prussian army, which he supposed to be considerable, was on its march to support Seidlitz; and that he should be incessantly attacked, by the grand line of cavalry which he discovered. From the wavering countenance of the Austrian hussars, Seidlitz perceived his artifice had produced a proper impression. He repulsed them insensibly; and, shock after shock, still gaining ground, obliged them to repass the defile where, but a few days before, they had suffered so much. The column of cavalry, that composed the right of the enemy, retreated at the same time. Seidlitz then sent some dragoons and hussars into Gotha; who entered precisely as the prince of Darmstadt, with the troops of the circles, began to retire; and there made a number of prisoners. The precipitation with which the prince of Darmstadt abandoned Gotha had nearly become fatal to the prince de Soubise, who was at the castle, and did not expect so prompt a retreat: he had only time to mount his horse, and fly full speed. A hundred and

sixty soldiers, and three officers of note, were taken by the Prussians.

Any other general, except Seidlitz, would have applauded himself to have escaped; in such a situation, without loss. Seidlitz would not have been satisfied with himself, had he not derived gain. The example proves that the capacity and fortitude of the general are, in war, more decisive than the number of his troops. A man of mediocrity, who should perceive himself under such circumstances, discouraged by the awful appearance of the foe, would have retired as he approached, with the loss of half his men, in a skirmish of the rear-guard, which the superior cavalry of the enemy would have been in haste to engage. The artful use made of the regiment of dragoons, extended and shown to the enemy at a distance, was highly glorious to general Seidlitz, in so difficult a situation.

Hitherto the king had been only able to keep affairs in suspense; he could undertake nothing, and must wait the benefactions of time. He remained tranquilly at Erfurt, till he understood that a French detachment, from the army of Westphalia, was on its march, through Hesse, to Langensaltza. As he must not wait the arrival of this corps, which might fall

fall on his rear, he determined to retire previous to its approach. It was beside rumoured that general Haddick traversed Lusatia to penetrate into Brandenbourg; and that prince Maurice had been obliged to fly, that he might hastily gain Torgau. It was probable the general would advance to Berlin. Having no succour to expect, the king thought proper to remain no longer at Erfurt; and, that he might run no unseasonable risk, he retreated to the Eckartsberg. Here frequent couriers arrived from Dresden. Finck informed him a corps, under Marshall, was on the point of quitting Bautzen, to follow that of Haddick; and it was certain prince Maurice was not sufficiently in force to resist the combined generals. This occasioned the king to resolve to bring him a reinforcement.

The troops repassed the Saale, at Naumburg. Marshal Keith, with some battalions, threw himself into Leipsic. The king passed the Elbe at Torgau, and marched toward Annaberg; where he received intelligence that Berlin had escaped, for a contribution of two hundred thousand crowns, paid to the Austrians; that Haddick had not waited for the arrival of prince Maurice; and that Manteufel remained inactive, in his camp at Bautzen.

The

The idea that first struck the king was to cut off the retreat of Haddick. For this purpose, he repaired to Hertzberg. Prince Maurice was on his return, and the king wished to wait for him, because that Haddick had already repassed Kottbus. He remained in this position for some days, that he might understand what were the actual intentions of the French, which must decide the part he had to take; whether this should be to oppose their enterprises, or, should the campaign be ended in Thuringia, whether he should return to Silesia, for the relief of Schweidnitz, the siege of which was begun by general Nadasti.

But the enemy induced the king to undertake operations (26th) which he could not then foresee. The departure of the Prussians, from Erfurt, engaged the prince de Soubise to pass the Saale, and approach Leipsic. Marshal Keith sent advice of this, warmly requesting aid; and hither it was necessary to march, with all speed. The king, on the 28th, immediately began his march to Leipsic. With his small army, he cleared the right shore of the Mulde, where Custine had advanced with some brigades; after which he entered Leipsic, and there was joined by prince Maurice, and prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. The grand causeway that

that leads to Lutzen was first secured. On the 30th, the army assembled, marched, and encamped at Altranstädt; when Retzow was detached in advance, to guard the defile of Rippach. The same night, the king marched to fall on the enemy's quarters, dispersed in the vicinage of Weissenfels; but they escaped, those who were in Weissenfels excepted. The three gates of the town were attacked, and the officers were commanded, without delay, to gain the bridge of the Saale, that this important passage might be secured. The town was forced, and five hundred men taken; but those of the garrison who escaped had set fire to the covered bridge, which being wholly of wood was soon in flames. To extinguish the fire was impossible; for the enemy, in ambuscade behind walls on the opposite shore, kept up so heavy a fire of small arms that all who endeavoured to preserve the bridge were killed, or wounded. Fresh troops soon appeared on the other side of the river, the number of whom continuing to increase demonstrated the impossibility of effecting the passage of the Saale, at that place. But, as it was but the van of the army that had arrived at Weissenfels, and as the greatest part of the troops were still

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on their march, they were ordered to take the road to Merseburg, with the hope of being able to secure the bridge of that town.

When marshal Keith arrived here (November) he found the French already had occupied the place, and that the bridge was broken. He did not remain hesitating, but took some battalions, and marched to Halle, whence he dislodged the French, and repaired the bridge, which they had in like manner destroyed. The army of the king thus had its right at Halle, its centre opposite Merseburg, and its left at Weissenfels, covered by the Saale, ascertaining its communication behind that river by detached corps, which also watched the motions of the enemy. Marshal Keith first passed the river, near Halle. This manœuvre, which could be of no ill consequence to the French, occasioned (2d) the prince de Soubise wholly to abandon the banks of the Saale, and retreat to the village of St. Michael. The Prussians employed this day, and the night following, in repairing the bridges of Weissenfels and Merseburg. Early on the morning of the third, the king and prince Maurice, having passed the river, marched with their columns toward Rosbach: as did that of marshal Keith, where their orders were to form a junction. During the march,

march, the king went with some cavalry to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, which was one of the very worst. The thoughtless hussars pushed forward to the camp, and carried off some horses and soldiers, whom they dragged from their tents. These circumstances, added to the little precaution of the French generals, determined the king (4th) to march and attack them on the morrow.

By break of day, the army quitted the camp. The van-guard consisted of the whole cavalry. Arriving at the place where the evening before the post of the enemy had been reconnoitred, no enemy was to be found. The prince de Soubise had no doubt reflected on the imperfect nature of his camp, and had changed it the same night. He had extended his troops along the height, in front of which was a ravin ; his right was supported by a wood, which he had fortified with an abatis and three redoubts, furnished with artillery ; his left was surrounded by a large pond, which could not be turned. The army of the king was too feeble, in infantry, to rush upon a post so formidable ; had the defence been but little obstinate, it could not have been carried, with the loss of less than twenty thousand men. The king, judging this attack beyond his strength, sent orders for the infantry

to pass the marshy defile, which was near, and assume the camp of Braunsdorf: the cavalry followed, consisting of the rear-guard. When the French saw the Prussian troops retreating, they caused their piquets to advance, with some artillery, and kept up a warm cannonade, but to no effect. All the musicians and trumpeters in the army, all their drums and fifes, began to play at once, as if they had gained a victory. However little agreeable this spectacle might be, for men not accustomed to fear the foe, it was necessary to remember circumstances, behold it with the cold eye of indifference, and oppose German phlegm to French petulance, and French gaiety.

The same night, intelligence was received that the enemy made a motion, from the left to the right. The hussars were in the field by break of day; they entered the camp the French had quitted; and learned, from the peasants, that the latter had taken the road to Weissenfels. Soon after, a considerable body formed opposite the right of the Prussians, that had the appearance of a rear-guard, or a corps that covered the march of an army. The Prussians paid little attention to these manœuvres, because that their camp was covered, as well in front as at each wing, by an impracticable marsh. There were

were only three narrow causeways, by which they might have been attacked; but three plans therefore seemed to remain for the enemy; either to retire through Freyburg into Upper Thuringia, because subsistence failed; or to take Weissenfels, the bridges of which however were destroyed; or finally to gain Merseburg before the king, and cut off his passage of the Saale. Yet the Prussian army was much nearer than that of the French, and this manœuvre was the less to be feared because it led to a battle, from which good fortune was to be hoped, since there would be no post to force. The king sent many parties over the country, and tranquilly waited in his camp, till the intention of his antagonists should become more clear; for any precipitate motion, made mal a propos, might have spoiled his whole plan. Intelligence, sometimes false, and sometimes true, brought by the scouts, kept him in this incertitude till toward noon, when the van of the columns of the French was perceived, which at a certain distance turned the left of the Prussians. The troops of the circles, in like manner, insensibly disappeared from their former camp; so that the corps which was supposed to be a rear-guard, and which in fact was the reserve under St. Germain, remained singly in face of the Prussians. The

king went himself to reconnoitre the march of the prince de Soubise, and was convinced it was directed to Merseburg. The French proceeded slowly, because that they had formed different battalions in columns, by which they were impeded, whenever the narrowness of the road obliged them to break.

It was two o'clock when the Prussians struck their tents : they made a quarter wheel, to the left, and began to march. The king kept pace with the army of the prince de Soubise : his troops were covered by the marsh from Braunsdorf, and which, extending a full quarter of a league from thence, ends at the distance of two thousand paces from Rosbach. Seidlitz, with the whole cavalry, formed the van-guard. He had orders to glide along the hollows, with which this country abounds, to turn the French cavalry, and fall on the van of their columns, before they should have time to form. The king could only leave prince Ferdinand, who that day commanded the right of the army, the old guards of the cavalry, who put themselves in one line, to make a show ; which they might the better do because they were covered by a part of the marsh of Braunsdorf. The two armies, marching side by side, continued to approach. The army of the king carefully maintained a small eminence,

nence, which goes immediately to Rosbach. That of the French, apparently unacquainted with the ground, marched in the valley. The king established a battery on this height, the effects of which were decisive, during the action. The French raised one in the valley ; and, as it fired up hill, it produced no effect.

While each party were taking these precautions, Seidlitz had turned the enemy's right, unperceived by themselves, and fell with impetuosity on the cavalry. The two Austrian regiments formed to face him, and sustained the shock ; but, being abandoned by the French, the regiment of Fitz-james excepted, they were almost totally destroyed. The infantry of the two armies were still on the march, till their respective vans were within five hundred paces of each other. The king wished to have gained the village of Reichardswerben ; but, as it was six hundred paces distant, and as he each moment expected the action would begin, he detached marshal Keith thither, with five battalions, in which consisted the whole of his second line. The king meantime advanced within two hundred paces of the two French lines ; and perceived that their order of battle was composed of battalions in columns, alternately interlined with battalions extended. The wing of

the prince de Soubise was in the air ; and, the Prussian cavalry being employed in the pursuit of that of the enemy, the wing of the French could only be outwinged by the infantry. For this purpose, the king placed two battalions of grenadiers in a line, forming a hook * with his left flank : they had orders, the moment the French should advance, to make a half wheel to the right, which would necessarily bring them on the flank of the enemy. These orders they punctually executed ; as the French came up, they received the fire of the grenadiers in flank ; and, having stood at the most three discharges of the regiment of Brunswick, their columns were seen to press on the left. They had soon closed upon the extended battalions which separated them, and that mass of infantry became at each moment more large, heavy, and confused. The more it fell back on the left the more it was outwinged, by the front of the Prussians.

While disorder increased in the army of the prince de Soubise, the king was informed that a corps of the enemy's cavalry presented itself in the rear of his troops. He hastily assembled the first squadrons that could be found, and

* *Un crochet.* Perhaps an angle. T.

scarcely

scarcely had he opposed those that were coming upon his rear before they retreated with promptitude. The body-guard and the gendarmes then were employed against the French infantry, which was in the utmost disorder. The cavalry attacked it, dispersed it, and made a considerable number of French prisoners. This charge was made at six in the evening; the weather was cloudy, and the darkness so great that to have pursued the enemy would have been imprudent, however great the confusion and the rout. The king contented himself with sending different parties of cuirassiers, dragoons and hussars, after them; none of whom exceeded thirty men.

During this action, ten battalions of the right of the Prussians had remained idle spectators. Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, who commanded them, had not quitted the marsh of Braunsdorf, which served to cover a part of his front. He had repulsed the troops of the circles, who opposed him, by some discharges of artillery, and obliged them to give ground. There were only seven battalions of the king's army engaged, and the battle did not continue above an hour and a half, before the victory was decided.

On

On the morrow, the king departed at day-break, with the hussars and dragoons, following the enemy, who had retired through Freyburg. The infantry had orders to pursue the same route. The rear-guard of the French was there still. The dragoons alighted, and drove some detachments of the enemy from the gardens. Dispositions were then made to attack the castle ; but the enemy, not giving time for this, repassed the Unstrut in haste, and burnt the bridges. The detachments the king had sent out the evening before arrived here successively. Some brought in officers, some soldiers, others cannon. None of them returned empty handed.

So much diligence was employed, in repairing the bridge of the Unstrut, that in less than an hour it was fit for use. The army of the prince de Soubise had taken so many roads that it was impossible to know which to follow. The peasants affirmed, the greatest part of the fugitives had taken the route of the Eckartsberg ; and thither the king marched, with his troops. The number of prisoners augmented, during the whole day ; all the detachments, that were sent into different parts, brought in some. The Eckartsberg was found to be garnished by a corps of the troops of the circles, which might amount to five or six thousand men. The king,

king, having no other infantry than the volunteers of Meyer, sent them in ambuscade, with some hussars, into a wood in the vicinity of the camp, with orders to alarm the enemy all night ; who, little pleased at having their rest disturbed, forsook their post, and lost four hundred men, with ten pieces of artillery. General Lentulus, who followed them on the morrow as far as Erfurt, took eight hundred more of their men, whom he brought back to the king.

The battle of Rosbach had cost the army of the prince de Soubise ten thousand of his troops : the Prussians took seven thousand men, sixty-three cannon, fifteen standards, seven pair of colours, and one pair of kettle drums. If the conduct of the French generals be examined, it will be found difficult to grant it our approbation. Their intention indubitably was to drive the Prussians out of Saxony. But did not the interest of their allies rather demand they should simply bound their views to the detention of the king, that marshal Daun and prince Charles might have time to complete the conquest of Silesia ? Had they but kept the army of the king in Thuringia, for a short time, this conquest would not only have been made but the season would have become so rigorous, and so far advanced, that it would have been

been impossible for the Prussians to make that progress, in Silesia, of which we shall have immediate occasion to speak. As to the battle in which they so untimely engaged, certain it is that the prince de Soubise, by his incertitude and the order of his troops, rendered it possible for a handful of men to vanquish his army. The manner in which the court of France distinguished the merit of its generals was still more surprising. D'Etréés was recalled, for having gained the battle of Hastenbeck: and the prince de Soubise, for having lost that of Rosbach, was soon after promoted to be a marshal of France.

Properly speaking, the battle of Rosbach did but afford the king an opportunity of hastening, in search of new dangers, into Silesia. The victory was only important by the impression it made on the French, and on the shattered army of the duke of Cumberland. No sooner did the news of it reach the duke de Richelieu than he quitted his camp, at Halberstadt, and withdrew into the electorate of Hanover: while the allied troops, ready to lay down their arms, recovered courage, and acquired hope. An advantageous change, about the same time, happened in the English ministry, of which we shall presently speak, that gave new strength

to the British government. These ministers, ashamed of the disgraceful convention of Closter-Seven, resolved to break it: which they might with the greater justice do, because it had been neither ratified by the king of England nor the king of France. They began immediately to restore the army of Stade to activity. Disgusted with the duke of Cumberland, who had lost the confidence of the troops, the king of England wished to appoint another general, and requested the king would send him prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, whose justly-acquired fame was spread through Europe. Though, by his absence, the Prussians lost a good general, of whom they had need, it still was so important to restore the army of the allies that the king could not refuse the request. Prince Ferdinand departed, and repaired to Stade, by private roads, in the environs of which he found a body of thirty thousand men dispersed, whom the inconsistent and thoughtless French had neglected to disarm.

The king returned from the Eckartsberg to Freyburg, at the same time that a detachment, sent by marshal Keith to Querfurt, came back from pursuing the French. The very peasants of the neighbourhood brought in prisoners. They were enraged at the sacrilege which had been

been committed, by the soldiers of the prince de Soubise, in the Lutheran churches. Those things which the populace held in the highest veneration had been profaned, with gross indecency, and the unbridled fury of the French had brought all the peasants of Thuringia into the interests of Prussia.

The king was preparing to depart. The affairs of Silesia demanded his presence and aid. He proposed to march immediately for Schweidnitz, and constrain Nadasti to raise the siege. On the 12th of November, he left Leipsic at the head of nineteen battalions and twenty-eight squadrons. Marshal Keith marched at the same time, with a small corps, to penetrate into Bohemia, near Leutmeritz, in order to facilitate the passage of the king into Lusatia, and by this diversion oblige Marshall to quit the environs of Bautzen and Zittau. Marshal Keith took a considerable magazine from the enemy at Leutmeritz, whence he feigned to advance toward Prague.

The king meantime entered Lusatia, dislodged Haddick from Grossenhayn, and Marshall at his approach fell back to Löbau. During the march from Bautzen to Weissenberg, the van of a column was sent toward Löbau, and on its appearance Marshall retreated to Gabel.

Gabel. The king then pursued his route without impediment. On his arrival at Görlitz, he received the disagreeable news of the reduction of Schweidnitz. The place was taken in the following manner. Nadafti had opened the trenches, on the 27th of October, between the fort of Bögendorf and the tile-kiln. His third parallel was finished on the 10th of November. The garrison had made some successful sallies; and, though the bombs had in part ruined the town, the enemy had not yet carried any work. Impatient at this slow progress, Nadafti resolved to risk a coup de main. On the night of the 11th, he made a general assault, on all the redoubts which surround the body of the place: two were taken. This misfortune occasioned the governor, Seers, and Grumbkow his associate, to lose all recollection. They capitulated, and surrendered prisoners of war with their whole garrison; consisting of ten squadrons of hussars, and ten battalions of infantry. The Austrians disarmed the soldiers; and, as most of them were Silesians, gave them passports, and liberty to return to their villages.

This accident could not have happened in a worse time, for the derangement of the plans of the king. His junction with the prince of Bevern became so much the more necessary
since

since it was easy to foresee that Nadasti, having taken Schweidnitz, would join marshal Daun, to overwhelm the remaining Prussians near Breslau. The king had indeed commanded the prince of Bevern to attack the foe, and not suffer Schweidnitz to be taken, as it were, under his eye. The plan was practicable, the position of the Austrians at Lissa considered. The prince had but one evolution to make to come upon the enemy's flank, which he would probably have beaten. Thus would the siege of Schweidnitz have been raised, and the Imperialists disconcerted. Instead of which, by remaining inactive, Nadasti could not fail of finally taking a place which had no hope of succour; and the whole force of the enemy, coming to fall upon the Prussians, must carry their intrenchments of the Lohe.

Ill fortune would have it that the prince could not comprehend the force of these arguments. The generals however prevailed on him, one day, to make the attempt. He left his camp, and beat the light troops that covered the right flank of the Austrians; after which, instead of attacking the army, and driving it into the Oder, as must have happened, his want of confidence in himself, and the dread of failure in an undertaking where certainty never is

is to be obtained, induced him to forbear: He thought he had done sufficient, and ordered his troops back to their intrenchments.

The king arrived at Naumburg, on the Queis, November the 24th, and there was informed of the victory of the Austrians over the prince of Bevern, and of the loss of Breslau. All that had been predicted to the prince had but too literally proved true. Nadasti joined prince Charles and marshal Daun; and the enemy, impatient to complete their conquest, lost no time in putting their project into execution. On the night of the 21st of November, they constructed four heavy batteries, in the front of the Prussians, between Pilsnitz and Gross-Mochber. The prince of Bevern remained a tranquil spectator, suffering them to finish their works, although such preparations announced the designs of marshal Daun, on the Prussian intrenchments. Nadasti marched beside the Lohe (22d) and formed toward Gabitz. The prince of Bevern supposed this was to come upon his rear, though that was difficult, and he farther enfeebled himself by a detachment, under the command of general Ziethen, to oppose all attempts of the enemy on that side. The front of the Prussian camp, behind the Lohe,

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was covered by redoubts, with ill-placed apertures, some of which were even overlooked from the opposite shore, nor had care been taken to send a sufficient number of cannon thither. The greatest part of the artillery remained in an intrenchment, which the prince of Bevern had thrown up in a bottom, to cover his flank of the Lohe, toward the suburb of Breslau.

Marshal Daun having had time enough attentively to perceive and examine all these negligences, and blunders, turned them to his own advantage. The attack began on the 22d, at nine in the morning: some redoubts were alternately taken and re-taken. The Prussian cavalry was made to act in a marsh, where it could not fight, and where it was thundered upon by sixty pieces, from an Austrian battery beyond the rivulet. Notwithstanding all these false steps, the Prussians did not yet lose ground. Ziethen, on the left toward Gabitz, not only repulsed his attacks but pursued Nadasti beyond the Lohe. The routed enemy retired behind the rivulet of Schweidnitz. In the interim, the Austrians, who attacked the prince of Bevern, had passed the Lohe, protected by their artillery. They immediately took some of the Prussian redoubts, by the aid of the apertures. The troops made

a brave

a brave defence, and the Prussians dislodged them several times. Prince Ferdinand of Prussia even drove back a body of the enemy as far as the Lohe ; but the Austrians were too numerous, the camp was lost, and night came on.

Though resources still might have been found, these the prince of Bevern did not perceive. In his first consternation, he passed the Oder, and threw Lestwitz with eight battalions into Breslau. Thus he lost eighty pieces of artillery, and near eight thousand men, which the attack of the camp of Lissa would not have cost. The Austrians pretended that the action cost them eighteen thousand men ; and certain it is that the neighbouring villages were full of the wounded. On the morrow, or rather by night, the prince of Bevern thought proper to reconnoitre the corps under general Beck, who was encamped at no great distance. He was alone, and suffered himself to be taken by some pandours. General Kyau, the next in rank, assumed the command of the forces ; and, without consulting what was to be done, took the road to Glogau. Lestwitz no sooner supposed himself left to his own support, in Breslau, than he lost all confidence. The Austrians approached the city, and Lestwitz, who till then had maintained the reputation of a brave officer,

without waiting till the enemy fired a single shot against the ramparts, demanded to capitulate, and obtained free egress with arms and baggage. In two days, he and his garrison, the half of which deserted, followed the army on the road that Kyau had marched.

The king received these various afflicting articles of intelligence all at the same time. Without dwelling on disaster, he thought but of redress, and made a forced march to gain the banks of the Oder. On his route, he made a circuit round Lignitz, which the Austrians had fortified, and pushed forward immediately to Parchwitz. His van-guard fell unexpectedly on a detachment of the enemy, three hundred of whom were taken. He arrived at Parchwitz on the 28th, having marched from Leipsic to the Oder in twelve days. The king desired general Kyau should pass the Oder at Koben; but this could not be performed, because that most of the troops had already gained Glogau. Under these circumstances, time was of all things the most precious: not a moment must be lost, the Austrians must incessantly be attacked, however great the hazard, and expelled Silesia, or the province must be given up eternally.

The

The army that passed the Oder, at Glogau, could not join the troops of the king till the 2d of December: this army was discouraged, and overwhelmed by the memory of recent defeat. The honour of the officers was appealed to; their former exploits recapitulated; and mournful ideas, the impression of which was so strong, were endeavoured to be dissipated; wine even was had recourse to, that the depressed spirit might be renovated. The king conversed with the soldiers, distributed provisions gratis, in fine, exhausted every means, imagination could supply and time could admit, to awaken confidence in the troops, without which all hope of victory is vain.

The countenances of the men began already to be cheerful; and those who had beaten the French at Rosbach persuaded their comrades to take heart. A little repose restored the soldier, and the army was disposed to wash out the stain, received on the 22d, whenever any occasion should present itself. This occasion the king sought after, and it was presently found. He advanced on the 4th to Neumarkt, was with the van-guard of the hussars, and heard the enemy had established a bakery in that town, that it was garnished with pandours, and that the army of Daun was expected.

The heights situated beyond Neumarkt would give the enemy advantage, should he be permitted to occupy this height; and the difficulty was to take it, for the infantry was not come up, nor could join the van-guard before night. There was no artillery present. The hussars were the only troops ready to act, and it was resolved to make a virtue of necessity. The king, unwilling to admit the prince of Lorrain to encamp in his presence, made some squadrons of hussars alight, sent them to force the town-gate, and a regiment on horseback entered full gallop. Another regiment passed the suburbs, and gained the gate of Breslau, and the attack was so successful that eight hundred Croats were made prisoners by the hussars. The place of encampment was immediately occupied, and the piquets and traces which the Austrian engineers had left, to mark out the position of their troops, were there found. The prince of Wurtemberg took the command of the van-guard, and it was reinforced at night by ten battalions, with which he encamped at Kammendorf. The cavalry passed the defile on the same day; the main body of the infantry cantoned in the town of Neumarkt, and the neighbouring villages.

Positive

Positive intelligence now informed the king that the prince of Lorrain had quitted the camp of the Lohe, and had advanced beyond Lissa; that his right was supported at the village of Nypern, his left at Golau, and his rear by the small rivulet of Schweidnitz. The king was rejoiced to find the enemy in a position that added such facility to his wishes; for he was obliged and determined to attack the Austrians wherever he could meet them, were it even at the Zobtenberg. The disposition of the march was immediately formed, and the army put in motion, on the 5th, by dawn of day. It was preceded by a van-guard of sixty squadrons and ten battalions, headed by the king in person. The four columns of the army followed, at a small distance; the infantry formed the centre, and the wings were composed of cavalry. Approaching the village of Born, the van-guard discovered a grand line of cavalry, the right of which extended towards Lissa, and the left more advanced was supported by a wood, that was on the right of the Prussian army. This was supposed to be a wing of the Austrians, whose centre could not be seen. The officers sent to reconnoitre affirmed it was the van-guard: it was learnt also that general Nostitz was the commander, and that the corps con-

sisted of four regiments of Saxon dragoons, and two of Imperial hussars.

For the greater certainty, ten battalions glided into the wood that covered the left flank of Nostitz, on which the Prussian cavalry, having formed, fell with great heat. The regiments were dispersed in a moment, and pursued to the front of the Austrian army. Five officers and eight hundred men were taken, and were marched in presence of the columns to Neumarkt, to animate the soldiery by the example of success. It was with difficulty the king restrained the fury of the hussars; they were on the very act of attacking the centre of the Austrian army, when they were assembled, between the villages of Heyde and Fobelvitz, within cannon-shot of the enemy.

Here the Imperial army was so perfectly distinguished that it might be counted man by man. Its right, known to be at Nypern, was concealed by the great wood of Lissa; but of the centre and the left nothing was invisible. On the first inspection of them and the ground on which they stood, it was judged necessary to make the grand attacks on the left wing, which was extended on a small hill encumbered with pine-trees, but ill-supported. This post carried, the advantage of ground would be gained for

for the remainder of the battle, because from that part there was one continual descent toward Nypern: instead of which, should the centre be assaulted, the right wing of the Austrians might, by traversing the wood of Lissa, have taken the Prussians in flank: and still this hill must have finally been attacked, for it commanded the whole plain. To have delayed would have been to have reserved the greatest difficulty to the time when the troops must be harassed, fatigued, and incapable of grand efforts: whereas, by conquering the greatest danger at the commencement, advantage was taken of the first ardour of the soldier, and the remainder of his task became easy.

In consequence of this chain of reasoning, the army was incontinently disposed to attack the left. The columns that had been formed had their order reversed. They were placed in two lines, and the platoons with a quarter-wheel filed off to the right. The king, with his hussars, kept pace with the march of his army upon a succession of hillocks, which concealed the motions from the enemy that were made behind the hillocks; and, being between the two armies, he could observe that of the Austrians, and direct the march of his own. Confidential officers were sent, some to observe the right

of

of Daun, others toward Canth to watch the motions of Drafkowitz, who there was encamped. The enemy at the same time was reconnoitred along the rivulet of Schweidnitz, that there might be no apprehension he should come upon the rear, when the battle should be begun. The plan the king was preparing to execute was to bring his whole army on the left flank of the Imperialists, to make his grand efforts with his right, and to refuse the enemy his left, with all that foresight which might avoid faults similar to those committed at the battle of Prague, and which had caused the loss of the battle of Kolin.

Already had Wedel, who with his ten battalions of the van-guard was to form the first attack, marched in front of the army. The van of the columns had already gained the rivulet of Schweidnitz, without being perceived by the foe. Marshal Daun understood the motion of the Prussians as a retreat, and said to prince Charles of Lorrain—"These good folks are going, let them go"—Wedel however had formed before the two lines of infantry on the right. His attack was supported by a battery of twenty twelve-pounders, formed of the cannon which the king had taken from the ramparts of Glogau. The first line received orders to advance

vance in short ranks, like the steps of a ladder, the battalions keeping fifty paces in the rear of each other, so that, the line being in motion, the extremity of the right was a thousand paces in advance to the extremity of the left; and this disposition rendered it impossible to engage without orders.

Wedel now attacked the wood where Nadasti commanded, found no great resistance, and carried it with promptitude. The Austrian generals, seeing themselves turned and taken in flank, endeavoured to change their position; endeavoured, but too late, to form a line parallel to the Prussian front. The whole art of the king's generals was employed to rob them of time. The Prussians had already gained a height which commanded the village of Leuthen; and, at the very instant when the enemy wished to throw infantry into this village, a second battery, of twenty twelve-pounders, played on them with such timely effect that they gave up the attempt, and retreated. The Austrians, on the side where Wedel fought, seized on the bank beside the rivulet, to prevent him from sweeping their line in its whole extent. But Wedel did not suffer them long to remain here: after a combat more obstinate than the preceding, they were obliged to give ground.

Ziethen

Ziethen at the same time charged the enemy's cavalry, and put it to the rout. Some squadrons of his right were taken in flank, from the bushes on the banks of the rivulet, by a volley of case shot which came unexpectedly, and repulsed his corps; but it formed again beside the infantry. The officers who were ordered to observe the right of Daun then came to inform the king this right was crossing the wood of Lissa, and would instantly appear in the plain: in consequence of which Driesen received orders to advance, with the left wing of the Prussian cavalry. When the Austrian cuirassiers began to form, near Leuthen, they were saluted, from the central battery of the king, with a complete volley, and attacked at the same time by Driesen. The dispute was but short. The Imperialists were dispersed, and fled routed. The line of infantry that had formed beside these cuirassiers, behind Leuthen, was taken in flank by the regiment of Bareuth; which, driving them on the volunteers of Wunsch, took two entire regiments, officers and colours.

The enemy's infantry being totally dispersed, the king advanced with the centre of his infantry on Leuthen. The fire was hot and short, for the Austrian infantry was only scattered among the houses and gardens. Leaving the village,

village, a new line of infantry was perceived, which the Austrian generals had formed, on an eminence, near the wind-mill of Segeschutz. The army of the king was obliged to sustain their fire some time; but the foe did not perceive, amid this confusion, that the corps of Wedel was in his neighbourhood. The Austrians were suddenly taken in flank and rear, by this brave and able general; and that excellent manœuvre ascertained victory, and ended this important battle.

The king collected the first troops that presented themselves, and went in pursuit of the enemy, with the cuirassiers of Seidlitz and a battalion of Jung-Stutterheim, directing his march between the rivulet of Schweidnitz and the wood of Lissa. The darkness became so great that he sent some horsemen forward, to reconnoitre the forests, and to bring intelligence. He occasionally caused volleys of artillery to be fired toward Lissa, whither the main army of the Austrians had fled. Approaching this town, the van-guard sustained a discharge from about two battalions, but not a man was wounded. It replied with fire from the artillery, still continuing its march. As he proceeded, the cuirassiers of Seidlitz brought in prisoners by troops. Arrived at Lissa, the king found all the houses filled

filled with fugitives, and the dispersed men of the Imperial army. He immediately seized the bridge, on which he placed his artillery, with orders to fire while any powder remained. The enemy retired on the road to Breslau, and he threw some platoons of infantry into the houses nearest the rivulet of Schweidnitz, that they might fire on the opposite shore, during the whole night, either to keep up the panic of the vanquished, or to prevent them from sending troops on the opposite side, that might on the morrow dispute the passage.

The battle began at one o'clock, and it was eight when the king arrived with his van-guard at Lissa. When his army engaged with the Imperialists, who were said to amount to sixty thousand combatants, he was thirty-three thousand strong. Had not night come on, this battle would have been one of the most decisive of the age.

The troops had no time to rest. They left Lissa (6th) while it was yet night, took many of the enemy's stragglers, and arrived about ten o'clock on the banks of the Lohe; where, in despite of the strong rear-guard under the command of Serbelloni, posted near Gross-Mochber, ten battalions passed the rivulet. They were formed in a ravin, sheltered from the Austrian artillery,

artillery, and hussars were sent behind the villages and hamlets, in ambuscade, where they remained covered, and ready to act whenever occasion should require. Serbelloni hastened his retreat as much as possible, and retired about two in the afternoon toward Breslau. Ziethen, with all the hussars, twenty squadrons of dragoons, and sixteen battalions, as speedily followed. A party of the Austrians threw themselves in a disorderly manner into Breslau ; and this rear-guard, inspired with terror, and retiring in confusion, lost many men on its march. Ziethen pursued the army of marshal Daun through Borau, Reichenbach, and Kunzendorf, to Reichenau, where he was joined by Fouquet, who came with some troops from Glatz, and they drove the Austrians thence into Bohemia.

The king on his side formed the circumval-
lation of Breslau, on the 7th. Posts were taken
at the suburb of St. Nicholas, at Gabitz, at the
Lehmgruben, at Hube, and at Durgensch ;
and, as military reasons required the city should
be in like manner inclosed on the other side of
the Oder, the king sent orders to Wied, who
had been ill at Brieg, to leave this place with
three battalions, to which were added five
squadrons, and to take post on the grand cause-
way that leads from Breslau to Hundsfeld. Here
he

he intrenched himself to the best of his power, to prevent the garrison from escaping into Poland, should it make the attempt.

Preparations then were made for a siege, The king drew ammunition, artillery, and mortars, of which he stood in need, from the fortresses of Brieg and Neiss. On the 10th six battalions took possession of the suburb of Ohlau, and fixed themselves at the convent of the order of mercy, from which they drove the pandours. Forcade took post in the church-yard of St. Maurice, where a battery was raised protected by the walls; and, to divert the attention of the governor, prince Ferdinand of Prussia erected a battery, and threw up one end of an intrenchment, in the suburb of St. Nicholas, that he might be led to believe the Prussians meant to make their attacks on that side; while Balby drew his parallel from the church-yard of St. Maurice, extending opposite to the gate of Schweidnitz. From this parallel two grand crossing batteries directed their fire on the Taschen-bastion, and on the cavalier by which it is commanded. The besieged made a poor defence. They attempted a sally through the suburb of Poland, on the side where Wied commanded, in which they lost three hundred men. On the 16th a bomb by chance set fire to a

powder magazine of the Taschen-bastion. The epaulement was blown up, and its ruins formed a kind of breach. The cold became so severe that the governor dreaded, in despite of his precautions, the moats being frozen, lest the Prussians should make an assault, and the place should this way be taken. He likewise knew the Imperial army was driven into Bohemia, and that he could expect no succour. These considerations induced him to capitulate; and he and his whole garrison surrendered prisoners of war; on which occasion fourteen thousand men besieged and captured seventeen thousand. But it must be remembered a part of this garrison consisted of the fugitives of Leuthen; and that in general neither fortifications nor numbers defend a town, but that all depends on the strength or weakness of the understanding and the courage of the commander.

We have without interruption related the incidents of this expedition into Silesia; perhaps it will not be improper here to give an abstract of the losses of each party.

The Prussians, at the battle of Leuthen, only lost two thousand six hundred and sixty men in killed and wounded; because that they there obtained,

obtained, the first attack excepted, the advantage of ground.

The Austrians on this day lost three hundred and seven officers, twenty-one thousand soldiers, one hundred and thirty-four cannon, and fifty-nine pair of colours. Generals Ziethen and Fouquet took two thousand five hundred prisoners, in pursuit. The capture of Breslau cost the enemy thirteen generals, six hundred and eighty-six officers, and seventeen thousand six hundred and thirty-five common men. The sum total was forty-one thousand four hundred and forty-seven, by which the Imperial army was enfeebled on its return into Bohemia.

Long, severe, and painful as this campaign had been, and fortunate as was its conclusion, still another expedition remained to be undertaken, so great were the losses that had happened in Silesia. The town of Lignitz must be recovered, where the Imperialists had made inundations and erected works. Hither the king sent Driesen, who with a corps of cavalry had held the place invested from the 16th, and, on the 25th, Prince Maurice came up, with a detachment of infantry, regularly to lay siege to the town. All was prepared, the artillery arrived, and Bulow, whom Daun had appointed governor, preferred the preservation of his garrison

rison to a defence which must finally have been ineffectual. He capitulated on condition he and his troops had free leave to depart. This was willingly granted, because the men were fatigued to excess, and the ground was so frozen that it could not be opened by spade and pick-ax. The works and sluices were raised, that, should the enemy take it a second time, it might not hastily be put in a state of defence, or be made a place of arms. The whole cavalry was afterward employed in the blockade of Schweidnitz, the siege of which was delayed till the approaching spring. The corps of Ziethen formed a line which, extending from Schmiedeberg through Landshut, Friedland, and Braunau, terminated at Glatz. On the 6th of January the troops went into winter quarters, and the king remained at Breslau, that he might watch over affairs personally, prepare all necessaries to re-complete the army and put it in a good condition; and that he might early commence the ensuing campaign.

To conclude the history of the events of the year, it still remains for us to report what passed in Prussia, between marshals Lehwald and Apraxin, and what the Swedes performed in Pomerania. Apraxin approached the frontiers of Prussia in the month of June, at the head of

a hundred thousand men. His main army marched toward Grodno, the capital of Polish Lithuania. Fermor, with a corps of twenty thousand men, aided by the Russian fleet, laid siege to Memel, which was taken by capitulation on the 5th of July. Lehwald had proposed to defend the banks of the Pregel, and had encamped at Insterburg, whence he observed Apraxin. After Memel had surrendered, the enemy penetrated into Prussia, and approached Insterburg; while Fermor on his part inclined toward the Pregel. This seemed to be the moment when Lehwald ought to have acted decisively, and to have given battle to one of the generals. An opportunity more favourable perhaps would not present itself. The corps of Fermor, that arrived at Tilsit, gave him apprehensions; he feared being turned, and retired to Welau. He had two regiments of hussars in his army, amounting at the utmost to two thousand four hundred men; which hussars not only made head against twelve thousand Tartars and Cossacks, whom the Russians drew after them, but during the whole campaign obtained many signal advantages over these enemies.

(August.) After the retreat of marshal Lehwald, Apraxin, being under no constraint, joined

joined Fermor at Insterburg. They both advanced, marching beside the Aller, and encamped at Jægerndorf, a mile and a half from the Prussian army. The king had given full powers to Lehwald to act as he should think proper; as well because of the distance of the place as because the parties, which often hovered round the army of the king, might intercept dispatches of much consequence. Lehwald, who dreaded lest a corps of Russians should approach Königsberg, the works of which were too vast for defence, and that the place should be taken in which were his magazines, while he should be kept in awe by the Russian marshal, imagined he could not more effectually impede any such attempt than by giving battle to the foe: for which reason he determined to march and attack him in his camp at Jægerndorf.

He put himself in motion on the 29th, and inclined toward the wood, where he came precisely upon the flank of the Russians. Had he made his attack without delay, he would, apparently, have been successful. Though his corps only amounted to twenty-four thousand men, he might hope for the advantage because the Russians were surprised by his arrival, did not expect an attack, and their camp was

in great confusion. They were beside ill posted, and there was no obstacle to prevent his marching upon them immediately. What were the reasons that restrained him, and occasioned him to defer that till the morrow which he ought instantly to have put in execution, it is impossible to say.

He gave battle on the 30th. The hussars and Prussian dragoons made the Russian cavalry and the Cossacks by whom they were opposed give way, and drove them to the camp. The enemy had changed his position, during the night, whence it resulted that the dispositions made by marshal Lehwald, the day before, to attack him as he was then posted, no longer corresponded with the ground. His cavalry of the left nevertheless assailed that of the Russians, and drove it to the rear of its van. But here the Prussians met so hot a fire of artillery and case-shot that they were obliged to rejoin the infantry. It was at this moment that Lehwald attacked a wood full of abatis, in which the Russians had placed their grenadiers. The wood was in the centre of the army of Apraxin; the grenadiers were beaten, and almost cut off; but the intricate braky ground where this action passed concealed a manœuvre, which the enemy then made, from the Prussians, and which

which became fatal. Romanzow advanced with twenty battalions of the second line to the support of the grenadiers. He took the Prussian infantry in flank and rear. It lost ground insensibly, and at length was obliged to retire, which it did in good order, while the dragoons and hussars covered its retreat. This corps, which was not pursued by the enemy, returned to Welau and assumed its former camp. In this battle the marshal only lost, dead, wounded, and prisoners, fourteen hundred men, and thirteen pieces of artillery.

Apraxin remained some days in his camp at Jægerndorf. On the 7th of September he made a feint of passing the Aller, and of marching immediately for Königsberg; but he certainly could not be very intent on this expedition; for, finding a Prussian corps that disputed the passage of the river, he desisted from his attempt. Ten days after he suddenly decamped from Jægerndorf, and retired toward the frontiers of Poland. Marshal Lehwald, for form sake, followed him as far as Tilsit, less with a design to engage with the rear-guard than to impose upon the public. The disproportion of strength was too great between the two armies, and the check the Prussians had received too recent. He obtained his wishes without in-

curing any danger ; for the enemy, of his own motion, retiring into Poland, he had but to suffer him tranquilly to pursue his march.

Marshal Apraxin evacuated all Prussia, Memel excepted, of which the Russians remained in possession. The Prussian army halted in the vicinity of Tilsit, too fortunate to be thus cheaply disengaged of a foe so formidable. But, though it had escaped the calamities by which it was threatened for this campaign, it was little probable it would long enjoy the same good fortune. Had marshal Lehwald possessed the talents of prince Eugene, how might he, ultimately, with twenty-four thousand Prussians, have resisted an army of a hundred thousand men ? The king had too many enemies to combat, and his troops were too much diminished, for him to be able to send succour to his army of Prussia. It was to be feared, nay it might be predicted, that the Russians by gaining greater knowledge would extend their views, correct the faults they had committed, and would, at the commencement of the next campaign, detach a considerable corps toward the Vistula, which should expose Lehwald to the peril of being cut off from Pomerania. There was every reason to fear that, surrounded by enemies so numerous, he would have undergone a fate

similar

similar to that of the duke of Cumberland ; with this difference, that the Russians, not so polite as the French, would have obliged him to lay down his arms.

The Swedes had only made a progress in Pomerania because they had met with no resistance. They were in possession of Anclam, Demmin, and the fort of Peenamunde, which they had taken after a fortnight's siege. The garrison of Stettin consisted in ten battalions of militia, that had been raised by the states of Pomerania. Manteufel, at the head of four battalions, was not in force sufficient to form any grand plans. Should the armies remain divided as they then were, the king would incur the greatest risks in Prussia, and at the same time hazard the invasion of Pomerania by the Swedes. He therefore resolved to concentrate his forces more that he might proceed with the greater security, and to abandon the extremities, which the number of his enemies no longer permitted him to defend.

These motives induced him to recal Lehwald and his army from Tilsit. The marshal immediately marched into Pomerania against the Swedes, whom he quickly dislodged from Anclam and Demmin. They were soon driven under the cannon of Stralsund, whence, not thinking

thinking themselves in safety, they retired, and took refuge in the isle of Rugen. A great frost came on, by which the arm of the sea that separates this island from Pomerania was frozen over. Marshal Lehwald might have profited by the occasion, had not his great age prevented him; he might have marched over the ice with his army, and have destroyed all these Swedish troops. Such an occasion would, at least for a time, have delivered the king of an enemy who made a vexatious diversion. Though marshal Lehwald did not attempt all that he might have done, still he made three thousand Swedes prisoners, in this short expedition. A detachment that he sent to besiege the fort of Peenamunde did not take the place before the month of March, in the ensuing year.

The multifarious objects that were to be attended to during this campaign were immense. Pressed to make efforts on every side, success might only be obtained by employing the same troops in various places. Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick was in want of cavalry for his army, and this must necessarily be sent him for the enterprise he meditated. As it was for the benefit of the king that the French should be driven from Lower Saxony and the Lower Rhine,

Rhine, that he might contribute on his part as much as his situation would permit, he detached ten squadrons of dragoons and five of hussars from the army of marshal Lehwald, with orders to join prince Ferdinand of Brunswick at Stade. The prince immediately made an attempt on Zell which was unsuccessful; first because the duke de Richelieu, having foreseen his intention, prevented him from passing the Aller; and again, because this barren country, which produced nothing but heath, could not furnish him with subsistence.

Notwithstanding this design failed, he soon after took Harburg. The king afterward concerted with him the plan of his campaign. His advice was that the allies should incline for the Weser, and for two reasons. The first, that they ought not to ruin the capitals of the electorate of Hanover and the dutchy of Brunswick, by laying siege to them for their recovery: the second was to inspire the French with the fear of being cut off from the Rhine, which would induce them wilfully to evacuate these provinces; especially if a detachment of Prussians should, at the same time, appear on the side of Brunswick. Prince Henry, who had remained in Saxony for the cure of the wound which he had received at

Rosbach,

Rosbach, was to command this detachment. The plan was well laid, and we shall see, at the commencement of the following campaign, the success which accompanied prince Ferdinand in its execution.

C H A P. VII.

The Winter of 1757 to 1758.

NEVER was campaign more fruitful in sudden changes than that the history of which we have just concluded. That chance which presides over the incidents of war had insolently sported with the destiny of the belligerent powers. At one time it had bestowed on Prussia the most brilliant success ; at another it had hurled her headlong into an abyss of miseries. The Russians had gained a battle in Prussia, yet had retreated as if they had been vanquished. The French, on the point of disarming the duke of Cumberland, appeared to be the umpires of Germany : yet scarcely had this news time to be rumoured throughout Europe, before the defeat of one of their armies was published, and the resurrection of the army of the duke, which was supposed to be for ever extinct, was beheld. Such a succession of decisive yet contradictory events had as it were stupified Europe. Incertitude was seen to attend projectors ; designs were no sooner conceived than overthrown, and armies were almost destroyed in a single day.

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Some moments of tranquillity were requisite for the minds of men to recover their recollection, and that each power might coolly consider its actual situation. Here were beheld the burning desire of vengeance, wounded ambition, vexation, and despair, arming the hand of emperors and of kings who formed the grand alliance. There was seen the necessity of continuing war; and rays of hope shone forth on Prussia, inducing her to exert her utmost efforts for self-defence. Renovated fermentation gave a renovated degree of activity to politics and to courts. Each prepared to carry on the war with additional obstinacy, fury, and destruction.

Such is the general picture of the passions which agitated kings and their ministers. The nature of this work requires us to enter into the most circumstantial details; and that we should take a successive retrospect of all the courts of Europe, that we may distinctly figure to ourselves what was passing in each.

During the last autumn a change had taken place in the British ministry. Fox, who had intrudingly been made a member of it by the intrigues of the duke of Cumberland, saw himself unable to maintain his station against the opposing party. He resolved voluntarily

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to resign, and was succeeded by Pitt, whose eloquence and high genius had rendered him the idol of the nation. He was the greatest man in England. He had subjugated the house of commons by the force of oratory, over which he reigned, and of which he might be pronounced the soul. Having taken the helm, he applied the whole extent of his genius to render his country queen of the ocean, and like a great man thought the convention of Closter-Seven disgraceful, which he regarded as opprobrious to England. His first steps in his new career all tended to abolish the very remembrance of this shameful treaty. He it was who proposed to reinforce the troops of Germany by an English corps, which corps effectually joined them in the year 1758. He still farther judged it conducive to the nation's glory to renew the alliances that had been contracted, as well with the king of Prussia as with other princes of Germany. He concluded a treaty with the king, by one article of which the king of England engaged to pay the king of Prussia an annual subsidy of four millions of crowns, which was continued to the year 1761. The king saw himself under the necessity of accepting this subsidy, which otherwise was repugnant to his manner of thinking. But the French had despoiled him of the provinces he possessed on the

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Lower Rhine, and he was on the eve of beholding Prussia invaded by the Russians, whom he was the less enabled to impede since marshal Lehwald had been obliged to hasten into Pomerania, and oppose the Swedes. This subsidy was beside the only succour that might be obtained from England, since she had various times declined the request that had been made to send a squadron into the Baltic.

Pitt, about this time, sent Sir Robert Keith into Russia, there to counteract the intrigues of the French and Austrian faction, and to endeavour to remove the film from the eyes of the empress, blinded by the prejudices with which she had been inspired against the king of Prussia. Mr. Goderick* departed with similar views for Sweden; but the French party, who despotically governed the senate of Stockholm, put every spring in action to interdict all entrance into the kingdom to this Englishman. Goderick remained in Denmark, and the senators applauded themselves for having prevented the money of England from overturning their system. While Pitt was taking measures so proper respecting politics, the ports of Great Britain abounded with ships; plans for war by land and sea were concerted, and new

* Read—Sir John Goodricke. T.

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activity reanimated every branch of government.

Keith, who in the interim had arrived at Petersburg, found not the court in a disposition favourable to listen to the purport of his embassy. The ambassadors of Austria, France, and Saxony, were there all puissant. By the aid of their intrigues, and the profusion of their bribes, they had gained the favourite of Elizabeth, who then governed the empress, consequently the empire. The ambassadors, disgusted with the small progress of the Russian army, and particularly with its retreat, at the close of the last campaign, endeavoured to animate the mind of the empress with their own warlike enthusiasm, and excited her to make still greater efforts in the coming year than she had done in the past. They perceived that their intentions were secretly traversed by the grand chancellor Bestuchef, and they determined his downfall, in which they were effectually successful.

We have in this work depicted count Bestuchef as a man who had changed passion into principle, and had become the sworn enemy of Prussia: but he renounced his system that he might please the grand duke, who he foresaw would soon ascend the throne. He gave

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instructions to marshal Apraxin in a manner as favourable as circumstances would permit, and this was the sole cause that the Russians evacuated the states of the king at the close of the campaign. Bestuchef was encouraged in this conduct by the counsels of the grand duke and grand dutchess of Russia, who mutually entertained the most favourable sentiments of the cause of the king. The grand duke, by birth prince of Holstein, had acquired from the history of his ancestors an implacable hatred against the Danes, occasioned by the injustice the kings of Denmark had committed on his family. Fearing the affairs of the king might oblige him to an alliance with the Danes, he offered his credit, and every service he could render him in Russia, provided he would not enter into any engagement with these constant enemies of Holstein. His offers were accepted by the king, who promised to enter into no treaty with Denmark ; and, though this condescension was of no present advantage, it will hereafter be seen that it was this his close connection with the grand duke of Russia that overthrew the vast projects of Austria.

However secret all these affairs might be kept, still something was perceived : the ambassadors of France and Austria saw the conduct of the grand

grand chancellor vary. They obtained cognizance of the orders that had been expedited to marshal Apraxin, and employed the favourite of the empress to effect the fall of the minister, and to afford every kind of contrariety to the court of the grand duke. From that moment all bowed before these ambassadors in Russia, and they drove the empress Elizabeth into violent measures that were little conformable to the true interests of her empire.

The court of Vienna had received shocks so violent, at the close of the last campaign, that its fortitude began to be shaken. Austria had supposed the war was almost terminated, and regarded the conquest of Silesia as accomplished. Suddenly deprived of these flattering hopes, she had beheld her army ruined, and its shattered remains with difficulty escaping into Bohemia. Misfortunes so unexpected relaxed her ardour for war, and so many projects rendered abortive diminished her dislike, or rather her insurmountable aversion, to peace. The style of her chancery, and the memorials of Ratisbon, became milder, but bitterness and rudeness revived with renovating hope. While the first impressions of misfortune were strong, the empress queen wished some intercourse with the king; whether it were to begin a negotiation,

or to acquire the honour of magnanimity. Count Kaunitz informed the king of an imaginary conspiracy against him, entered into by two Neapolitans and a Milanese. The king replied he was obliged to the empress queen for the information she had been pleased to give him; but as there were two modes of assassination, the one by the poniard, the other by injurious and dishonourable writings, he assured her majesty that he concerned himself little with the first, but that his feelings were infinitely more strong respecting the second. This did not prevent indecency and scandal from being continued in these writings; nor even from increasing, according as success favoured the arms of Austria.

France heard with chagrin of the pacific propensities of the empress queen, because that the defection of Austria would have been very considerably prejudicial to her affairs, while she should continue at war with the English by sea and land. Louis XV. piqued at the disgrace which the battle of Rosbach had inflicted, hoped by the continuation of war to find opportunity of revenge; and the ministers of France laboured, at Vienna, with infinite application, to inflame the passions that began to be calmed at that court. The shame of a great power being abased by a petty prince

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was what weighed most on the mind of the empress. Ancient animosity against Prussia was awakened ; all dispositions toward peace vanished ; and the connections of friendship and intelligence between the courts of Vienna and Versailles became more than ever intimate. Thus, far from the powers with which Prussia was at war being repulsed by her success, they undertook to redouble their efforts, that they might appear superlatively formidable and dangerous, at the opening of the ensuing campaign.

The king likewise took similar measures for the re-establishment of the army, during winter, that it might be enabled to act with vigour. The losses that had resulted from seven pitched battles, which the Prussians had fought, were to be repaired. But the ravages of war were unequal to the ravages which epidemical disease made in the hospitals. The disease we speak of was a species of inflammatory fever, accompanied with all the symptoms of the plague. The sick became delirious on the day they were attacked. Carbuncles appeared on the neck, and under the arm-pits. Whether they were or were not bled it was the same ; death carried off all those without distinction who were attacked by this malady ; the venom of

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which was so violent, its progress so rapid, and its effects so prompt, that the patient in three days was in the grave. Resort was ineffectually had to every kind of remedy. At length emetics * were employed, and succeeded. Three grains were dissolved in a measure of water, the sick were made to drink till the dose began to operate, and this was found to be a sovereign specific against the disease; for, after it was brought into use, scarcely three out of a hundred died. The causes of the disease, no doubt, were perspiration impeded by cold, and indigestion occasioned by bad food. Powerful evacuations only were found effectual.

Though the losses of the army in the hospitals were considerable, sufficient recruits still were collected, during winter, to fill up these losses; but it was impossible to employ them in the spring, because that most of them were peasants, whom it was necessary to exercise and discipline; and the campaign began early.

The royal house this year lost the queen mother. The fatal news was received by the king after the battle of Kolin, and at the moment when fortune was most averse to Prussia. His majesty was deeply affected. He had

* *On eu recours à l'émétique.* By this phrase the royal author probably means some preparation of antimony. T, venerated

venerated and adored this princess, as a tender mother, whose virtues and great qualities were the admiration of those who had the happiness to approach her. Her death did not occasion a ceremonious mourning; it was in this instance a public calamity. The great regretted her easy and gracious affability, men of a subordinate rank her clemency, the poor their lost refuge, the unfortunate their late resource, men of letters their protectress, and every branch of her family that had the honour to be nearest her person imagined a part of themselves was deceased, and were more sensible than she herself was of the stroke of death.

In the same year died the sultan Osman. His successor had the character of being a more bold and enterprising monarch. The rumour of his reputation, on his accession to the throne, rekindled all the intrigues of the Prussian ambassador at the Porte. The sieur von Rexin wished to be admitted to an audience with the grand seignior; this favour he had more than a year been interceding to obtain, for till it was obtained he could not begin those negotiations with which he had been charged with the grand vizir and the principal officers of the Divan. In the course of the work we shall see the various forms this negoti-

tiation assumed, and shall have occasion to remark how little proper oriental nations are to pursue the principles of good and wholesome policy. This defect principally arises from their great ignorance of the interests of the monarchs of Europe, from the venality of the people, and from the vices of government, which subject every thing that relates to peace and war to the decisions of the muphti, without whose fetfa it is impossible to put the Ottoman troops in motion.

C H A P. VIII.

Campaign of 1758.

(February.) PRINCE Ferdinand of Brunswick was the first who this year took the field. The task he had to perform was difficult. It was nothing less than to expel eighty thousand French from Lower Saxony and Westphalia, with thirty thousand Hanoverians, who three months before had been ready to lay down their arms and sign a disgraceful treaty. He detached a corps, on the Weser, which took Verden; and another, under the hereditary prince, that marched on each side of the river, to gain Hoya, on which place by the efforts of valour and good conduct this young hero seized. Scarcely was St. Germain informed of the progress he had made before he evacuated Bremen, where he had a garrison of twelve battalions, and, with fourteen others that had wintered in the vicinity, took the road to Westphalia.

(March.) While the hereditary prince seized on Hoya, the bridge of which over the Weser was of importance to the allies, prince Ferdinand of Brunswick passed the Aller with the main army.

army. Beust, who led the van-guard, surprised and took the regiment of Poleresky, in the vicinage of Hanover. This accident, added to the march of prince Henry who approached the town of Brunswick through the districts of Mansfeld and Hildesheim, disconcerted the French generals, and made the count de Clermont, who had taken the command instead of the duke de Richelieu, determine at once to evacuate Brunswick, Wolfenbuttle, and Hanover. Prince Ferdinand marched immediately for Minden; where, having joined the detachments from the Weser, he besieged that place with the main army. The count de Clermont passed the Weser at Hameln, and sent de Broglio into the vicinage of Buckeburg, for the relief of Minden; but, finding no opportunity of attempting any thing against the allies, this general did but remain a spectator of the capture of the town, the garrison of which surrendered prisoners of war.

After the capture of Minden, de Broglio turned toward Paderborn, to rejoin the prince of Clermont; and the army of the allies marched to Bielefeld. The French, confounded by this sudden revolution in their affairs, evacuated Lippstadt, Hamm, and Munster. The count de Clermont, who had no longer any footing in Germany,

Germany, repassed the Rhine at Wesel, and cantoned his army on the opposite shore. Prince Ferdinand halted at Munster (April) and sent his troops into the environs that they might have time to recover from the fatigues they had sustained, by continual operations in a season so early and so severe. The allies took eleven thousand French prisoners, during this short expedition, which can only be compared to the famous campaign of marshal de Turenne, when, penetrating through Thann and Belfort, he surprised the Imperialists, who were scattered in their quarters in Alsatia, and obliged them to repass the Rhine.

On the 2d of June, prince Ferdinand crossed this river with his army below Emmerich. He had bribed some Dutch boatmen, but who would not however engage to construct a bridge, except on the territories of the republic. From thence he presently advanced into the country of Cleves. Some French troops were surprised in their quarters, but most of them joined the army which had assembled near Crefeld. Prince Ferdinand occupied the town of Cleves. He left some troops under the command of Imhof, to cover his bridge of Emmerich; he then proceeded with the allied army up the left shore of the Rhine; and, on the 20th of the month,

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came within a day's march of the count de Clermont. He had resolved to attack the French army, in the hope that, should he gain a complete victory, he might recover Wesel, and transport the theatre of the war beyond the Rhine. For this purpose the prince caused Wangenheim to join him, who had been toward Kaiserswerth; after the junction he marched for Closter camp. On his approach, St. Germain abandoned the town of Crefeld, and retired a mile in the rear, that he might draw near the count de Clermont, who then encamped at Nuys. He joined the count at Vischern.

It was on the 23d of June that prince Ferdinand quitted his camp of Hast and Kempen to attack de Clermont. He divided his army into three corps; one, under the command of Wangenheim, presented itself in the front of the foe, to hold him in awe; while the main body of the allies, turning the left of the French, presented itself on their flank, between Vischern and Anrodt. In this part, behind a rivulet, there was a bulwark, or *Landwehr*, by which the French profited to take post; but, after a severe conflict, they were dislodged by the infantry of the allies. The French carabiniers hastened to the support of their infantry; and their leader, the count de Gisors, ardently attacked

tacked the infantry of prince Ferdinand. The count was slain, and his discouraged troops took to flight. The prince of Holstein then fell on, with the Prussian dragoons, and completed the rout. During this shock, the hereditary prince, with a part of the right of the allies, had gained upon the rear of the French. The manœuvre completely disconcerted the count de Clermont; who, imagining himself on the point of being attacked in front by Wangenheim, while he was taken in flank by prince Ferdinand, and in momentary danger of being totally turned by the hereditary prince, abandoned the field of battle, and retired to Nuys, then to Weringhen, and afterward to Cologn.

That he might profit by victory, prince Ferdinand detached the hereditary prince, who took Ruremonde by capitulation, and sent parties forward to the very gates of Brussels, while Wangenheim, who had been ordered to march with four battalions into the dutchy of Bergen, besieged Dusseldorf, in which there were eight battalions. The town surrendered, by capitulation, on the 8th of July. Here a considerable magazine appertaining to the French was found.

Prince Ferdinand however, being informed that the enemy was collecting forces to oppose him,

him, called in the corps of the hereditary prince to the convent of St. Nicholas, where he encamped. This commencement of de Clermont induced the court of Versailles to recall him, and to send marshal de Contades to take the command. The marshal immediately ordered the army to advance, that it might recover its lost confidence. M. de Chevert, in the mean time, being at Wesel, where the French had a numerous garrison, left the place with a considerable corps to combat Imhof, who guarded the bridge of the allies, near Emmerich. Of this the general received information, and with his whole corps put himself in ambuscade, on the road by which de Chevert was to pass; beat the foe, and took many prisoners.

The success of prince Ferdinand would have prevented the French from repassing the Rhine, and might have accomplished the capture of Wesel toward the close of the campaign, had he not by a diversion been obliged himself to pass this river, that he might reinstate the affairs of Hesse and Lower Saxony. On the eleventh of July the prince de Soubise had put himself in motion; and had been joined at Hanau by fifteen thousand of the troops of Wurtemberg. Prince Ferdinand had left the prince of Ysenburg in Hesse, with about seven thousand men.

This prince retired to Marbourg, at the approach of the French van-guard, commanded by de Broglie, and passed the Fulda. The French attacked him in the position he had taken, near Sangerhausen, and after a combat of six hours he was obliged to cede to numbers. He retired to Eimbeck, and established himself among the hills, confining his manœuvres to the preserving of a communication with Hanover.

Finding no resistance, the prince de Soubise then seized on Nordheim, Munden, and Göttingen. De Contades (August) who supposed the diversion of de Soubise would soon oblige the allies to retreat, advanced in person, and even occupied the post of Brugen, which was on their left. But prince Ferdinand, who might not suffer this dangerous neighbourhood, sent the hereditary prince to dislodge the French. He afterward resolved to retreat toward the Niers, that he might approach the succour that was coming from England. The French made a similar march, but were anticipated by the allies. Prince Ferdinand, who perceived the only means of maintaining himself beyond the Rhine was a victory over de Contades, made dispositions for battle; but the marshal did not think proper to risk an action, and retired to Dalen. Prince Ferdinand then marched for

Wachtendonk,

Wachtendonk, from which the hereditary prince, who led the van-guard, drove the French, and the whole army crossed the Niers.

Prince Ferdinand, incapable of longer maintaining himself and army beyond the Rhine, withdrew the garrison from Ruremonde, which found means to escape at the very time that the place was summoned by the foe. The whole army passed the Rhine, over its bridge at Griethausen, between the 8th and 10th of August. It was necessary to evacuate Dusseldorf at the same time; and the governor Hardenberg diligently marched to Lippstadt there to defend that important post. The French a few days after passed the Rhine, and extended as far as Dorsten, being covered by the Lippe.

On the 14th, prince Ferdinand was joined at Böckholt by twelve thousand English, under the duke of Marlborough. Marshal de Contades was, at the same time, reinforced in his camp of Halteren, by between five and six thousand Saxons, whom the Austrians had assembled in Hungary, and who were commanded by prince Xavier, second son of the king of Poland. Prince Ferdinand detached Imhof to Crefeld, and M. von Post to Dalmen; and farther, in consequence of the motions of the enemy toward Lunen, the hereditary prince was detached

detached to reinforce the corps at Dalmen. Prince Ferdinand quickly followed with the army, and the hereditary prince obliged the French to retreat to Halteren. Under these circumstances it was thought proper to detach Oberg, with a corps of nine thousand men, to pass the Lippe, and march into the bishoprick of Paderborn; as well to interrupt the communication of the two French armies, as to be ready, should there be any necessity, to aid the prince of Ysenburg.

In the mean time, and while the prince of Ysenburg remained near Eimbeck, de Soubise had taken Cassel, Göttingen, and some places on the Werra. He then formed the project of seizing on Hameln (September), but from this he was obliged to desist, when he understood that prince Ferdinand had repassed the Rhine. He afterward evacuated Münden, Göttingen, and all the places he had occupied in the country of Hanover, that he might strengthen himself on the Diemel. In this position he remained till the 5th of September; and, leaving only M. du Mesnil on the Diemel to oppose the corps under Oberg, he successively advanced to Münden, Göttingen, and Nördheim. On the eleventh, the prince of Ysenburg was obliged to quit Eimbeck, at the approach of the French,

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and retire to Coppenbrugge, where he was joined by some regiments from the army of the allies; after which he, in conjunction with Oberg, advanced on Holzmunden. This manœuvre made de Soubise, who was at Göttingen, apprehend he should be cut off from Cassel; and, immediately withdrawing his corps, he diligently returned into Hesse. The allies and the French arrived nearly at the same time before Cassel, where they encamped in presence of each other.

All these motions had no influence on the operations of prince Ferdinand; he pursued his purpose, which was to observe the army of de Contades. The French, having vainly attempted to surprise the hereditary prince, at Halteren, and having been there repulsed with considerable loss, turned their views elsewhere. De Contades detached M. de Chevert (October 1st) with twenty thousand men, to join the prince de Soubise; and, by this reinforcement, to give him the superiority necessary to overwhelm the prince of Ysenburg, and at the same time to occupy prince Ferdinand, so as to prevent him from sending detachments into Hesse. Contades himself inclined toward Hamm with his army, and sent M. de Chevreuse to Söft.

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Perceiving this, the allies fell back toward Munster, whence the hereditary prince was detached (the 9th) to Warendorf on the Ems; and the prince of Holstein to Telgade. Having been joined by his reinforcement, de Soubise lost no time in putting himself in action. The prince of Ysenburg, informed of the arrival of de Chevert, crossed the Fulda, and continued to retire before the enemy as far as Lutterberg, that he might not be cut off from Munden. Here he was attacked by the enemy with a force so superior that he was obliged to yield the field of battle, with the loss of sixteen field pieces, and about two thousand men. He retired by Dransfeld and Göttingen to Möringen. This event obliged prince Ferdinand to quit Munster, where he left a good garrison; and on the 17th arrived with his army at Lippstadt.

On the morrow, the hereditary prince marched to surprise de Chevreuse, who was at Söft; but this surprise did not take place, because the French were informed of the march of the allies: though, after a short combat, they retired and abandoned all the provisions they had amassed at Söft. Prince Ferdinand incontinently assumed his camp near that town, which induced de Chevert to change his route. He had quitted de Soubise, after the affair of Lutterberg,

and could only join de Contades by a circuitous march. When de Chevert had left the army of Hesse, Oberg passed the Wefer, at Holzmun-den; and, continuing his route, on the 21st of October, he joined the allied army at Söft. The position of prince Ferdinand intercepted the communication of the two French armies; and, however superior they might be in number to that of the allies, this did not prevent the prince de Soubise from supposing his position hazardous; consequently he evacuated Cassel (the 22d) and all Hesse, and crossed the Maine at Hanau, with his whole forces. Here the campaign would have ended, had not de Contades once more attempted to surprise Munster. M. d'Armentieres had approached this place, at the head of fifteen thousand French, near which he had chosen a camp that the trenches might be immediately opened. But on the 26th Imhof arrived at Warendorf, followed by the duke of Holstein, at the same time that Wangenheim, with a large detachment, occupied the camp of Rheda. These various manœuvres, which menaced to cut off d'Armentieres from Wesel, and the skirmish which happened with major Bulow, made him resolve to renounce his project, and to cross the Lippe, on the 2d of November. The French army soon took the road for Wesel,

to enter into winter quarters on the opposite shore of the Rhine. Marburg excepted, they had no longer any footing in Hesse, and thither the hereditary prince was sent, who employed but a few days in his expedition. After the capture of this place, being masters of all Westphalia and Lower Saxony, the allies went into quarters.

During this excellent campaign of prince Ferdinand, the king did not remain idle in opposing the Austrians. He prepared to reap all possible advantage from the battle of Leuthen, and the consequences which had resulted from that battle. On the 9th of January, Werner had been detached into Upper Silesia; and, however superior the enemy might be to his corps, the former was obliged to retire into Moravia, and the Prussians then recovered Troppau and Jægerndorf. The king judged this early beginning necessary for the execution of his designs. The expedition of the month of January appeared to the foe but as the consequence of the battle of Leuthen, and conducted to the clearing of all Silesia from the troops of Austria.

In this state affairs remained till the 14th of March, when the army began its motions for the commencement of the campaign. The

enemy was known not to be sufficiently advanced in his arrangements to oppose the plans the king had formed ; so that this time was judged the most proper to change the blockade of Schweidnitz into a regular siege. The king put himself at the head of the army of observation, and cantoned from Landshut to Friedland. Prince Maurice had the command of the left, and continued the communication through Wustengiersdorf to Braunau. Fouquet commanded the corps which covered this defile of Silesia. The king fixed his head quarters at Griffau, which was the central position of the places occupied by his troops.

The main army of the enemy was still in cantonments, in the environs of Königsgrätz and Jaromirs. Marshal Daun had the sole command, and had ordered the corps of Laudon to advance to Trautenau, and that of Beck to Nachod (April). Such was the position of the armies when Treskow more nearly invested the town of Schweidnitz. The trenches were not opened till the night of the 1st of April : the attack was directed on the fortress of the potence, as the place least fortified, and the most commodious for the bringing up of ammunition. Twenty-four cannon, twenty mortars, and sixteen howitzers, were erected in battery ; but, having

having often been deranged by the artillery of the besieged, this battery was not entirely completed till the 8th; and on the 10th an arrow was seized on which the enemy was obliged to abandon. This arrow, which brought the Prussians within a hundred paces of the fort of the potence, gave occasion to the coup de main which was attempted on the latter work, that the siege might be terminated with the greater promptitude. The artillery of the water fort and that of the potence having been dismounted on the 15th, the assault was made after midnight. The potence was turned on the narrow part, and a thousand grenadiers carried it with a loss so insignificant as not to merit being mentioned. The governor, disconcerted by an action so vigorous, beat the chamade and surrendered himself and garrison prisoners. The count von Thierhaimb evacuated the town on the 18th, and his men, to the amount of five thousand, were dispersed in the different fortresses of Silesia and the electoral march.

The siege, thus fortunately and timely terminated, facilitated the execution of projects more great. The design of the king was to penetrate into Moravia, and to take Olmutz; not with an intention to preserve the place, for the diversion of the Russians was foreseen; they

having seized on Prussia, and prepared to enter Pomerania and the marches of Brandenbourg; but in order to amuse the Austrians, during the whole campaign, in a country distant from the states of the king, that he might have time and opportunity to oppose the Russian army with the greater strength. For the execution of this plan it was necessary to deceive marshal Daun, and to gain some marches upon him, that there might be time sufficient to secure the environs of Olmutz before his arrival. With this intent the army of the king left the mountains, and descended into the plains of Schweidnitz and of Reichenbach, under the pretence of relieving the troops after the fatigues of the siege, and of waiting for recruits by whom they were to be joined. Ziethen remained with a corps in the vicinity of Landshut, whence he drew a line to Friedland; and Fouquet entered the county of Glatz, that he there might guard the passes. These two corps had masked the motions of the army behind the hills, and had been further of service in preventing the Austrians from receiving such intelligence as might teach them what were the intentions of the king.

(May.) While these dispositions imposed upon the enemy, the Prussian army marched to Neiss, where it divided into two columns, one of which, commanded

commanded by the king, took the road of Troppau; and the other, under marshal Keith, that of Jægerndorf. On the 3d of May these two columns entered the plains of Olmutz; the one by Gibau, the other through Sternberg. Fouquet followed them, as soon as he observed the foe had taken the alarm, and quitted the vicinity of Königsgrätz to incline toward Hohenmaut. He took the road for Neiss, whence he escorted the ammunition and provisions, requisite for the siege, as far as Olmutz. This was the 12th, and on the same day the army of observation passed the Morava at Littau. The king advanced to Holeschau, where M. de Ville, encamped with seven regiments of cavalry, was attacked by the prince of Wurtemberg, and repulsed beyond Prostnitz, toward Wischau. The prince encamped his corps at Prostnitz, and remained there to observe the enemy on the side of Wischau and Brunn; having four regiments of dragoons, one of hussars, and four battalions, under his command.

Keith, having invested Olmutz, opened the trenches on the 27th of May. The ten squadrons of Bareuth, five hundred hussars, and some free battalions, were placed by him on the other side of the Morava, and they encamped near a village named Dolein. That the marshal and

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the army might be in the greater safety during the siege, it was thought necessary to drive de Ville further. This general was near being surprised in his camp, and did not suppose himself in safety till he had approached the fortifications of Brunn.

The army of observation, in the mean time, occupied all the posts which there was sufficient leisure to select; in consequence of this the margrave Charles assumed the camp of Neustadt; prince Maurice that of Littau; Wedel that of Namiest; and the king occupied that part of the heights which extend between Prostnitz and Holeschau, from Namiest to Studenitz.

On the 10th of June, Puttkammer and the convoy he escorted joined the army, without having been disturbed in his route. Ziethen, who had been attacked at Griffau by the enemy, repulsed the assailants; and, remarking that the whole force of Austria inclined toward Moravia, he quitted the hills and joined the royal army, almost at the same time with Puttkammer. As there were not sufficient ammunition and provisions for the siege, a new convoy was prepared in Silesia, as well to carry on attacks as to reinforce the army. The siege would apparently have been more successful, had not the trenches been

been too distant, and the first batteries necessarily forsaken, because they fired without effect, by which much ammunition was ineffectually consumed.

The van-guard of marshal Daun entered Moravia, in the interim, under the command of Harsch; and encamped in presence of prince Maurice, on the hills of Allerheiligen, not far from Littau. Harsch made an unsuccessful attempt to surprise that town. Daun, who followed, had marched for Gewitsch, whence he detached a corps of six thousand men, who took post at Prerau. This position obliged marshal Keith to place his dragoons at Wisternitz, and his free companies at Bistrovann, and Kosutchan. The intentions of Daun were to throw succours into the besieged place, without exposing himself to a battle, the loss of which would have incurred the capture of Olmutz. He attacked the village of Kosutchan by night (the 8th) which was defended by a free battalion that was obliged to give ground. The dragoons of Bareuth, who had passed the night under arms, by the negligence of colonel Meyer, the commander, did not wait the return of the scouting parties before they unsaddled. The enemy came up impetuously, driving the patroles before him, and fell on the tents of the dragoons, which

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he did not give them time to quit. The regiment lost three hundred men, and would have been totally ruined, had not the battalion of Nimschewsky timely arrived, and obliged the assailants to hasten their retreat.

The success of this gave the Austrians an inclination for nocturnal attempts. They three times attacked the regiment of Ziethen at Kostellitz, and were three times repulsed with considerable loss. The free battalions of le Noble and de Rapin were not equally fortunate. They had been sent by the margrave Charles to Sternberg, whence they were to repair to Bahrn, to escort a convoy which arrived on the 10th. But they were very ill treated by the pandours, and lost five hundred men.

Let us return to more considerable objects. The position of the Austrian army, and principally the corps it had detached to Prerau, required that the town of Olmuz should be more closely invested, beyond the Morava. The corps of the margrave, at Neufstadt, did not appear to be essentially necessary there; and, as there were not too many troops, the margrave took post in such a manner that his left occupied a bridge the Prussians had at Commothau, over the Morava, while his left extended to the bridge of Holitz. However, while the Prussians

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changed their position, the Austrian colonel Bulau had found means to glide into the town, and brought the governor, Marshall, a reinforcement of twelve hundred men.

Marshal Daun, a few days after, descended into the plain, and encamped at Prettitz, between Prostnitz and Wischau. Here he was informed the Prussians expected a grand convoy, on which the success of the siege depended, because that ammunition began to fail. This convoy was escorted by eight battalions, and four thousand convalescents, horse and foot, who had been formed into regiments to serve on the occasion. It left Troppau on the 25th of June; and Daun, directing his views to the capture of it, sent Janus to Bahrn, and Laudon to Liebe, that it might be intercepted. The king, to oppose him, detached Ziethen, with twenty squadrons and three battalions, who came up with the convoy near Gibau. On the morrow (the 28th) general Laudon attacked, and, after an action of five hours, was obliged to retreat. The convoy advanced very tardily, because of the badness of the roads; and Daun employed the time to send a reinforcement of eight thousand men to Janus and Laudon. On the 30th there was a new attack, between Bautsch and Domstadt. Scarcely had a thousand

sand horse, four battalions, and four hundred waggons, began the march, and passed the defile of Domstadt, before the enemy, with all his forces from Bahrn and Liebe, fell on the convoy ; so that the two columns of the enemy, meeting, cut off the van-guard, which had passed the defile, from the corps that followed. Ziethen, who was with the main body, vigorously charged one wing of the foe, but numbers were too disproportionate for him to succeed. After having bravely combated, he was constrained, with most of his men, to retire for Troppau. He here lost general Puttkammer, and eight hundred men, without including the whole convoy and the army money, which fell into the hands of the enemy.

This misfortune occasioned the siege to be raised. Had the convoy arrived, the town must have been taken in less than a fortnight ; for the third parallel was finished, and the besiegers had begun to open the saps. But, however well founded these hopes might be, it was requisite they should be renounced, for the safety of the army ; which, by prolonging its abode in Moravia, would have wanted subsistence.

There were two roads for retreat ; the one leading into Upper Silesia, by which the army had advanced, and the other which crosses Bohemia,

mia, and leads into the county of Glatz ; or through Braunau into Silesia. The enemy prepared to render the first route difficult. Laudon, Janus, and St. Ignon, had remained there after the battle of the convoy, and marshal Daun had marched with his army to Tobischau ; so that it was to be feared, should this road be taken, the army would have two corps on its flanks, and Daun who would incessantly harass the rear-guard. In a word the march must have been one perpetual battle, in which the army might have lost the heavy artillery for the siege, its baggage, wounded, and sick, and perhaps it might even have been totally ruined, at the passage of the Morava, which the enemy might have rendered fatal. These considerations quickly determined the king to return through Bohemia ; because it was possible, the enemy not being prepared on that side, to gain two marches on him ; which was matter of great importance for the safety of the artillery, and baggage, that encumbered the army.

On the night of the first of July, the king quitted his camp, and divided his troops into two columns. The corps of prince Maurice formed the van-guard, where the king was in person, and passed by Konitz, Tribau, and Zwittau, to Leitomischel ; where it seized on a

magazine of the enemy. The second, under the conduct of marshal Keith, retreating from its trenches, only left four mortars, and one cannon, which were immoveable because the carriages were broken. It took the road of Littau, Muglitz, and Tribau. The march thus far was not disturbed by the foe, because Daun, having made all his dispositions relative to the roads of Upper Silesia, could not withdraw his troops with sufficient promptitude to act effectually on the side of Bohemia. Lascy, nevertheless, who encamped at Gibau, wished to assault the rear guard, which was obliged to pass the defile of Krenau, to march to Zwittau. On this village he seized with his grenadiers, but he was quickly dislodged by Wied, and the troops peaceably continued their march.

Marshal Keith had divided his column into three corps; one of which, under Retzow, having passed Hohemaut, approaching the small hills of Holitz, found them occupied by the enemy. The Prussians seized the chapel which is on the height, facing one held by the foe; a reciprocal cannonade was commenced; while Retzow continued to make his convoy and escort file off. At the same time St. Ignon, who commanded the Austrians, imagined this the moment for attack, and with eleven hundred

dred horse fell on the regiment of Bredow cuirassiers, which he obliged to retreat. In the interim a lieutenant with fifty hussars came up, who had been sent by the king with dispatches for Keith. This brave officer, named Kurz-hagen, fell with his few men with such timely effect on the flank of general St. Ignon that he recovered the cuirassiers. The Prussian cavalry hastened up, and repulsed the Austrians; with the loss of six officers, and three hundred men. Marshal Keith and his column arrived precisely when the enemy was routed, and took the Austrian infantry, which still maintained itself on the heights, in the rear. This hastened the flight of the foe through thick forests, by which his retreat was protected.

While Keith was thus employed with the enemy and his convoys, the king, having gained ground, had arrived on the 11th near Königgrätz. Buccow covered that town with about seven thousand men, whom he had encamped behind the Elbe, and in intrenchments which surrounded the suburbs. When the Prussians came up, some battalions were placed toward Hota, on the Adler, where a battery was erected to take the intrenchments of Buccow in the rear. Another corps, at the same time,

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passed the Adler higher up; and this was to attack the intrenchment on the morrow at break of day. A heavy body of cavalry was intended to have been sent over the Elbe, to cut off the retreat of the Austrians; but the bridges could not be completed till the morning of the 13th, and Buccow did not think proper to wait so long. He evacuated his intrenchment and the town on the same night, and retired toward Clumetz.

The king, having this day been informed that Retzow was attacked at Holitz, marched thither, with a corps of cavalry; but the affair was over, and marshal Keith fortunately conducted the whole artillery employed at Olmutz, with fifteen hundred sick and wounded, beside ammunition and provisions appertaining to the army, to Königsgrätz. As soon as the troops were assembled, they encamped at the confluence of the Adler and the Elbe (the 14th) having the town of Königsgrätz, occupied by six battalions, in their front.

The first care of the king was to disencumber himself of the heavy baggage he had dragged from Olmutz to Königsgrätz; and Fouquet was commanded, with sixteen battalions and as many squadrons, to conduct the artillery, the wounded, and the superfluous waggons, to Glatz.

Glatz. The enemy had some design of harassing the Prussians in their march: Laudon, on the same day, took post with four thousand men in the wood of Opotschna. Intelligence was received of this, and the king, desirous of securing the march of Fouquet for Neustadt, selected some troops, and immediately marched to attack Laudon. The general was in danger of being surprised, but the wood favoured his retreat, and only a hundred Croats were taken. He retired toward Holitz, and the king held the post of Opotschna till Fouquet had tranquilly escorted his convoy to Glatz. Immediately after his arrival (the 16th) he detached the elder Schenkendorf to Reinerz, Golze to the Hunulberg, and occupied the camp of Nachod himself, that he might cover the rear of the army.

The expedition used on this march had given time to effect the arrangements, before marshal Daun could approach the Prussian army. He arrived on the 22d, and encamped on the heights of Cluĕn and Libitschau, beyond the Elbe, while the king was returning from Opotschna, to rejoin the main army. Had the Austrians been his only foes, the campaign would have been ended without quitting Bohemia, except to take winter quarters; but the

invasion with which the Russians menaced Pomerania, and the new March, obliged the king to return with his troops into Silesia, that he might be in readiness to send aid wherever it should be needful. Whatever might secure the frontiers of Silesia constituted a part of this plan; consequently all the forage and provisions of the circle of Königsgrätz were carried off, that Daun might be impeded, for want of magazines, from acting on that side against Silesia. This was in reality become impossible; for he had been obliged, at the commencement of the campaign, to send all his subsistence toward Brunn, and the Prussian army had afterward, on its march, seized on all the magazines he possessed in Bohemia; and finally had consumed the forage of the circle of Königsgrätz.

The camp of Königsgrätz was quitted on the night of the 25th. The pandours attacked the suburbs at the time the troops were departing. General Saldern and colonel Blankenfée were killed there; seventy men were lost. The army of the king retired by Caravalhotta for Rochonitz. Laudon, St. Ignon, and Lascy followed the rear-guard, with about fifteen thousand men; and though they attempted an attack they could not succeed, but were vigorously repulsed by the Puttkammer hussars.

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That the enemy might be robbed of his inclination to harass the rear-guard, an ambuscade was prepared, on the morrow, at the passage of the Metau. A wood which lies on the road, and which runs from Jaromirs to the Metau, was occupied by ten battalions and twenty squadrons; after which the army began its march, and only presented a feeble rear-guard of hussars to the foe. Laudon, who was easily heated, determined on assault; and the cavalry, leaving its ambuscade, fell upon him in every direction. He was very ill treated, and lost three hundred men. After bestowing this trifling correction, the royal army peaceably pursued its march, and encamped between Boruflawitz and Geffnitz.

Retzow was detached to cover the right of the army at the pass of the mountains. (August) He dislodged Janus from Studenitz, and the king occupied the camp of Skalitz. On the ground where the army encamped was a height, upon the right, the possession of which was absolutely necessary. Here the king placed the volunteers of le Noble, as a lure which he presented to the enemy; while six battalions, encamped in a kind of ravin, had orders to support this post, should it be attacked. What had been foreseen happened; Laudon came on the night of the second to surprise le Noble,

but was received in a manner he did not expect, was put to flight, and, without enumerating the dead and wounded, lost six officers and seventy men.

Marshal Daun however had extended his army along the Elbe, so that it proceeded, from Königgrätz to Jaromirs, toward Königshof. The king, on the morrow, encamped at Wisoka, and Retzow at Starkstadt. The march was continued from Wisoka to Politz and Wernersdorf, without being followed by the foe. On the 8th all the troops resumed the camp of Griffau and Landshut.

The expected diversion on the part of the Russians happened during this return through Bohemia. Fermor had advanced in several corps, from Prussia, on the frontiers of Pomerania and the new March. Platen had observed the enemy from Stolpe, where he had remained all winter, with a detachment. On receiving this advice, count Dohna had orders, in the month of June, to raise the blockade of Stralfund, and to approach the Oder, that he might oppose the Russians, let them attempt on what side they would to enter the states of the king. From Posen, Fermor had advanced to Königswald, Meseritz, and Closter Paradies, where he encamped in three corps. Count Dohna had detached

tached Kanitz to Reppen, to observe the enemy; whence Malachowsky marched to Sternberg, from which he dislodged the Russians.

Dohna, who was not sufficiently in force to make many detachments, called in Platen, and only endeavoured to dispute the passage of the Oder with the enemy. To this effect he encamped at Frankfort. The match however was unequal; and, as the least check suffered by the corps of Dohna might become prejudicial to the state, and incur the total ruin of the electoral March, the king determined to repair thither in person, with a reinforcement sufficiently considerable to give the Prussians a kind of equality with the foe. This reinforcement consisted of sixteen battalions and twenty-eight squadrons. The greatest part of the army remained, under the command of marshal Keith and the margrave Charles, in the camp of Landshut, to guard the frontiers of Silesia.

The king directed his march through Ronstock, Lignitz, Hinzendorf, Dakau, Wartenberg, Schertendorf, Croffen and Ziebingen, to Frankfort; where he heard that Fermor, having advanced through Landsberg to Cammin and Tamsel, had bombarded the town of Kustrin (15th) which he had reduced to ashes, after the town had rejected all the propositions of capitu-

lation that general Stoffel had sent to Schack, who was the governor. These attempts of the enemy had induced count Dohna to approach with his corps for the relief of the fortress. It was here, in the camp of Gorgast, on the 22d of August, that the king joined the count. The Russians had drawn their parallels precisely to the end of the causeway which leads from Kustrin to Tamsel, and their batteries were so constructed that the army could not attempt to relieve the place, without being exposed to very considerable and ineffectual losses. The king notwithstanding determined on attack: fight he must, in order to rid himself, for a time, of one enemy that he might turn his arms elsewhere. The king could only employ three weeks in this expedition; and how might he so shortly accomplish his purpose without a battle? Daun, whom he had left at Jaromirs, might in this interval either march toward Silesia or Saxony; and the power of returning to either of these places, as should be found necessary, was requisite. The king therefore thought it would be best to deceive the enemy by appearances. Batteries were constructed opposite Direwitz, and the mounds of the Oder were occupied as if there had been a real intention of passing the river in the vicinage. The king at the same time reinforced the garrison

rison of Kustrin with four battalions: Kanitz he had sent to Wrietzen, to collect all the boats he could find on that part upon the Oder.

While on the night of the 23d the army marched up the Oder to Gustebiese, Kanitz, who there joined the king, had collected sufficient boats for the construction of the bridge; and this was laboured at so effectually that the whole army had passed the river by noon. The march was continued to the village of Clossow, where the king encamped, and by this position cut off the corps of Fermor from that of Romanzow, which was toward Schwedt, where it intended to pass the Oder. On the 24th, the army encamped at Dermitzel, opposite Fermor, who, on the motions of the Prussians, had raised the siege of Kustrin, and had called in the detachment of Czernichef; with which and the main body he took a position between the villages of Quartschen and Zicker, having a marshy rivulet in his van. The Russians encamped in a square, according to the custom introduced by marshal Munich, when he made war in little Tartary against the Turks.

The very day that the Prussian army arrived, (the 25th) the king seized on the mill of Damm, and the bridge over the rivulet. His van-guard took possession of the forest of Massin, which must

must be passed to turn the camp of the enemy. On the morrow the army descended into the plain, in four columns, near the village of Batzellow. The enemy had left their heavy baggage under a small escort between this village and Cammin. Had the king been in less haste he might have easily taken it, and have obliged the Russians by some marches to quit the country : but decision was necessary and every thing was to be hoped, considering the strange plan of battle the enemy had formed.

The army therefore continued its march for Zorndorf, where the king proposed to attack the front opposite to that he had faced when he was at Dermitzel. The Cossacks set fire to Zorndorf, which caused some embarrassment; for the heavy artillery was to pass the village to form batteries in opposition to those of the enemy. The left, destined to make the first attack, was supported by a bottom which goes toward Wilkendorf. Manteufel commanded the first attack, which consisted of ten battalions. He was supported by the left of the first line, under the orders of Kanitz, and by the second line of the army. Some ravins were employed, under the shelter of which the cavalry of the left was placed, protected from the artillery of the enemy, and

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where it remained ready to act, whenever action should be found necessary. The king's commands were that the first attack, continually advancing, should be supported at this ravin, which led directly on the right of the Russians: but, from accident and misconception, it happened that the troops departed from the ravin as they approached the enemy; so that Kanitz, who ought to have been on the rear of Manteufel, was on his right.

The attack was repulsed, and the infantry thrown into much confusion; but, as the enemy was also in disorder, the king ordered Seidlitz instantly to charge. He formed three columns which at the same time pierced the square, and in less than a quarter of an hour the field of battle was cleared of foes. The troops that escaped of the Russian army passed this bottom that it had on its right, and again began to form toward Quartschen. The king then took the infantry of his right, with which he made a quarter wheel, and formed facing the bottom; which his troops were various times sent to pass, but from which they continued quickly to return, without the reason at first being understood. The military chest of the Russians and all the baggage of their generals were in the bottom; and the troops, instead of

marching forward as they might have done, amused themselves with the pillage, from which they returned as soon as they were well loaded. The cavalry could not act here because of the marshes which abounded in the bottom, and the Prussians were reduced to cannonade the enemy, which cannonade continued till the close of night.

The battle began at nine in the morning, and did not end till half past eight in the evening. The Russians retired into the wood of Tamsel, where their whole troops formed a platoon; the cavalry in the centre, surrounded by the infantry. They lost, on this day, a hundred and three field-pieces, twenty-seven pair of colours and standards, eighty-two officers, among whom were five generals, about two thousand prisoners, and at the least fifteen thousand men left dead on the field, for the cavalry gave them no quarter.

The Prussian army here lost general Ziethen, of the cuirassiers; sixty officers dead or wounded, and about twelve hundred men, with twenty pieces of cannon. On the Morrow, the army of the king took a position very near that of the Russian army; they were within twelve hundred paces of each other. Had there been sufficient ammunition another attack would have been made;

made; but it was necessary to remain satisfied with cannonading, and this was not so warm as might have been desired, because it was requisite to husband the powder. Neither of the armies erected their tents. The Russian dragoons attempted an assault on the Prussian infantry, and were ardently repulsed by the regiment of Kreytzen.

During the battle and the succeeding day it was a dreadful spectacle to see all the neighbouring villages in flames, which the Cossacks had set on fire, and who here brought with them every calamity with which the race of man can be afflicted. The Prussian artillery however played with success, for it was almost impossible for the gunners to miss the great mass the enemy formed; while that of the Russians fired without the least effect.

Toward the evening, some little ammunition was received, which the batteries employed to good purpose; for, the ground then becoming insupportable, it was quitted by the Russians, during night, who marched and encamped at Cammin. The king followed: some hundreds of prisoners were taken from their rear-guard; and the Prussians encamped before Tamsel, near the enemy. The loss of the battle obliged Romanzow hastily to quit the vicinage

of the Oder and Stargard, to accelerate his junction with Fermor; who presently retreated to Vietz, and afterward to Landsberg, where he assembled all his forces. The king pursued as far as Blumberg.

While the Prussian army was employed against the Russians, Laudon traversed Lusatia, intending to join the latter, which he would have accomplished, had he not met with prince Francis of Brunswick on his road, whom the king had detached to Beesko, from the camp of Tamfel. The prince, after having taken several parties, obliged the enemy to retire for Lubben. The strongest reasons obliged the king to desist from further pursuit of the advantages he had gained against the Russians. He was obliged to hasten into Saxony, to the aid of prince Henry; and Dohna, in consequence of this new arrangement, remained to face the Russians, while the king departed to join the prince his brother, with the same corps that he had led into the electorate.

The better to understand the chain of events, it is requisite we should give a succinct narration of what had hitherto happened in Saxony. His royal highness had from the month of July occupied the camp of Tschopa, to oppose the troops of the circles, under the prince de Deux-ponts,

ponts, who had been joined by an Austrian corps commanded by Haddick. Prince Henry had driven a detachment of the enemy from the Basberg; and, as the main body of the circles was not yet come up, a partisan war only was carried on, in which the Prussians had the advantage of making prisoners, at different reprisals; one of the most considerable of whom was M. von Mitrowsky, an Austrian general.

(August 2d.) His highness having received news of the approach of a corps of the enemy, commanded by Dombale, that advanced on Zwickau, detached Finck to drive him out of Saxony; in which he was so successful that the enemy was obliged to retreat for Reichenbach. The presence of the prince soon after became necessary in the environs of Dresden, because that the prince de Deuxponts (the 6th) was taking the road of Töplitz, through Bohemia. The army marched by Chemnitz, and established itself at Dippoldiswalda, keeping Hulsen with a detachment at Freyberg, and Knobloch at Maxen. Another corps of the circles having in the interim (20th) taken post at Waldkirchen, it was attacked and beaten by Kleist. But, as Haddick advanced toward Cotta, prince Henry changed his position, assumed the camp of Sedelitz, near Pirna, and garnished the villages

of Zehista and Zuschendorf in his van. The army afterward took the camp of Gamig, which was more convenient.

The prince de Deuxponts presently appeared, and occupied the heights of Struppen, keeping Haddick on his left, which extended from Rothwernsdorf to Cotta. He resolved to take the Sonnenstein, which incommoded his position. For this purpose he ordered some mortars to advance, and Grape, who commanded there, unseasonably surrendered himself a prisoner of war.

During this, marshal Daun had advanced into Lusatia. He had left a detachment of twenty thousand men, under generals Harsch and de Ville, who encamped between Jægerndorf and Troppau. The intention of the marshal was to employ this corps in the siege of Neiss, as soon as the distance of the Prussian army would permit him to undertake the siege. He had hoped the invasion of the Russians would have attracted the whole force of the king; and, as he found himself deceived in this hope, he advanced into Lusatia, to draw the Prussians thither, and give Harsch time to achieve the siege. He advanced to Königsbrück, where he heard of the defeat of the Russians; on which, abandoning any designs he might have on Meissen or Torgau, he retreated for Stolpen. He presently
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sent different detachments on the Elbe, with intent to pass the river at Pilnitz, and come on the back of the Prussians at Gamig, while the prince de Deuxponts and Haddick should attack them in front.

Prince Henry, having received information of these projects, sent the intelligence to the king, which occasioned the rapid march of the monarch to join his brother. Marshal Keith and prince Charles had immediate orders to quit Silesia, and repair to the royal army in Lusatia. Fouquet remained at Landshut, to whom was committed the guard of the passes of Bohemia. The corps of the king departed from Blumberg on the second, and, passing by Manchenau, Mulrose, Trebatz, Lubben, Doberbek, and Elsterwerda, arrived on the 9th at Dobritz, near Grossenhayn, where it was joined by marshal Keith and the margrave, whose corps had passed by Hartmansdorf, Priebus, Moska, Spremberg, and Senftenberg. Werner and Möring, the one at Priebus and the other at Spremberg, had, on their road, beaten two Austrian detachments, and had taken above five hundred prisoners. The army encamped, on the 12th, between Bocksdorf and Reichenberg, where the king held a conference with his high-

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ness, that they might take such measures as were requisite, under the present circumstances. The army began its march, on the same evening, with intent to occupy the heights of Weißig before the enemy. The Austrians had a post at the White Stag, from which it was necessary they should be dislodged. Hither the king directly marched; and Wedel took the road which going from Radeberg would turn that position. The Austrians were forced to retire; and, as soon as the Prussian van had gained the heights of Weißig, it fell on the hussars and dragoons that had repaired thither, to protect the encampment of marshal Daun. Here he had come to trace out a camp for his troops. All these corps were repulsed, and the royal army assumed the camp of Schönfeld, facing the camp of Daun, which extended from Lohmen, through Stolpen, toward Bischofswerder. The communication of the two Prussian armies was immediately secured by bridges over the Elbe. The army of the king arrived in good time; for Lacy was commanded, with all the Austrian grenadiers, to construct a bridge at Pilnitz; and it must be confessed that Daun might have found sufficient time to execute this design before the arrival of the king, had acting with promptitude

promptitude and ardour been any part of his character.

On the day that the army assumed the position of Schönfeld, general Retzow was sent with a detachment to dislodge Laudon from Radeberg, whence he retired for Armsdorf and Fischbach. It was determined again to attack him here, and for this purpose prince Francis, with some battalions, presented himself in his front, while Retzow turned him on the right, and the king on the left. It is probable his corps must have been ruined had these manœuvres been all performed at once; but it generally happens that such projects do but succeed in part. Laudon however lost more than five hundred men; he escaped (27th) through the wood, and occupied the small hills of Harta, where he encamped under the protection of the cannon of marshal Daun.

These trifling advantages were entirely undecided. One of the principal objects in the present circumstances of the king was to remove the Imperial army from the banks of the Elbe. This was difficult to effect, otherwise than by inspiring Daun with fears for the convoys which he drew from Zittau, and thus obliging him to make the wished-for motions. The king quitted his camp of Schönberg, and led his army to

Ramnau, by which the Prussians approached the flank of the foe ; and, to occasion him more quietude, Retzow repaired to Bautzen, where he took post with his corps. Laudon still occupied a height near Bischofswerder, opposite to the Prussian left, which it was determined to take. To this effect the prince of Wurtemberg came on the back of the Austrians, while the king presented himself in front. Laudon did not wait for action, but retreated, in great confusion, beyond Bischofswerder, while the Prussians occupied his camp and the town.

Dauh feared, in his turn, that the position of the Prussians might do him an injury. He had now renounced the projects that had been formed against the army of prince Henry ; he was obliged to approach his subsistence ; and at the same time proposed to choose a post by which he might cut off the Prussians from Silesia, and give Harsch time to besiege and take Neiss. On the 5th of October, the marshal forsook the vicinage of the Elbe, and, passing by Kruse and Neukirch, encamped at Kitlitz, on the heights of Lobau, as far as the Stremberg. The prince of Durlach was posted with his reserve, from Reichenbach and Arnisdorf, toward Doberschutz. On this motion of the enemy, Retzow was sent to occupy the Weissenberg.

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The army marched to Bautzen, whence Wedel was detached, with six battalions and some cavalry, to oppose the Swedes, who had advanced to Pasewalk. From Bautzen the royal army marched (the 10th) toward the enemy, and took a position between Hochkirchen and Kotitz : the head quarters were at Radewitz.

The army was at this time weakened by the departure of the detachment under Wedel, and of the large garrison necessary for Bautzen, to protect the bread against the enterprises of the foe. The king's intention was, by taking the camp of Hochkirchen, to conceal his real design from the Austrians ; which was to join Retzow, posted on the Prussian flank, and, after the junction, to fall upon the prince of Durlach, on the side of Debitsch, which could not be executed sooner than the night of the 14th, because that subsistence for the army could not be sooner provided and arranged. A part of the convoy however came up on the 12th ; marshal Keith, who was with it, was attacked on the road by Laudon, who was repulsed with the loss of eighty men. The prince of Lichtenstein, lieutenant-colonel in the Löwenstein regiment, was among the prisoners. After this affair, Laudon, having assembled his dispersed troops, took post in a wood which was a long quarter of a league,

German measure, beyond the Prussian right, facing the village of Hochkirchen: a marshy bottom separated the flank of the king from these heights.

The battle, of which we shall immediately speak, obliges us to enter into a circumstantial description of the ground, occupied by the two armies. The village of Hochkirchen, where the right of the king was supported, stands on an eminence. A church-yard, with a thick stone wall, capable of containing a battalion, overlooks the whole country. The village extending in length formed a natural flank for the army, and was garnished with six battalions. A battery of fifteen pieces was erected at the angle of the front and the flank. Before the van of the line ran a rivulet between rocky banks: below the height of Hochkirchen was a windmill and some cottages, where a free battalion had been placed to defend the passage, which was the more certain because it was under the protection of the Prussian artillery of the head quarters, toward Radewitz. A part of the camp passed the rivulet, because of the heights which it was necessary to occupy, and of the communication with the corps of Retzow, which was secured and the road abridged, by this position.

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The right of marshal Daun, as we have said, was supported on the Stremberg ; his centre was on impregnable heights ; his left inclined toward Jauernick and Sornitz. Daun secretly prepared roads for four columns, that led to the wood of which Laudon had taken possession. His intention was to attack the Prussian army in four parts at once ; that is to say, from the post of Laudon ; at the mill occupied by the free battalion ; from that part toward Kottitz which lay beyond the rivulet ; and the fourth attack was to be made, by the prince of Durlach, on the post of the Weissenberg, where Retzow commanded.

It was on the night of the 13th of October that the marshal executed his plan. The attack of the mill and the free battalion was the first, which the enemy carried without any great difficulty. Laudon, having at the same time found means to glide with his pandours on the back of the army, set fire to the village of Hochkirchen, which obliged it to be abandoned by the Prussian battalions. Amid this confusion, the enemy seized on the battery which was at the angle of the village, while the brave major Lange, with a battalion of the margrave Charles, threw himself into the church-yard of Hochkirchen. The men had only time to run to

arms, and not sufficient to strike their tents. The king heard the firing of artillery, and, though he received no intelligence, immediately took three brigades from the centre, with which he marched to the right. The darkness was so great that it was impossible to see a step in advance. It was soon perceived that the enemy was master of the Prussian grand battery, because the cannon balls flew into the camp, and this would have been impossible from the Austrian batteries. The glare of light from the flames of Hochkirchen aided the Prussian dispositions. The king came on the rear of his camp to turn this village. On his march, the men fell in with a corps of Austrian grenadiers, three hundred of whom were taken; but, in the confusion of the battle, not having men enough to guard them, most of them escaped. The Prussian infantry turned Hochkirchen, and began to repulse the Austrians, when it was itself repulsed by some squadrons of the foe, that could not be distinguished in the dark. The gendarmes and the regiment of Vasold made a vigorous charge; all whom they encountered gave way: but, unable to guide themselves amid the darkness, they fell upon the infantry posted at the wood which Laudon had occupied the day before. Here was the whole artillery of the Austrians, with

with the infantry, well and advantageously established. The cannon firing case-shot forced the Prussian cavalry to retire to the infantry.

Marshal Keith and prince Maurice of Anhalt, on the other side, endeavoured to recover the battery that was lost. They put themselves at the head of some battalions to traverse the village of Hochkirchen, the road through which is narrow; seven men can scarcely march a-breast there; and as they left it they found themselves so considerably out-winged, by the Austrians, that they could neither form nor lead their troops to the charge, but were soon obliged to retreat. Marshal Keith was killed, general Geist mortally wounded, and prince Maurice dangerously. Though different attempts were made to pass the village, there were no means of succeeding, the conflagration was so great, and the battle was lost.

In order to cover the retreat, the king sent Retzow orders to join him incessantly. This general had thrice repulsed the prince of Dur-lach. As the latter could not attack him but by marching through a defile, Retzow suffered as many enemies to come up as he pleased, after which he charged and overthrew them, with considerable loss, at the place where they left the defile. This manœuvre had been three times

times repeated when he received orders to join the king. He arrived seasonably for the left of the Prussians, which the king had been obliged to disgarnish that he might succour the right, but not soon enough to prevent the battalion of Kleist being surrounded by the enemy, and constrained to lay down their arms. The right of the army was supported, in despite of the efforts of the foe to pass the village of Hochkirchen.

The battle had begun at four o'clock ; at ten the church-yard was carried ; the village and the battery already were lost ; the enemy was too well established to be dislodged ; the heavy corps of cavalry came on the back of the army ; and Retzow had abandoned the Weissenberg. Under these circumstances the position of the army might no longer be maintained, and nothing remained but retreat. The cavalry first descended into the plains, to cover the march of the infantry, and the infantry then took the road for Doberschutz, where the camp was marked out, and the corps of Retzow constituted the rear-guard of the army. The Austrian cavalry several times attacked the Prussians, but was vigorously repulsed by Seidlitz, and the prince of Wurtemberg. The camp the army assumed was good, near Bautzen, surrounded

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by a double marshy ditch, and was upon hills which were not overlooked on any side. Marshal Daun, the same day, returned into his former camp, and did not appear to have obtained a victory.

We have already said the Prussians lost persons highly worthy to be regretted, because of their great merit. Such were marshal Keith, prince Francis of Brunswick, and general Geist. Most of the generals were either hurt or wounded ; as were the king, the margrave Charles, and many others whom it would be too tedious to name. The army was deprived of three thousand men, chiefly infantry, and of the prisoners it had taken. Only one general, named Vitteleschi, and seven hundred men remained.

While these events passed in Lusatia, generals de Ville and Harsch kept Neiss closely blockaded. Information was received that a train of a hundred pieces of artillery and forty mortars were to leave Olmutz for Silesia. Combining these preparations with the effect which the battle gained must produce on the minds of the Austrians, it was easy to predict the siege of Neiss would be the result. The place was too important for the king not to employ all imaginable means for its salvation. The siege however could not be raised except by marching an army

army into Silesia. It was difficult to avoid deranging affairs in one country, while endeavouring to re-establish them in another. At length, intelligence being obtained that the Russians had abandoned Stargard, and directed their march through Reez and Calies for Poland, the king took the following measures. He sent for his brother, with ten battalions and some artillery, to replace that which had been lost. Count Dohna received orders to march into Saxony, and only to leave a corps in Pomerania, under the command of Platen, to succour Colberg, which was besieged by fifteen thousand Russians, under Palmbach. He was commanded to direct his march for Torgau, that he might thence turn on whichever side his presence should be most necessary. Finck took the command of the remainder of the corps of prince Henry which held the camp of Gamig.

While these orders were dispatched, Daun advanced, and encamped near the army of the king. A detachment covered his flank at Buchwald; his right was supported at Cannewitz, whence the line extended by Belgern, Wurchen, and Dresla, in a semicircular form, through Grubschutz and Strela. The reserve was posted at Hochkirchen. However formidable might be the aspect of these troops, the Prussians had

the less to fear because that scarcely had the Austrians assumed this position before they intrenched themselves to the very teeth. The two points which merited most serious attention were the preservation of Bautzen, where the subsistence and ovens of the army were, and the mill of Malschwitz, which was on a height, and which the enemy must not be suffered to possess.

The king guarded the town of Bautzen, against the attempts of the Austrians, by an intermediate corps, which he placed between that town and his right; but to the mill, at the extremity of the left, he only sent some hussars, that the enemy might not perceive how important this post was to the Prussians. The reason of acting thus was that the mill was a quarter of a mile from the left, so that keeping the position of the army it could not be maintained, because of its distance; and the reason of its importance was that, on the meditated march of the king, he could not gain Görlitz before Daun, if his columns did not pass at the foot of this mill, where if the enemy had placed any troops he must have crossed the Spree behind his camp, and re-passed it lower down, by which his army must have made a circuit of two miles. Marshal Daun, in the mean

meantime imagined that the king, when he should hear of the siege of Neiss, could find no other expedient to gain Silesia than that of attacking him; and this was the reason of his assuming the position of Cannewitz and Wurchen, and of his intrenching himself. That so it was is apparent from the letter he wrote to Harsch, in which he says, “ continue your siege in tranquillity; I shall detain the king; he is cut off from Silesia; and, should he attack me, you will hear a good account of him.” It happened very different to the suppositions of the marshal.

Prince Henry with his detachment departed from Gamig, passed through Marienschein, and on the 21st arrived at the royal army, without encountering any foe on his route. Every preparation for the march could not be made sooner than the 24th, and the same evening the army was in motion. The garrison of Bautzen served as an escort to the army provisions. This corps began its march on the preceding night, and passed through Kumerau, Neudorf, Trauben, and Culmen. The army proceeded in two columns. The rear-guard formed on the right of the windmill, whence it took the road for Leichnau and Ischmitz, entirely turning the right of the enemy. It afterward inclined

toward Weyersdorf, and from thence for Ullersdorf, where the army encamped. Möring, who led the van-guard of the baggage, surprised three hundred Austrian horse, near Ullersdorf, few of whom escaped ; and the column of the king having, near Weyersdorf, (the 25th) fell in with a battalion of pandours, who did not suppose any enemy near, this battalion was totally destroyed.

On the morrow (the 26th) the army was in motion before break of day, that it might gain Görlitz sooner than marshal Daun. The van-guard of hussars and dragoons arrived here first, and found a corps of cavalry behind a defile, on the side of Rauchertswalde, which, in a situation so advantageous, it was impossible to attack. Every attempt was made by skirmishing to engage it to combat, but ineffectually. Information was brought by a deserter that this was a corps of carabiniers and horse-grenadiers, commanded by a Spanish general named Ayassas ; and on hearing this it was resolved to insult his Spanish pride, that he might be engaged to pass the defile, and suffer himself to be beaten. To this effect he was provoked by the hussars ; and the Spaniard passed the defile in a fury, and fell upon those whom he supposed had treated him with

with contempt. The dragoons immediately charged and drove his troops back into the very defile he had so imprudently passed. He lost eight hundred men, whom the Prussians took, and escaped under the hill of Landskron, where the prince of Durlach had lately come up with the reserve under his command. The infantry of the Prussian van-guard arrived at the same time, and was employed to seize on Görlitz, which surrendered without any great difficulty. The army of the king here supported its left; its right extended to Girbiedorf and Ebersbach. The flank was covered by a muddy rivulet which runs in a valley; the side of which opposite the Prussians was steep.

The Austrians arrived in the afternoon. Daun extended his army behind the Landskron, from Offen toward Marckersdorf. The king was obliged to keep his camp, that he might employ some days in the arrangement of subsistence, so that the army was not again in motion before the 30th. The troops decamped by night to pass the Neisse, before intelligence should be gained by the enemy. Laudon was found in ambush in the wood of Schönberg. This was a light march to the Prussians, because the baggage and provisions had taken the route of Naum-

Naumburg-am-Queis. The rear-guard was attacked near Schönberg, and the whole route was one battle. Laudon was encouraged by a reinforcement of twelve thousand men, that had been sent him by Daun. Prince Henry, who commanded the rear, made such excellent dispositions, by reciprocally supporting the brigades, and timely replacing them, in order to receive those that retired to continue their march, that time only was lost. Lieutenant-general Bulow and about two hundred soldiers were indeed wounded; but there were not at the most above fifteen men killed.

It was necessary to throw bridges over the Queis, at Lauban, which occasioned the loss of the day. On the 1st of November the army took the road for Silesia. Preparations were particularly made to give the enemy a good reception on the rear; for his force was sufficient to merit this attention. The two wings of the Prussian camp were on the summits of two mountains, each of which ended toward the Queis. The more Lauban was approached the more these heights commanded that of the camp. A separate rear-guard was formed on each of them. The king was on the hill of the right,

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the margrave on that of the left; the hussars were placed in the bottom between these two corps of infantry, to act as occasion should require. Behind these, brigades of infantry and artillery, in gradation, occupied the prevailing heights, that each corps, as it retired, might march under the protection of another.

On the first motion of retreat made by the Prussians, Laudon ardently hastened to fall on the rear-guard, and was nearly taken by the hussars. He was desirous of being the first to occupy the ground the king had quitted, and here his artillery was brought. But the heavy fire from the Prussian batteries dismounted his guns, put his infantry into disorder, and obliged him to fly. He three times endeavoured to renew this manœuvre, but always without effect; a reception similar to the first afforded similar obstacles, till at length the hussars of Puttkammer, in ambuscade, left the wood, fell upon his troops, and for that day disgusted him with disturbing the march of the Prussians.

His highness, who had taken post on the opposite shore of the Queis, there received the rear-guard; after which he parted with the king his brother. The monarch marched through Löwenberg, Pombsen, Jauernick, and Girelsdorf,

dorf, to Nossen; and prince Henry to Landshut, on the 6th, where he relieved general Fouquet, who joined the king on his route to Neiss.

The siege of Neiss had been begun by Harsch on the 20th of October. He had directed his attack on the fort of Prussia, lying toward Heidersdorf. The second parallel that was finished was at the distance of thirty fathoms from the covered way, and the batteries were all mounted. Although Daun had sent him succours by the way of Silberberg, the Austrians raised the siege on the rumour of the approach of the king. Treskow, the governor of Neiss, profited by the moment, and made a sally, on which occasion the enemy lost eight hundred men. Harsch and dé Ville hastily retired, passed the Neisse, and retreated through Ziegenhals to Jægerndorf, leaving a considerable quantity of ammunition in the environs of Neiss, which they wanted time to remove.

Fouquet followed the enemy into upper Silesia, and took post at Neustadt, where he could observe them the best. Scarcely had the troops arrived in the vicinage of Neiss before the king undertook a new expedition. After the Prussians had left Lusatia, marshal Daun, on the 4th of October, had taken the road of

the Elbe; which river he passed on the 7th, and encamped at Pirna. Finck, who had remained at Gemich (Gamig) during the absence of prince Henry, was unable to maintain this post against an enemy so superior in numbers. He retreated to the Windberg, and thence for Kesseldorf; while Daun detached the troops of the circles toward Eulenburg, Torgau, and Leipsic. Count Dohna was on his march in these parts. The Russians as we have said had taken the road for Poland, general Palmbach excepted, who, with a detachment of some thousands of men, had laid siege to Colberg. This Russian general had been active on the 26th and 27th of October. He gave successive assaults on the covered way, and was each time vigorously repulsed. A new attack was prepared for the 29th, and the Russians had even placed boats, by means of which they hoped to pass the great moat, and take the place by storm. Count Dohna having sent Platen to the succour of Colberg, this general beat a corps of observation placed by the Russians near Greiffenberg; after which he advanced to Treptow. His arrival made Palmbach conceive a dislike to sieges and assaults; and he retired, by Cöflin and Bublitz, into Poland. The trenches were opened on the 3d, and the

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town was relieved on the 29th of October. The governor, Heyden, distinguished himself during the siege by his good order, vigilance, and fortitude.

Count Dohna called in Wedel to his army, who had acted against the Swedes, had beaten them at Fehrbellin, had driven them through Ruppin, beyond Prenzlow, had taken an entire detachment of Hessenstein in the lordship of M. von Arnim, and had been every where attended by victory. He was relieved by Manteufel, who had fewer troops; and during the march into Saxony, Wedel conducted the van-guard of Dohna.

When Haddick arrived near Torgau, on the 12th, the Prussian van-guard appeared there at the same time. Haddick retreated through the wood for Eulenburg. (15th) Wedel followed his footsteps, and, though the bridges of the Elster were broken down, the Prussian cavalry forded the river, and fell so seasonably on the foe that Haddick lost two hundred men, and three field pieces. Count Dohna followed Wedel from Eulenburg, and advanced on Leipsic, which the army of the circles had invested. The prince de Deuxponts, intimidated by the check Haddick had sustained, did not wait the approach of the Prussians, but

raised the siege, and hastily retired for Colditz. He thence turned toward Plauen, and went to take quarters in the empire, on the side of Hof and Baireuth.

While the prince de Deuxponts and Hadick fled to gain the empire, marshal Daun approached Dresden. The Prussian corps, too much exposed at Kesseldorf, passed the Elbe and encamped in the suburb of new Dresden, between the Fischhaus and the Scheunens. Schmettau, the governor of Dresden, perceiving the Austrians were preparing to seize on the suburb of Pirna, set it on fire. Daun was careful of the royal children, who were in the city, otherwise it is to be presumed he would have been more enterprizing; the moats of the place however were good.

The king had quitted Silesia; his van-guard was at the Weissenberg; so that the governor might safely expect the arrival of aid. The return of the king deranged the projects of marshal Daun. Count Dohna had expelled the army of the circles, the season was advanced, and the royal army might in three days be at the gates of Dresden. These various considerations inspired Daun with the wish to retreat. He decamped, on the 15th, for Grunau and Leibnitz, and returned into

Bohemia,

Bohemia, where he sent his troops into winter quarters.

On the news of his departure the margrave Charles, who was with the main army, at Görlitz, received orders to return with the troops into Silesia. The king, who was at the Weissenberg, advanced to Dresden; where arrangements were taken for winter quarters. Count Dohna returned into Pomerania and Mecklenbourg. Hulsen took post at Freyberg, on the frontiers of Bohemia. Itzenplitz commanded at Zwickau, and a line was drawn in Silesia along the Bohemian frontiers, from Greiffenberg to Glatz. Fouquet occupied Jægerndorf, Leobschutz, Neustadt, and the environs.

We have but slightly noticed the campaign of the Swedes, to whom only detachments from the garrison of Stettin had been opposed, till the time that the king sent the corps under Wedel, from the camp of Ramnau in Lusatia. The prowess of the Swedes consisted in penetrating into the open country, when and where they found no opposition. A feeble detachment reduced them to the defensive; and, far from making conquests, they thought themselves exceedingly happy to find they were

permitted during the winter to canton in the vicinity of Stralsund.

We have in like manner silently passed over some detachments sent by his royal highness, at the beginning of the spring, toward Bareuth and Bamberg. Driesen and Meyer headed these petty expeditions, the end of which was to retard the operations of the army of the circles, and to spread terror among such of the princes of Germany as had declared against the king.

If we take a summary view of this campaign, we shall find that it is distinguished from other campaigns by the number of the sieges that were raised. There were but two places taken; Schweidnitz by the Prussians, and the Sonnenstein by the troops of the empire. The king raised the siege of Olmutz; the Russians the sieges of Kustrin and of Colberg; the Austrians those of Neiss and of Dresden; and the troops of the circles those of Torgau and of Leipsic.

After the close of this long and fatiguing campaign, the king, having caused the works of the Sonnenstein to be raised, returned into Silesia, and fixed his head quarters at Breslau.

C H A P. IX.

The Winter of 1758 to 1759.

THE royal family this year lost two illustrious persons; the one was the prince of Prussia, who fell into a decline, and was carried off, at the beginning of June, by a suffocating catarrh, at the time that the Prussians besieged Olmutz. The goodness of his heart and intelligent mind spoke a future mild and happy government, and made him regretted.

The margravess of Bareuth was the second; a princess of uncommon merit, with a cultivated understanding, a mind adorned with very superior knowledge, a genius apt at all things, and a singular talent for the arts. These happy gifts of nature form, however, the least part of her eulogy. Her excellent qualities, her generous and benevolent inclinations, her noble elevation of soul, the gentleness of her character, all united in her the brilliant advantages of wit to the unshaken virtues of the heart; virtues which she never falsified. She often suffered ingratitude from those on whom she had heaped wealth and favours; but there is no

example of her having deceived any person. The king and this worthy sister were in habits of the most tender and constant friendship, from love that was formed in early infancy, that had been strengthened by the same education, the same feelings, and which fidelity unshaken rendered indissoluble. This princess, whose health was feeble, was so highly affected by the dangers that threatened her family, that grief completed the ruin of her constitution. Her disease soon became evident; the physicians knew it to be a confirmed dropfy. Their remedies were ineffectual; they could not aid her. She died, on the 14th of October 1758, with a courage and fortitude of soul worthy the highest philosophy; and on the very day on which the king was beaten at Hochkirchen by the Austrians.

The Romans would not have failed to have attributed some fatality to this day, thus marked by two of misfortune's strokes, that at once fell so heavy on the king. In this enlightened age men have recovered from such stupid errors as would induce us to believe one day can be more or less fortunate than another. The life of man hangs but by a hair; the gain or loss of a batle depends but on a trifle. Our destinies are one continued chain of second causes, which,

which, in the multitude of events that they lead to, must necessarily produce good and evil fortune.

In this year terminated the pontificate of pope Benedict, the least superstitious, and the best informed, of any of the pontiffs who long had sat on the episcopal throne. The French, Spanish, and Austrian factions elected Rezzonico, the Venetian, to be his successor; who took the name of Clement XIII. The difference of the genius of these two popes was the more evident to the public because Clement, though he might be a good priest, wanted the talents necessary to the sovereigns of Rome, by which they should govern their states and the catholic church. The first steps of his pontifical government were all false. He sent marshal Daun a consecrated toqua,* and a sanctified sword, for having beaten the Prussians at Hochkirchen; though such presents, according to the custom of the Roman court, are made only to generals who have vanquished pagan nations, or have civilized barbarians. His conduct, therefore, necessarily embroiled him with the king of Prussia, to whom he ought to have paid respect, because of the great number of catholic sub-

* A kind of cap. T.

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jects that were settled in the states under his domain.

This pope had more important disputes with the king of Portugal, relative to the Jesuits, who had made war on the Spaniards and Portuguese in Paraguay, and had even beaten them. After the quarrel, the king of Portugal no longer thought proper to confide the secrets of his conscience, and of his government, to the members of a society that had acted as the enemy of his kingdom. He dismissed the Jesuit who had been his ghostly father, and chose a confessor from another order. The Jesuits, to revenge this affront, which was to them a matter of the more consequence because the conduct of the king might be imitated by other monarchs, caballed in the state, and excited all the grandees of the kingdom, over whom they had any influence, against the government. Father Malagrida, animated by a more ardent zeal, a more theological hatred, than his brethren, accomplished a conspiracy, by his intrigues, against the life of the king, of the members of which the duke d'Aveiros declared himself the chief.

This duke, knowing the king was to take an airing in his coach, concealed the conspirators on the road where the monarch was to pass.

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The coachman was killed at the first fire, and at the second the king had his arm broken. The secret of the conspiracy was long after discovered by letters, which the chiefs of the party had written to Brazil, there to raise an insurrection. The duke d'Aveiros and his accomplices were arrested; they unanimously deposed that the crime had been suggested to them by the Jesuits, who were the instigators of all that had happened.

The king wished to inflict an exemplary punishment on the authors of this abominable plot. His just resentment, armed by the laws, and sustained by the tribunals of the realm, was ready to burst forth against the Jesuits. The pope undertook their defence, and openly opposed the course of justice. These fathers were however banished the kingdom, and went to Rome, where they were received, not as rebels and traitors, but as martyrs heroically suffering for the faith. Never did the court of Rome give such cause of scandal. However vicious the pontiffs had been, whom preceding ages had detested, not one of them had openly declared himself the protector of crimes and murderers.

The ill-judged conduct of the pope appeared to influence the whole clergy. The holy toqua
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that he had sent to marshal Daun excited a capricious zeal among the ecclesiastical princes of Germany. The elector of Cologn, among others, issued an edict in his states, by which he forbade his protestant subjects, under severe punishment, to rejoice for the advantages which the Prussians or their allies might gain over their enemies. The fact, which of itself is deserving of little notice, merits to be cited, because that it characterises the absurdity of manners in an age in which reason has, in other respects, made so great a progress. But these farces, which were acted by petty courts, were attended with no consequences except the hisses of the public; whereas the passions that agitated the great courts of Europe produced scenes more fatally tragical.

We have seen that not long since the abbé de Bernis became minister for foreign affairs at Versailles, and was soon created a cardinal, for having signed the treaty of Vienna. So long as his own fortune was in question, all ways for the accomplishment of this were equal to him; but, when he saw himself established, he endeavoured to maintain himself in his employment by conduct and principles less variable, and in greater conformity to the permanent interests of the state. His views all were turned to the

procuring of peace, in order to terminate a war from which he could foresee nothing but disadvantage; and, on the other part, to release his nation from a forced alliance, the burthen of which was borne by France, and the fruits and utility of which were all gathered and enjoyed by the house of Austria. Addressing himself to England, by clandestine and secret means, he there began a negotiation for peace; but the marchioness de Pompadour was of a contrary opinion, and he immediately saw himself arrested in his career. By his acts of imprudence he had raised himself; by his sage views he was ruined. He was disgraced for having spoken of peace; and sent an exile into the bishopric of Aix.

The duke de Choiseul, a native of Lorraine, ambassador from France to the court of Vienna, son of M. de Stainville, ambassador from the emperor at Paris, became the minister for foreign affairs, in lieu of the disgraced cardinal. He signalized his entrance into the ministry by a new treaty of alliance, which he concluded with the court of Vienna; a copy of which we have given at the end of the chapter, that we might not interrupt the connexion of the narrative. Whoever reads it will perceive the ascendancy which the court of Vienna had acquired over that of Versailles, and which as it proceeded did but increase.

increase. Not satisfied with the disadvantageous treaty that he had concluded with the empress queen, the duke de Choiseul commanded the *Académie des Inscriptions*, in the name of the king, to strike a medal which should eternize the memory of that event.

The two courts stopped not here: they employed their common credit at the court of Petersburg, to inflame the hatred of the empress, Elizabeth, against the king of Prussia. They remonstrated to her that it became her to wash out the stain her honour had received at Zondorf, by sending an army more numerous into the field, on the approaching spring. Her favourite incessantly repeated that, in order to change the contempt of the Prussians for the Russians into terror, it was necessary she should command her generals to act with greater vigour, and to follow on all occasions the advice they should receive from the allied powers. These insinuations were conducive to the purpose which the court of Vienna had in view; that is, to make her allies encounter all the perils of war, and to husband all its advantages for herself.

The king of Poland was a party in all these intrigues. He not only embittered the court of Petersburg against that of Berlin but, wishing
likewise

likewise to gain from the friendship of the empress Elizabeth advantages in favour of his family, he solicited her aid for the procuring of the dutchy of Courland, in favour of his third son, prince Charles. The empress, desirous of obliging the Saxons, gave her consent; and Augustus II. invested his son with this duchy. The new duke repaired to Petersburg, to return the empress thanks for the grant. But this prince, restless and ardent, took part in all the cabals of the court: his proceedings embroiled him with the grand duke and dutchess, whose hatred he incurred, and which finally occasioned his ruin.

While the empress of Russia bestowed duchies and appropriated kingdoms, she herself was not without apprehensions. She dreaded lest the English, the allies of Prussia, dissatisfied with the conduct the Russians had held toward them from the commencement of the war, should send a fleet into the Baltic, and burn the port of Cronschlott. To prevent any such attempts, her ministers negotiated a treaty of association with the crowns of Sweden and Denmark, in order to interdict the passage of the Sound to foreign fleets. This convention, in which the Swedes found their advantage, and to which

the subsidies of France obliged the Danes to consent, was hastily concluded between the three powers.

England troubled herself little concerning the measures the powers of the north were taking, to forbid her squadrons an entrance into the Baltic. She ruled over the ocean, and in every other sea was mistress; without disturbing herself either concerning the Baltic or the Sound. Admiral Boscawen and general Amherst had taken Cape Breton; Keppel had conquered the island of Goree on the coast of Africa. The Indies presented spoils far different from any to be found on the shores of Denmark, Sweden, or Russia.

This great progress of the English did not ease the king of the load under which he laboured, nor secure his crown from impending perils. He had in vain requested a squadron of the English, to cover his ports in the Baltic, menaced by the fleets of Russia and of Sweden. His ambassador Rexin, at the Porte, was continually traversed in his negotiation by Mr. Porter, the ambassador of Great Britain. The new emperor of the Turks was destitute of education, ignorant of business, and timid to an extreme; as well from the dread of being dethroned as from that of the ill success of his arms, should he engage

engage in a war with the house of Austria. How great soever the sums were that were sent to this court, whatever mode of corruption was attempted, affairs were but little advanced thereby, for the Austrians and French scattered their money and made their presents with the same profusion; and the Turks found it more to their interest to receive rewards for remaining quiet than for becoming active.

The ineffectual efforts which the king had made, at the Porte, progressively confirmed him that he had nothing to expect from foreign aid, and that he must recur to his own proper resources. His whole attention was turned toward his army. All the men that could be obtained were raised; arms and horses were distributed, and the troops were provisioned, in order, during the ensuing campaign, to oppose the multifarious foes, whom Prussia had to combat, by a well conditioned and numerous army.

*Extract from the Treaty of Alliance concluded
at Versailles, on the 30th of December,
1758, between the Empress Queen and the
King of France.*

This treaty appears to have been concluded in opposition to the convention of subsidy, which had been signed on the 11th of April, the same year, between the courts of Prussia and England. Mention of this is even made in the preamble, and it is there said in so many words,

That, as the tranquillity of Germany must not hope for re-establishment, except by enfeebling the pernicious power of the king of Prussia, the most christian king and the empress queen had thought proper to strengthen the ties of their union by a treaty, confirming the treaty of Versailles of the 1st of May 1756; that they might concert measures the most proper to oblige the aggressor to give satisfaction to the injured, and security for the future, and that they might permanently establish the repose of Germany, by reducing the king of Prussia within such bounds as no longer should permit him, at the will of his ambition, and of that of England, to trouble the general tranquillity, as well as the tranquillity of his neighbours.

They

They then proceed to the treaty itself, which contains the following articles :

ART. I. The two parties confirm the treaty of Versailles, of the 1st of May 1756, which they make the basis of the present convention.

II. The king of France promises, during the whole course of the present war, to furnish the empress queen with a succour of eighteen thousand foot and six thousand horse, either in men or money, which shall be at the choice of the empress queen.

III. The succour in money is fixed at three millions four hundred and fifty-six thousand florins per annum.

IV. The king of France singly undertakes to pay the subsidy of Sweden.

V. He promises to maintain the corps of Saxon troops ; and that it shall be at the disposal of the empress queen, whenever she shall make the demand.

VI. The two parties engage to procure the king of Poland, elector of Saxony, not only restitution of his estates but also a proportionate indemnification.

VII. The king of France promises to employ a hundred thousand men in Germany, to cover the Austrian low countries and the states of the empire.

VIII. The

VIII. The safety of the coasts of Flanders rendering it necessary that the towns of Ostend and Nieuport should be secured from all insult, and the most christian king being desirous of undertaking the defence of these two places, they shall remain confided to the guard of his troops, so long as the present war between France and England shall continue; but this arrangement, which is solely relative to the security of the aforesaid places, is not to be any way prejudicial to the right of sovereignty of the empress queen.

IX. The king of France however promises to give up the towns of Nieuport and Ostend, even before he makes peace with England, if it shall so be ultimately agreed.

X. The countries conquered from the king of Prussia shall be governed and administered in the name, and by the commissaries, of the empress queen; but the revenues shall appertain to the most christian king, with the exception of forty thousand florins, to be deducted for the expences of administration.

XI. The two parties engage to terminate any individual discussion they may have, in an amicable manner.

XII. The most christian king promises to make every effort during the war, and to employ in

in the conferences for peace his most efficacious good offices, in order that, in the treaty to be concluded between the empress queen and the king of Prussia, the duchy of Silesia, and the county of Glatz, shall be ceded and ascertained to the house of Austria; and he previously undertakes to guarantee all that shall be stipulated on that head, between the empress queen and the king of Prussia.

XIII. The two parties engage to conclude neither peace nor truce with their common enemies, except in perfect concert. The king of France promises to conclude neither peace nor truce with the king of England, without stipulating with him that he shall employ all his efforts to engage the king of Prussia to grant her Imperial majesty just and honourable conditions; or at least, not without obliging the king of England to promise he will afford no further aid to the king of Prussia; and the empress queen engages to make neither peace nor truce with the king of Prussia but on the same conditions.

XIV. For the security of the protestant states, the treaty of Westphalia is confirmed; and it is agreed to invite the crown of Sweden to accede to the present treaty.

XV. The empress queen renounces her right of reversion to the duchies of Parma, Pla-

centia, and Guastalla, in favour of the male descendants of the infant don Philip.

XVI. The two parties engage to act in concert with the duke of Parma and the court of the king of the two Sicilies, to fix the order of succession in the kingdom of the Sicilies.

XVII. In return for the renunciation made in the XVth article, the most christian king promises to employ his good offices to induce the king of Naples to cede to the emperor his pretensions on the allodial property of the houses of Medicis and Farnese.

XVIII. The infant duke of Parma renounces his pretensions on the allodial property of the houses of Medicis and Farnese, as well as on the towns of Bozzolo and Sabionetta.

XIX. The most christian king promises to concur, by his good offices, in promoting the election of the archduke, Joseph, to be king of the Romans, in a manner conformable to the constitutions of the empire.

XX. The two parties agree to take no measures relative to the future election of a king of Poland but by common consent; and, their purposes being only to maintain the liberties of the Polish nation, they declare, from this time, should the free choice of the republic happen to

fall

fall on a prince of the house of Saxony, they will afford it their best support.

XXI. The empress queen having, with the duke of Modena, agreed on the marriage of the archduke Leopold with the princess of Modena, and wishing to request from the emperor and the empire the reversion of the feudal succession of Modena, in favour of the archduke Leopold, on condition that the states of Modena never shall be united to the collective states of the house of Austria, the king of France promises to promote the marriage, by his good offices.

XXII. The emperor, the empress of Russia, and the kings of Sweden and Poland, shall be invited to accede to this treaty.

The two, last as well as the three separate articles, contain nothing but simple formalities.

END OF PART I.